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Section 3 of the Act regulates the exercise of the power and performance of duties by the 
Commissioner. Sections 74 - 80 regulate the power of the Commissioner to issue assessments and 
to investigate matters related thereto. Sections 81 - 88 govern objections to and appeal against 
assessments. In chapter four the administrative law relationship between the taxpayer and the 
Commissioner will be examined with reference to the abovementioned sections of the Act in 
order determine how the discretionary powers contained in these provisions are controlled by 
reference to the jurisdictional facts which are contained in these sections. 
Generally, the taxpayer must enforce his remedy against the commissioner before a court of law. 
There is uncertainty as to the powers of the Special Court. This is examined in chapter five. 
1.2 Introduction 
In this chapter, the regulation of discretionary powers by 'rule based administrative action' and by 
'adjudicative techniques of decision' is examined generally. The control of discretionary power by 
ministerial responsibility is also canvassed generally in this chapter. 
More specifically the following is canvassed in this chapter : 
(a) What is Administrative Law, and why is it essential to examine the background of 
Administrative Law in a thesis which is concerned with the regulation of discretionary 
powers? 
(b) The meaning of discretionary power and the reason why discretionary power is essential 
in a society. 
( c) The regulation of the exercise of discretionary power with reference to the distinction 
between rule based administrative action and adjudicative techniques of decision. 
(d) The relationship between the collection of income tax (and a fortiori the exercise by 
officials of the Commissioner's office of their discretionary powers) and that which has 
been stated in (a), (b) and (c) above. 
1.3 What is administrative law 
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1.1 Subject of this thesis 
1.1.1 The regulation of discretionary power 
There is an administrative law relationship between the taxpayer and the Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Commissioner') The basis of this relationship is that the 
Commissioner is required to collect tax and the taxpayer is required to pay the tax. In exercising his 
powers under the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the 
Commissioner has been conferred with discretionary powers. In this thesis, this administrative law 
relationship is examined with specific reference to the means of regulating the exercise by the 
Commissioner of his discretionary powers. 
There are a number of ways in which the discretionary powers of the Commissioner may be 
regulated. Generally discretion may be regulated by 'rule based administrative action' (1). This 
means that discretionary power is exercised subject to internal rules which state how discretionary 
power must be exercised. Another method of regulating the exercise of discretionary power is 
subsumed under the category of 'adjudicative techniques of decision' (2). The essence of the latter 
category is that the affected person participates in the decision which affects him. 
The exercise of discretionary power may be regulated furthermore if the Minister who has 
responsibility for the Department is required to be responsible for and account publicly for the 
..actions of his subordinate. 
In this thesis, examples of rule based administrative action and adjudicative techniques of decision 
are examined. Thus in chapter two, the issuing of Rulings as a means of controlling the exercise of 
discretion is examined. It is submitted that the issuing of Rulings is an example of rule based 
administrative action because rulings should be issued in accordance with certain prescribed rules. 
In chapter three, an example of adjudicative techniques, namely the doctrine of legitimate 
expectation is examined. It is submitted that an individual should have a legitimate expectation that 











Section 3 of the Act regulates the exercise of the power and performance of duties by the 
Commissioner. Sections 74 - 80 regulate the power of the Commissioner to issue assessments and 
to investigate matters related thereto. Sections 81 - 88 govern objections to and appeal against 
assessments. In chapter four the administrative law relationship between the taxpayer and the 
Commissioner will be examined with reference to the abovementioned sections of the Act in 
order determine how the discretionary powers contained in these provisions are controlled by 
reference to the jurisdictional facts which are contained in these sections. 
Generally, the taxpayer must enforce his remedy against the commissioner before a court of law. 
There is uncertainty as to the powers of the Special Court. This is examined in chapter five. 
1.2 Introduction 
In this chapter, the regulation of discretionary powers by 'rule based administrative action' and by 
'adjudicative techniques of decision' is examined generally. The control of discretionary power by 
ministerial responsibility is also canvassed generally in this chapter. 
More specifically the following is canvassed in this chapter : 
(a) What is Administrative Law, and why is it essential to examine the background of 
Administrative Law in a thesis which is concerned with the regulation of discretionary 
powers? 
(b) The meaning of discretionary power and the reason why discretionary power is essential 
in a society. 
( c) The regulation of the exercise of discretionary power with reference to the distinction 
between rule based administrative action and adjudicative techniques of decision. 
( d) The relationship between the collection of income tax (and a fortiori the exercise by 
officials of the Commissioner's office of their discretionary powers) and that which has 
been stated in (a), (b) and (c) above. 
1.3 What is administrative law 











'Administrative Law is concerned to a considerable extent with the relationships between 
different branches of Government. In the first place, it is concerned with the position of 
administrative authorities vis-a-vis the Parliament, since nearly all of the functions of 
administrative authorities are conferred and defined by statute, and Parliament exercises 
a certain amount of control over the exercise of these functions. At the same time, the 
importance of judicial review, as a mechanism for supervising the activities of 
administrative agencies, makes the question of the proper relationship between the 
legislative and the administrative branches of Government on the one hand and the 
judicial branch, on the other, central to administrative law.' 
Baxter makes a distinction between general and particular administrative law. He states that ( 4) 
general administrative law : 
'May be said to comprise the general principles of law which regulate the organisation of 
administrative institutions and the fairness and efficacy of the administrative process, 
govern the validity of and liability for administrative action and inaction, and govern the 
administrative, and judicial remedies relating to such action or inaction.' 
He states that particular administrative law comprises the legislation governing, and legal 
principles and policies developed in respect of, specific areas of administration. 
According to Wiechers (5) administrative law is 'that section of public law which governs the 
organisation, powers and actions of the state administration.' 
1.4 Administrative Law and Constitutional Law 
The description of Administrative Law proposed by Cane above does not distinguish 
Administrative Law from Constitutional Law adequately. It is submitted that the relationships 
between different branches of Government are a major component of Constitutional Law. Baxter 
states (6) that because Constitutional Law and Administrative Law share the same subject 
· matter, that a distinction between the two is based on a difference of emphasis. He states that : 
'Perhaps the best that can be said is that the two subjects involve a difference of emphasis while 
constitutional law is primarily concerned with the structure and distribution of governmental 
power, administrative law is primarily concerned with its mode of exercise.' 
Wiechers (7) agrees that Administrative Law and Constitutional Law do not differ in character 
and content. He states that both these branches of the law form part of the public law of the 
State, and both involve the regulation of the division and the exercise of Governmental authority. 
He does however propose that Administrative Law to a certain extent 'constitutes a refined or 
more specialised part of constitutional law.' Thus Constitutional Law governs the power and 
procedures of Parliament, the Executive, the Judiciary and the relations between these organs 












1.5 Administrative law and the distinction between Private and Public law 
The question which must be answered is whether the distinction between Private and Public Law 
affects the content of Administrative Law. Generally it is difficult to distinguish between Public 
and Private Law although most writers agree that Administrative Law is part of what is often 
called Public law (8). Cane states that (9) : 
'Private law might be defined as law regulating the relations of private persons, whether 
individuals, corporations, or unincorporated associations, with one another. This 
definition suggests that public law concerns the activities of Governmental agencies; it 
regulates relations between Governmental agencies and private individuals on the one 
hand, and between different governmental agencies on the other.' 
Wiechers (10) proposes that public law 'governs general interests and private law individual or 
private interests.' He however states that the above may be too vague and suggests that this 
vagueness is eliminated by stating that public law serves the public interest as its primary and 
main function, while the main function of private law is to serve private or individual interests.' 
In view of the apparent vagueness of the distinction between Public and Private Law, the question 
which must be answered is whether it is necessary to distinguish Private Law from Public Law? 
Cane (11) suggests a number of reasons why this distinction is important. Firstly, because of the 
great power which the Government can wield over its citizens, the law has traditionally imposed 
on Governmental agencies special duties of procedural fairness which do not apply to dealings 
between private citizens. The application of the rules of natural justice by administrative 
tribunals, where such rules are not excluded, is an example of this. For example, in Administrator 
Transvaal v Zenzile (12), the appellant had dismissed hospital workers who had participated in a 
strike. Hoexter J A, distinguished between employers who are private individuals and employers 
who are representative of the State. He stated (page 34 B-D) that : 
'One is here concerned not with mere employment under a contract of service between two 
private individuals, but with a form of employment which invests the employee with a particular 
status which the law will protect. Here the employer and decision maker is a public authority 
whose decision to dismiss involved the exercise of a public power. The element of public service 
injected by statute necessarily entails, so I consider, that the respondents were entitled to the 
benefit of the application of the principles of natural justice before they could be summarily 
dismissed for misconduct.' 
Furthermore the activities of Governmental agencies are often subject to forms of public 
accountability, notably to Parliament, to which the activities of private individuals are not. 
Furthermore, Cane believes (13) that judicial intervention differs depending on whether Public 
Law or Private Law is involved. He states that when dealing with the exercise of governmental 
power the Courts are more likely to take a more restrained view of their role. Whereas when the 
Courts adjudicate the affairs of private citizens they are the primary organs for interpreting, 
applying and enforcing the law. Accordingly their role is less restrained. A further reason 











some of the functions of government are uniquely governmental, not all are. Cane suggests that 
in areas which are traditionally the domain of Private Law such as the law of Contract and Delict, 
the Courts tend to apply different rules depending on whether the parties to the contract or delict 
are both private individuals or whether one or both of the parties is a representative of the 
Government. It may be that, in such instances, that the private individual is prejudiced. For 
example, in South African Law, estoppel does not operate in favour of an individual where the act 
of the government official is ultra vires (14). This would not generally constitute a problem if the 
contracting parties were two private individuals. There are examples of this prejudice in Revenue 
Law. Thus in terms of section 82 of the Act, the onus of proof always rests on the taxpayer 
initially. A further example is the regulations governing the procedure in the Special Court in 
comparison to the rules of the Supreme Court. There is no discovery procedure in the Special 
Court. Furthermore, in terms of regulation B3 of the Act, the Commissioner must furnish the 
taxpayer with a copy of his dossier at the latest, 10 days before the hearing of the appeal. Thus, in 
theory the Commissioner could conceivably only furnish such information 10 days before the trial 
which would be unfair to the taxpayer who may be prejudiced in preparing for the appeal. 
Thus the distinction between Public and Private Law remains 'as elusive as ever (15).' It is 
submitted that the distinction between Private nd Public Law is a label (similar to the 
classification of administrative functions discussed in chapter four). This label should not be 
prescriptive of any consequences, but rather descriptive. 
It is submitted that the definitions of Wiechers and Baxter both share the view that, in attempting 
to distinguish Administrative Law from Private Law and Constitutional Law, it is necessary to 
refer to a difference of emphasis, rather than a difference based on substantive law. In a House of 
Lords decision (16) it was stated by Lord Willberforce that : 
'The expressions 'private law' and 'public law' have recently been imported into the law of 
England from countries which, unlike our own, have separate systems concerning public law and 
private law. No doubt they are convenient expressions for descriptive purposes. In this country 
they might be used with caution, for, typically, English law fastens not on principles but on 
remedies. 
1.6 Conclusion 
In this section, it has been shown that the regulation of discretionary powers forms part of a 
division of law known as Administrative Law. Administrative Law has been distinguished from 
Constitutional Law and is part of Public Law. 
1.7 Discretionary Power 











Constitutional Law is concerned with the structure and distribution of governmental power, 
Administrative Law is primarily concerned with its mode of exercise. 
The 'mode of exercise' of governmental power, which is an essential component of 
Administrative Law, implies that representatives of government have to exercise certain 
governmental powers. The exercise of such power means that government official will take 
decisions, in pursuance of the policy which must be implemented, which affect individuals in a 
society. Such official may be granted discretionary power which he must exercise when he decides 
the extent to which the individual is affected by the policy. 
1.8 Discretionary power and the Rule of Law 
1.8.1 vVhat is discretion 
'A public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his power leaves him free to 
make a choice among possible causes of action or in-action' (18). 
1.8.2 The Rule of Law 
In essence the Rule of Law means that all government action should be predetermined with a 
maximum degree of certainty. The Rule of Law is important to Administrative Law because the 
control of discretionary powers is dependent on the extent to which Government action is 
determined by certainty. The origin of the theory of the rule of law has been attributed to Dicey 
(19). Dicey (20) proposed the following propositions 
'(a) We mean in the first place, that no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer 
in body or goods except for a distinct breach of the law ... 
(b) We mean in the second place when we speak of the Rule of Law ... that with us no man 
is above the law 
( c) The general principles of constitution ... are the result of judicial decisions determining 
the rights of private persons in particular cases brought before the Courts.' 
The first proposition means that laws must be manifestations of general principles which must be 
laid down with certainty. The essence of the second proposition is that laws must provide 
certainty to the individual. Beinart (21) says that the second proposition 'relates primarily to the 
mechanics or structure of the legal system and not to the substance or content of the various 
laws.' Beinart states further that Dicey, although distinguishing between the mechanics and 











means that the courts must adjudicate any dispute. The essence of Dicey's propositions is the 
rejection of discretionary powers which he equated with arbitrary power. 
1.8.3 Necessity for discretionary powers 
Baxter states that (22) there are a number of reasons why discretionary powers are necessary in a 
society. Firstly not all policies are capable of being crystallised into legislation (23). Secondly 
discretion is also necessary because Governments ... 'are likely to go on undertaking tasks the 
execution of which no one is able to prepare advance rules (24). Thirdly rules are inflexible, and 
every legal system retains some elements of equitable discretion in order to meet justice required 
in individual cases. Fourthly discretion must be used to determine when the law applies, because 
the matching process can never be exact : the person invoking the law often has the discretion to 
do so (25). It is submitted that discretionary powers are necessary in a modern society. The 
complexities of a modern sophisticated society mean that it is impossible that predetermined 
rules can be promulgated which solve all disputes. Therefore it is necessary to determine the 
means of regulating the exercise of discretionary power. 
1.9 Control of discretionary power 
In this section, the control of discretionary power is analysed with reference to controls imposed 
by rule based administrative action and then with reference to control imposed by adjudicative 
techniques of decision (26). 
1.9.1 Rule Based Administrative Action 
1.9.1.1 
-This means that administrative action should be regulated by predetermined rules. Furthermore, 
the individual in respect of whom the decision is taken should have knowledge of such rules. In 
South Africa, an example of such a set of rules are the regulations pertaining to exchange control 
which are only available to authorised dealers. These rules enable to authorised dealer to 
determine the relevant information which will result in the success of an exchange control 
application. Another example, in the area of Revenue Law (27), is the practice manual which has 
been compiled by the Commissioner for Inland Revenue. This contains guidelines which Revenue 
official apply in exercising discretionary power. This information is not available to the taxpayer. 
The advantages of Rule Based Administrative Action 
The most obvious advantage of rule based Administrative Action is that it provides certainty to 
the individual who is affected by the exercise of the discretionary power. The applicant knows 
what information must be furnished to the official in order to increase the likelihood of a decision 













with certain criteria. This means that the exercise of his discretion is fettered. Thus the legality of 
official action can be measured and this permits 'individual redress against official action that 
does not accord with the standard (28).' Jowell (29) identifies a further advantage of rule based 
administrative action namely that the publication of rules 'generate public assessment of the 
fidelity of the official definition to legislative purpose,' ie. publication of rules enables the 
applicant to rely on the purpose of the legislation as a means of regulating the discretionary 
power. 
The disadvantages of Rule Based Administrative Action 
The main disadvantage of rule based administrative action is that discretionary powers may be 
fettered if the official is required to exercise discretionary power in accordance with 
predetermined rules. Rules may prevent 'flexibility individual treatment and responsiveness' (30) 
by the official who exercises the discretionary power. In other words the discretion of the official 
becomes fettered by the rules. 
Rule Based Administrative Action : Conclusion 
The above illustrates that there is a conflict in rule based administrative action. The conflict is 
between the certainty provided by the rules on the one hand and the fact that those rules may 
fetter the exercise of discretionary power on the other. Jowell proposes (31) that the solution 
would be a combination of rules and unfettered discretionary power. He says that the rules 
should provide that account should be taken of other material considerations. 
The problem, it is submitted is that the conflict remains. Even if there are rules coupled with a 
-provision which states that account must be taken of 'other considerations' there is still a degree 
of uncertainty because it is impossible to determine what constitutes 'other considerations.' 
1.9.2 Adjudicative Techniques of Decision 
The adjudicative techniques of decision provide another manner of controlling discretionary 
power. The adjudicative techniques of decision means that: 
'the affected person [participates] in the decision about his welfare, his rights or interests. This 
requirement attempts to influence the discretion of the decision-maker (who should be unbiased 
and independent in the ideal form of the adjudication normally found in the court room) by 
exposing him to the claim of the person whose interests are at stake (32).' 
Jowell (33) identifies the following disadvantage to such control of discretionary power namely 
that the decision may be taken with the appearance that the affected person has been afforded 
procedural justice, nevertheless the decision maker has already made his decision (34). 











Act (35) which provides that prior to the dismissal of an employee, a disciplinary hearing must be 
held in order to enable the employee to state his case. It is submitted that in many such instances 
the employer has decided the outcome of the hearing prior to it and merely complies with the 
procedural requirements of the Labour Relations Act in order to avoid the charge that the 
dismissal was procedurally unfair. 
It is however submitted that adjudicative techniques do provide an effective means of regulating 
discretionary power, especially where the reasons for the decision are publicised. Adjudicative 
techniques of decision 'encourage purposive decisions as justification must usually be made by 
reference to a general rule, standard or principal. Overt reference to arbitrary or particularistic 
factors (such as the defendant's race or political views) will be difficult (36).' 
A combination of rule based administrative action and adjudicative techniques of 
decision 
Baxter (37) proposes as a means of regulating the exercise of discretionary power proposes a 
combination of rule based administrative action and adjudicative techniques of decision. He 
proposes inter alia the following in order to control the exercise of discretionary powers: 
1. structure discretionary decisions by means of rules, principles and standards 
which stipulates the reference that must be taken into account and procedures 
that must be followed; and 
2. provide, by means of procedures, rules, standards and principles, the institutions 
and devices necessary for 'checking' or correcting the exercise of discretionary 
and non discretionary powers. 
Dean (38) likewise believes that discretionary power must be exercised with reference to certain 
criteria which may be summarised as follows. 
1. The discretionary power should be exercised by reference to as many jurisdictional facts 
as possible (39). (This incorporates rule based administrative action) 
2. The official inust give reasons for his decision (40). (This is a feature of adjudicative 
techniques of decision) 
3. Discretions which involve legislative functions ( eg. the power to make rules for an 
institution) should be treated as if they were acts of the legislature. Thus for example if 











Cane (42) suggests that three basic concerns underlie the rules governing the control of discretion. 
Some of the rules are concerned with the substance of the authorities decision : was it 
unreasonable; did it faithfully pursue the aims of the legislation conferring the power? 
Other rules are concerned with the procedure by which discretionary powers are 
exercised : the rules of natural justice, the rule against self-created rules of policy. 
Thirdly some rules are concerned with the legitimacy of the decision making process : 
does the decision have the stamp of legitimate authority. The rule against delegation is 
an example of this type of rule. 
Wiechers ( 43) states that there is no such thing as a judicial, quasi judicial, legislative or 
administrative discretion. The discretion may be the manifestation of a judicial, legislative, quasi 
judicial or administrative act. According to Wiechers, the only distinction is between a free and a 
circumscribed discretion. A free discretion is one on which the law confers a wide freedom of 
choice without freeing the exercise of the discretion from adherence to the rules laid down by law. 
Baxter ( 44) prefers the distinction of wide or narrow discretion 'for discretion is always limited to 
a greater or lesser degree.' He illustrates this statement by a reference to an example by Ronald 
Dworkin who states : 
'What does it mean, in ordinary life, to say that someone 'has a discretion?' The first 
thing to notice is that the concept is out of place in all but very special contexts. For 
example, you would not say that I either do or do not have discretion to choose a hc•use 
for my family. It is not true that I have 'no discretion' in making that choice, and yet il 
would be almost equally misleading to say that I do have discretion. The concept of 
discretion is at home in only one sort of context; when someone is in general charged 
with making decisions subject to standards set by a particular authority. It makes sense 
to speak of discretion of a sergeant who is subject to orders of superiors, or the 
discretion of a sports official or contest· judge who is governed by a rule book or the 
terms of the contest. Discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does not exist e.xcept as an 
area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction. It is therefore a relative concept. It 
makes sense to ask, 'Discretion under which standards?' or 'Discretion as to which 
authority?' 
It is submitted that a combination of rule based administrative action and of adjudicative 
techniques of decision is the most effective means of regulating the exercise of discretionary 
power. The application of this submission is the theme of this thesis. It should be remembered 
that the distinction between rule based administrative action and adjudicative techniques of 
decision is only one framework of the rule of law. A more traditional framework is to classify 
theories of the rule of law according to the degree in which they encompass substantive law. 
1.9.3 Theories of the content of the Rule of Law 
I. 
The Legalistic Theory of the Rule of Law 
In terms of this purely positivistic theory, the Rule of Law means only that a law is valid if it is 
enacted in terms of valid rules for the promulgation of rules in a society. The content of the rules 











is satisfied if administrative action is legally authorised by clear rules, regardless of the content of 
such rules. 
Procedural Justice Theories of the Rule of Law 
IL The legalistic theory is referred to above is subsumed under this category. The procedural justice 
theories pertain to the legal machinery that is necessary to the application of the laws. Raz ( 45) 
states certain principles which are common to these theories. These include : 
(a) All Laws should be prospective open and clear: 
(b) Laws should be relatively stable : 
( c) The independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed : 
( d) The making of particular laws should be guided by open stable, clear and general rules : 
( e) The principles of natural justice must be observed : 
(f) The Courts should have review powers to ensure the implementation of the other 
principles : 
(g) The Courts should be easily accessible (page 199-201). 
It can be seen that this theory is an example of adjudicative techniques of decision. Matthews 
describes this statement of the Rule of Law as meaning 'Government according to 
pre-announced clear rules faithfully administered by independent and accessible Courts 
according to fair trial procedures ( 46). Matthews ( 47) states that although this is a procedural 
theory nevertheless it does promote freedom beamse its central theme namely that laws should 
'provide a clear guide to human conduct presupposes that men are rational autonomous 
creatures and therefore it enlarges their freedom to choose from as many options as possible.' 
III. Theories based on Dicey's theory 
Over the years Dicey's theory has been reformulated so as to encompass the idea of civil liberties. 
Matthews ( 48) reformulates Dicey's propositions as follows : 
(a) The Rule of Law requires the observance of legality in the form of clear and general 
pre-announced rules administered by independent Courts; 
(b) It also requires that the citizens should actually enjoy the basic civil liberties of person, 
conscience, speech, movement, meeting and association; 
( c) The substantive rights, described in paragraph (b) are best secured by procedural 
mechanisms described in paragraph (a) as the principle of legality. 
This reformulation means that Dicey's theory now encompasses an aspect of substantive law 











IV. The Rule of Law as substantive justice 
1.10 
1.10.1 
The most expansive concept of the Rule of Law is a dynamic concept which should be employed 
to safeguard and advance the will of the people and the political right of the individual to 
establish social, economic, educational and cultural conditions under which the individual may 
achieve his dignity and realise his legitimate aspiration in all countries whether dependent or 
independent ( 49). 
In essence this theory conflicts with the earlier theories because legality is subject to ideological 
consideration. 
Administrative Law governs the legal relationship between the representatives of the State and 
the individual. The growth of the Administrative State has resulted in more and more decisions 
which affect individuals being taken by officials of the State who are vested with discretionary 
powers. It is necessary that such discretionary powers must be controlled. The theories of the rule 
of law, which were examined above, form a theoretical framework for the control of the 
discretionary powers. In order to further examine the control of the discretionary power of the 
Commissioner when he makes a decision which affects the taxpayer, it is necessary to examine 
the influence of constitutional doctrines on Administrative Law. The constitutional doctrine of 
the Separation of Powers is now examined briefly in order to determine its relationship to the 
regulation of discretionary powers. 
The doctrine of Separation of Powers 
Introduction 
The doctrine of Separation of Powers means that there is a distribution of powers between the 
Executive, Legislature and Judiciary so that there is a separation and balance of such power. No 
society adheres to this doctrine rigidly and as a doctrine it is useful as a barometer in illustrating 
the degree to which a State adheres or does not adhere to this doctrine. In other words, the 
doctrine is an indication of what should be the ideal in a society. Baxter (50) states that : 
'The idea rather than· the practice [of the doctrine of Separation of Powers] has done much to 
mould the characteristics of administrative law throughout the Western world, though 'separation 
of powers' has meant many different things. Critics never tire of pointing out that Montesquieu 
was wrong in believing that this doctrine of Separation of Powers truly reflected the realities of 
the English constitution, and that the latter's most characteristic feature was not the separation of 
powers but their fusion. Nevertheless, what Montesquieu rightly perceived was the importance of 
a distribution of powers and it is this core meaning that is to be found in all the doctrine's 
practical applications. In the light of these formal similarities with English law, it is not surprising 














The doctrine of Separation of Powers and the Sovereignty of Parliament 
A consequence of the doctrine of Separation of Powers is that Parliament is sovereign (51). 'The 
sovereignty of Parliament describes in formal terms the relationship which exists between the 
legislature and the courts (52).' 
It is the function of the judiciary 'to administer the laws which Parliament has enacted ... When 
an enactment is passed, there is finality unless and until it is amended or appealed by Parliament. 
In the courts there may be argument as to the correct interpretation of the enactment : there 
must be none as to whether it should be on the statute book at all (53).' 
The doctrine of separation of powers and the independence of the Judiciary 
The consequence of the doctrine in respect of the Judiciary means that the Judiciary's task is to 
interpret the Act of Parliament. 
Dicey stated (54) that: 
'Powers however extraordinary, which are conferred or sanctioned by statute, are never really 
unlimited, for they are confined by the words of the Act itself, and, what is more by the 
interpretations put on the statute by the judges. Parliament is the supreme legislator, but from 
the moment Parliament has uttered its will as law giver, that will becomes subject to the 
interpretation put on it by the judges .. .' 
Cane (55) states: 
'The doctrine of separation of powers encourages us to view the courts as independent and 
impartial third party adjudicators of disputes between citizen and citizen or between citizen and 
government. But the doctrine draws our attention to the fact that the courts are themselves a 
branch of government and that the judicial power is governmental power.' 
The doctrine of Separation of Powers and the Executive 
The doctrine of separation of powers means that the Executive is responsible for exercising the 
enactments of parliament. Furthermore the Executive is required to account to Parliament all its 














Turpin (57) states that Ministerial responsibility : 
'imports an obligation to submit to scrutiny - to provide opportunities Parliament to question, 
challenge, probe and criticise.' 
Ministerial Responsibility is different from parliamentary control of the Executive. Whereas 
parliamentary control means the exercise of power a priori by Parliament to influence the 
decisions of government, Ministerial Responsibility means the 'obligation of ministers to respond 
or answer or account for actions already performed (or left unperformed); responsibility is 
retrospective or a posteriori (58).' 
Ministerial Responsibility furthermore connotes a duty of accountability by the Executive to the 
Judiciary for administrative acts. Thus where an administrative act is reviewed by the Judiciary, 
the Judiciary is, in reviewing such act indirectly holding the Executive accountable for a decision 
which has been taken. 
In summary the most accepted meanmg of Ministerial Responsibility is a responsibility to 
Parliament for the 'merits and political wisdom' (59) of administrative action. It can also mean 
the indirect accountability of the Executive to the Judiciary when the legality of administrative 
action is reviewed by the Judiciary. 
The doctrine of Separation of Powers and Discretionary Powers 
It is submitted that the above doctrine is related to discretionary power. The Sovereignty of 
Parliament means that the discretionary power must be exercised pursuant to an enactment 
promulgated by Parliament. The independence of the Judiciary, in terms of the doctrine of the 
-Separation of Powers means that the Executive in exercising discretionary power is restrained by 
the Judiciary because the Judiciary controls discretionary power when it exercises its review 
functions. 
Conclusion 
The relationship of the Rule of Law to the regulation of discretionary power was examined 
generally. A distinction was made between rule based administrative action on the one hand and 
adjudicative techniques of controlling discretion on the other. It was shown that theories of the 
content of the rule of law contained both rules and adjudicative techniques in order to control 
discretionary powers. The importance of the doctrine of separation of powers and the 
relationship thereof to discretionary power was examined. 













the commissioner's office of their discretionary power) is examined generally in the remainder of 
this chapter. 
The collection of taxation 
Historical background 
A brief historical analysis of the need for and collection of tax illustrates the importance of the 
relationship between Administrative Law and Revenue Law. The imposition of a permanent 
direct tax on income is a recent phenomenon (60). In England, the main source of revenue which 
was required to fund State expenditure was originally customs and excise levies (61). In England, 
ad hoc direct taxation was required only when an emergency arose such as the need to fund a war 
(62). In the 11th century there was the Daengeld which was a property tax. Another feudal tax 
was the Scutage which was paid in lieu of military service (63). In the 17th century, the main 
source of revenue was the duty on malt, used in the making of ale (64). The major sources of 
revenue in the 18th century were the land tax, which gave a yield of £2 million, the customs duties 
which had their origins in mediaeval times and the excise duties, or inland revenue (65).' A large 
portion of the money was needed to pay for the wars against Louis XIV. In the 16th century 
legislation was passed when the collection of taxes was frustrated by evasion (66). In 1784, a tax 
was payable on pleasure horses. In 1793, a tax was imposed on hair-powder in order to finance <i. 
war against France. 
Some of the taxes were graduated such as the poll tax of 1380. In 1797 the Napoleonic wars 
resulted in the imposition of the Triple Assessment Act. This tax was imposed on persons who 
owned property. Furthermore, the amount of the tax payable was dependent on the means of the 
person. There was flexibility in this Act because exemptions and reductions were permitted for 
the first time. However, due to widespread evasion, the latter tax was abolished in 1798 and in 
1799 a tax on income was introduced (67). 
The effect on sectors of society of taxation was a factor which determined the imposition of 
taxation. In 1730, Britian's first Prime Minister, Sir Robert Walpole, reduced the salt tax, as a 
concession to the poor, and increased the land tax in order to make up the short fall. Two years 
later, he attempted to reintroduce the salt tax and was met with great opposition. The 
reintroduction salt tax was opposed because it was unfair to the poor because 'the poorer a man 
is, the more salt provisions he is obliged to consume.' 
Another factor was the fact that the imposition of such taxes lead to a flight of business. In 












'By such methods we shall soon banish all the artifices and manufacturers out of the 
kingdom. We know how ready some of our neighbours are to receive them, and to give 
them all possible encouragement ... How can we expect to keep them in our country, if 
we go on thus every year loading them with taxes, while neighbours are declaring them 
free from all imports and duties, and doing all that is in their power to entice them away 
from us?' 
The tax on income was regarded as unfair. In England, the late 18th and the 19th century were 
characterised by the repeal and re-introduction of taxes on income. At this stage, it was not 
considered a permanent tax. 
There was also opposition in England to graduation of income tax and only in the 20th century 
was the permanence of graduated income tax accepted. 
The growth of Administrative Tribunals 
The need of the feudal State and ultimately the 20th century Administrative State to obtain 
finance from its subjects and the obligation on the subjects of the State to pay the required 
revenue meant that there would be different perceptions on the part of the State and its subjects 
as to how much revenue had to be collected. 
In England, the Consolidating Act of 1803 which provided for taxes on windows inhabited houses, 
servants carriages, horses, mules and dogs contained an appeal provision in relation to appeals 
heard by the commissioners responsible for those taxes (69). 
The logical concomitant of an Act which contains appeal provisions to commissioners is the 
existence of a forum and rules where such appeals could be heard. 
Monroe states of the early administrative tribunals (70) 
'Not only were the tribunals so established distinct from the ordinary courts but, as a 
matter of policy, the way in which claims were to be decided bore little resemblance to 
common law procedure. First, it was for the taxpayer to declare his income. Pitt 
contemplated that he would merely declare that the proposed figure was adequate, a 
proper discharge of his quota, but in course of time this was modified : the making of a 
return of income by the taxpayer was from the outset and is today the first step in the 
process of fixing his liability. If there were doubts, the surveyor was to raise them. Then 
the commissioners would decide.' ... But if the citizen claims a benefit of exemption or 
abatement or challenges in respect of assessment, he must still, as under Pitt's 
arrangements, disclose the details of his affairs. The onus is on him, not on the inspector 
to prove what tax is due. The underlying assumptions as to bow tax will be imposed and 














In opposing Walpoles reintroduction of the salt tax, Lord Carteret stated (71) : 
'... the subject is not to be tried in the usual way, by God and his country, but ... by 
Commissioners and officers who are appointed by the Crown and removable at the 
pleasure of the Crown; the Crown is to be plaintiff or prosecutor and a man depending 
on the Crown, perhaps for his daily bread is to be the judge ... when things have been 
turned out of the ordinary course of the law, when any extraordinary method of 
proceeding before Commissioners have been introduced, extraordinary iniquities have 
been committed; some are discovered, but most of them are sunk into oblivion by the 
might of power.' 
The 20th century 
Baxter identifies two events in the 20th century which were catalysts to the growth of Public 
Administrations. The first event was the First World War and the second event was the Great 
Depression (72). Baxter states that World War One marked the beginning of the final phase in 
this growth. 
'Government, engaged in a war effort of unprecedented scale, became a great buying 
and selling concern. Anguished social conscience afterwards demanded the same 
massive machinery now be used to set all right the maladies of society. Nations hastily 
continued the task, begun already before the war, of erecting their welfare states with all 
the complex machinery which this enterprise entailed.' 
Baxter states (73) that as in Britain 'the great war had consequences were both direct and 
indirect; and during its immediate aftermath there was a great burst of administrative expansion.' 
Baxter states : 
that the fact that South Africa had to rely on its own resources during the war had 'the 
dual effect of stimulating local manufacture and creating a post-war belief that the South 
African economy should become self sufficient. Protectionist policies were adopted and 
industrial i centives were offered and public enterprises were created where there were 
thought to be strategically desirable. The effect was to increase substantially the level of 
state intervention in economic activity (74).' 
Baxter (75) states that another development was the intervention of the State in industrial 
activities for example by way of the enactment of the Factories Act No. 28 of 1918. Other factors 
such as the acute housing shortage during and after the First World War and the need to develop 
a coherent transportation policy resulted in the growth of the Administrative State in South 
Africa. 
The Welfare State of the 20th century 














De Kam identifies the following two features of the welfare state (76) 
'1. The production of goods (including services) and the distribution of income and wealth 
are primarily determined by the market process, that is, they are the outcome of the 
interplay of supply and demand. 
2. The State corrects the resulting patterns of resource allocation and the distribution of 
income and wealth, so as to ensure that all citizens may enjoy a given minimal level of 
welfare. 
De Kam (77) states that government intervention in a social welfare economy can be justified 
inter alia on one of the following grounds : 
'1. Markets fail to allocate resources efficiently. 
2. Market outcomes lead to unacceptable distribution of income and wealth. 
The above illustrates that in a Welfare State, the State Administration is greatly involved in all 
aspects of society. This extensive intervention of the State in society has, in books on 
Administrative Law, given rise to the notion of the Administrative State. 
The notion of the Administrative State 
Baxter states that the true value of the cliche 'administrative state' is that it emphasises the 
growing importance of the Executive and administrative branch of Government relative to the 
Legislative and Judicial branch' (78). It is submitted that the notion of Administrative State is 
generally synonymous with 20th century Government where the Executive, through the medium 
of administrative tribunals and officials, regulates and monopolises the exercise of authority in a 
society. Furthermore the notion of the 'Administrative State' 'emphasises that many legislative 
functions of Government are performed not by Parliament but by administrative officials and 
institutions while many judicial functions that would otherwise be performed by the Supreme 
Court or other courts of law are performed instead by administrative officials and tribunals (79).' 
The growth of the Administrative State 
The brief historical summary is relevant for the following reasons : 
a) Firstly it illustrates the development of the collection of revenue from an ad hoc system 
of tax based on assets to a graduated tax based on income. This development of Revenue 
Law is parallel to the evolution of the Feudal State into the 20th century Administrative 















The effect of the policy of racial separation on Administrative Law in South Africa is a subject in 
respect of which volumes could be written 'Separate Administrative institutions have continually 
been created in order to administer the affairs of persons of colour' (84). Even where such 
institutions have not been created, racism has played a role. (85) Racism has also affected an area 
of law which is crucial to Administrative Law, namely the Interpretation of Statutes. (86) 
Ironically the presumption of Interpretation of Statutes namely that the consequences of an 
administrative act must not result in discrimination against persons on the grounds of colour so 
that 'substantially unequal treatment can be inferred' (87) forms part of common law. 
As far as Revenue Law is concerned, the Margo Commission received evidence (88) that there is 
resentment about 'taxation without representation' and about items of State expenditure 
occasioned by the separation of the races. 
A further effect of racial separation on revenue law is that 'tax assessment and enforcement in 
the national states which collect tax require revitalisation. The present ineffective administration 
prejudices the South Africa taxpayer.' (89) The response of the Government to the latter 
statement was that it would consult with the national states. (90) The Margo Commission stated 
(91) that postal problems in the townships meant that 'official correspondence, assessments and 
demands for payment often do not reach the addressee, and the rendering of returns, the issue of 
assessments and the receiving of payments suffer accordingly.' The Margo Commission stated 
further (92) that 'at present there is an undisputed need for Black participation in communicating 
with and educating Black taxpayers, and, with normal development, there will be a growing need 
for Black administrators in Inland Revenue.' 
Security 
Laws relating to security such as the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 and laws which prevent the 
flow of information have an important effect on Administrative Law. An example is the limited 
powers of the Judiciary to review the actions of persons who are responsible for the 
implementation of the above legislation. In Revenue Law, the absence of a Freedom of 
Information Act (which exists in jurisdictions such as Australia and Canada) has meant that there 
is little publication of the Commissioners interpretation of the Act. (This is examined in detail in 
the next chapter) 
Tricameral parliament, provincial and local government 
This is a manifestation of racial separation. The tricameral parliamentary system is based vn 
race. Local government is segregated on a racial basis. Municipalities are constituted for whites, 












structure of government begs the question of what is the difference between Administrative and 
Constitutional Law. Baxter and Wiechers agree that the distinction is not clear. 'Perhaps the best 
that can be said is that the two subjects involve a difference of emphasis : while constitutional law 
is primarily concerned with the structure and distribution of government power, administrative 
law is primarily concerned with its mode of exercise (93).' 
The effect of the complex structure of government on Administrative Law is that at the stage of 
local government, the distinction between Constitutional and Administrative Law is even Jess 
clear than it is at the level of the central government. (94) 
The tricameral parliamentary system, and the system of provincial and local government affects 
the relationship between the taxpayer and the revenue collecting authorities (who include the 
Commissioner). 
The central and provincial governments obtain most of their finance from the State Revenue 
Fund which derives its money from taxpayers. Local government on the other hand derives its 
revenue from other sources such as property rates, and licenses and permits. This latter 'coercive 
power of taxation' (95) is the source of many cases pertaining to review of administrative action. 
The Public Service 
A tradition of public administration is that the person who is responsible for the day to day 
running of the department occupies the position of a 'professional administrator theoretically 
appointed for his administrative skills and not for his political allegiances.' (96) The Minister is 
responsible for the policy of the department. It is submitted that this distinction does not exist in 
practice. Firstly, in most departments, the policy permeates the implementation thereof to such 
an extent that one cannot say that the head of the department is an apolitical administrative 
automaton. (97) Secondly, as Baxter states (98) the administrators are involved in the planning of 
policy. 
Landman (99) states that the separation of administrative and political responsibility in respect of 
the Act is entrenched because parliament has vested the implementation of the Act in the 
Commissioner (100) and not in the Minister. Landman (101) states that the reason for this is that 
the intention of parliament is that the administration of tax law must be seen to be free from 
political considerations and that this ensured by the secrecy provisions in section 4 of the Act. 
Section 4 of the Act was amended in 1989 in order to ensure greater secrecy as a result of the 
publication of a directive from the Commissioner to the Receivers of Revenue requesting the 














Another aspect of the public service in South Africa which merits attention is the political role 
played by life time bureaucrats in departments, the Ministers of which change more frequently. In 
other words, it is submitted that not only are senior bureaucrats concerned with political matters 
affecting their departments because they sit on policy advisory committees but because of the 
permanence and security of their tenure as opposed to that of the particular minister. 
Specialisation 
The advancements of the twentieth century have meant that the administration of the State has 
had to become more specialised 'The modern state, and in particular the administration as its 
executive arm, is not merely a guard or 'nightwatchman' combating enemies, but an active 
entrepreneur, welfare officer, teacher, builder, planner, guardian of morals and much more. All 
these tasks demand exceptional and specialised knowledge on the part of the administration.' 
(102) It is submitted that this qualitative expansion is to some extent, a manifestation of 
monopoly capitalism and the accompanying wide powers of the Executive and not only a 
manifestation of technology in the twentieth century. 
This affects Revenue Law which likewise has become specialised. Tax avoidance schemes and the 
detection thereof have become more sophisticated. For example since 1988 there have been such 
additions to the Act as section 103(5) which deals with dividend/interest swops. Section 103(5) 
was was introduced to combat this sophisticated form of tax avoidance. Another example is 
section SE which deems dividends on certain shares to be interest. This section was also 
introduced to combat a sophisticated form of tax avoidance. 
Diversification\ decentralisation 
It is necessary to apply the doctrines referred to above to South Africa. 
Diversification\decentralisation is the quantitative expansion of the State. The tricameral system 
of government has caused this process to gain momentum. From an Administrative Law 
perspective, this feature means more decisions are made by the exercise of discretionary power. 
There is an increase of delegated authority. The doctrine of legitimate expectation which is 
discussed in detail in chapter three below becomes important as a protection against the 
omnipresence of the State. 
Application of the Constitutional Doctrines to the features of government in 
South Africa 











1.12.8.1 The Rule of Law 
From the above it can be seen that South Africa adheres to the legalistic theory of the Rule of 
Law and to a limited extent, to the Procedural Justice theory of the Rule of Law. South Africa 
adheres to the legalistic theory of the Rule of Law because laws are valid only if they have been 
enacted in accordance with a valid procedure. If one adopts Raz's (103) description of a 
Procedural Justice theory of the Rule of Law, then it can be seen that South Africa adheres to a 
limited extent to the theory. For example, not all laws are prospective especially when it comes to 
Revenue Law, eg. section SE of the Act was not introduced prospectively. Furthermore, although 
South Africa's laws are promulgated in accordance with open statute and clear rules, the courts 
are not easily accessible. Furthermore, the independence of the Judiciary in South Africa is open 
to question. (104) 
1.12.8.2 The doctrine of Separation of Powers 
Baxter (105) states that South Africa has been influenced by the idea rather than the practice of 
this doctrine. The idea is that there is a distribution of powers between the Executive, the 
Legislative and the Judiciary so that there is a separation and balance of powers. The doctrine 
has been distorted in South Africa because of the extensive powers of the Executive in South 
Africa and the decline of Parliamentary Supremacy. 
1.12.8.3 The Supremacy of Parliament 
The legislative supremacy of parliament is a consequence of the doctrine of Separation of 
Powers. In terms of this doctrine, the Judiciary, may not question the validity of legislation if the 
legislation has been enacted in accordance with constitutional laws which govern the 
promulgation of legislation. Furthermore, an administrative act, must not be contrary to an Act 
of parliament. In South Africa, the doctrine has been distorted entirely. Parliament cannot be 
said to be supreme because the Executive is dominant. Furthermore, Parliament is elected on a 
limited franchise. This negates the notions of parliamentary supremacy. 
1.12.8.4 Conclusion 
Thus the Constitutional doctrines which form the background of Administrative Law are not 
adhered to in South Africa. In the remainder of this chapter the importance of Administrative 












1.13 The administrative law relationship continued · aspects of taxpayer morality 
in South Africa 
Having examined the features of government in South Africa as part of the background in respect of 
the administrative law relationship between the taxpayer and the Commissioner, it is necessary to 
examine, in parenthesis, the background to the relationship further by referring to the morality of the 
taxpayers generally in South Africa. The technical nature of this relationship which is governed 
primarily by the Act, is not examined at this stage. 
The relationship between the taxpayer and the Commissioner has become more adversarial. The 
reason is that tax planning has become more sophisticated and the Commissioner has become more 
zealous in his response to such tax planning. There have been calls (106) for the normalisation of what 
is perceived to be deteriorating situation. Huxham (107) believes that 'the time has surely come for the 
Revenue authorities to have the courage to initiate peace moves.' He does contradict himself when he 
states (108) 'that it is beyond the power of the Revenue authorities to persuade the public to change 
their current thinking on tax matters and it is therefore clear that the future lies in a substantial shift 
away from direct tax to indirect tax.' 
He furthermore states (109) that 'the slow and almost imperceptible slide in moral standards is 
undoubtedly the biggest single factor influencing the present tax climate in the country [which] 
probably started at the time of the information scandal when the public were exposed to the 
phenomenon of misappropriation of funds and fraudulent behaviours and extensive press coverage 
thereof.' 
It is submitted that Huxham's analysis is incorrect because it is predicated on the view that the 
perceived hostility between the taxpayer and the Commissioner is bad and that something should be 
done to restore the 'camaraderie' between the two parties. (110) If this is one's premise then one's 
view as to the cause of this hostility and the solutions thereto must ipso facto be vague because one is 
attempting to restore a degree of goodwill to a vague relationship between two parties in an 
adversarial relationship. 











more aggressive in investigating such planning. It cannot be said that an important contributory factor 
to this is a decline in moral standards. (111) The most common motive for tax evasion and tax 
avoidance is greed which has always existed. 'In short therefore, irrespective of whether it is moral or 
not to avoid tax, it is natural to do so if one is fortunate enough to be in the position of being able to 
do so lawfully.' By the same token, the Revenue is charged with the task of collecting sufficient taxes to 
finance a nation's expenditure and if tax avoidance practices are subverting this object, it is natural that 
steps must be taken to counter this position.' (112) 
Furthermore, why should this relationship of goodwill be restored? It is better to accept the existence 
of a clear and adversarial relationship rather than one based on goodwill and the resultant vagueness. 
If one advocates the latter, then one's remedies for the normalisation of the latter relationship will be 
vague. 
In summary it is submitted that it should be accepted that it is as natural for a taxpayer to avoid tax 
legally as it is for the Commissioner to investigate and curb such avoidance. The two parties are in a 
naturally adversarial relationship. This relationship must be clearly defined and the rules of this 
relationship, especially those of administrative law are more important than a vague concept of 
goodwill. It is submitted that the developments in Administrative Law, which are examined in this 
thesis, introduce an element of flexibility into the Administrative Law relationship between the 
taxpayer and the Commissioner. It is better that the source of this flexibility is defined ie. 
Administrative Law rather than a vague concept such as goodwill. 
1.14 Conclusion 
The background of Administrative Law in South Africa has been examined briefly in this chapter. The 
sociopolitical features of government in South Africa and the more positivistic administrative law 
related features are interrelated because the latter are a manifestation of the former. The degree of 
non adherence to the doctrine of separation of powers is a manifestation of racial segregation and the 
lack of universal franchise. Although there is legislative supremacy of parliament, this must be viewed 
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The issuing of rulings is a manifestation of rule based administrative action. For example, in 
many jurisdictions (discussed below) there are procedural rules which apply to the issuing of 
rulings. Furthermore, these rulings are either binding on the Revenue in a court or have strong 
persuasive value before a court, depending on the jurisdiction. In addition, these rulings are 
usually published. Therefore, if a taxpayer seeks a similar ruling, the publication of the previous 
ruling provides a published standard against which to measure the legality of official action and 
thus to allow individual redress against official action that does not accord with the standard (1).' 
In this Chapter the powers of the Commissioner are examined with reference to deconcentration 
and decentralisation of administrative powers. The delegation of Administrative functions is also 
analysed. Thereafter the regulation of the exercise of discretionary powers by means of ruled 
based administrative action is examined with specific reference to section 3 of the Act. 
2.2 The Commissioner 
The parties to the administrative law relationship are the Commissioner and the taxpayer. 
Section 2 of the Act states that 'the Commissioner shall be responsible for carrying out the 
provisions of this Act.' (2) 
2.3 ~Relationships of authority 
It is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of relationships of authority into which a 
government organs may enter into with each other. Wiechers distinguishes between the following 
two relationships. (3) 
Firstly, there are those relationships which take place within the same sphere of authority ie. 
where one government department enters into a relationship with another. An example of this 
would be the administrative law relationship between the Director General of Finance and the 











The essence of this administrative law relationship is the power of the superior organ to give 
instructions to the inferior organ. More specifically it means that the superior organ has the 
power to give instructions to subordinate organs within the same sphere of authority and the 
superior organ also has the power to amend rules made by the subordinate organ. The only 
condition of this power is that, if the action of the subordinate organ has resulted in the 
acquisition of certain rights by individuals, the superior organ may amend the decision of the 
subordinate organ if it has express statutory authority to do so or if the action is invalid in law. ( 4) 
The second administrative law relationship between government organs occurs where the 
superior organ does not have the power to amend decisions taken by the inferior organ. In such a 
relationship, the superior organ only has power to approve or disapprove decisions of the lower 
organ but it may not amend those decisions. Wiechers states that this relationship is one of 
independent control. 
As far as the distinction between the types of relationships between government departments is 
concerned (5), it is submitted that the administrative law relationship between the Commissioner 
and the Minister of Finance is one of independent control. 
This is a relationship which exists between two administrative organs when one organ exercises a 
power of approval over the acts of the other. It is submitted that the Minister of Finance merely 
has the power to approve or disapprove of the actions of the Commissioner but not to replace 
such actions. The reason for this is that section 2(1) of the Act specifically provides that the 
Commissioner shall be responsible for carrying out the provisions of the Act. Furthermore, in 
terms of Section 2(2) a notice in the Government Gazette that any person who has been 
appointed to hold office as Commissioner for Inland Revenue is conclusive proof of such 
appointment. It is submitted that the effect of these two sections is that the Commissioner and 
not the Minister is responsible for the administration of the Act. 
2.4 The Administrative Law Relationship between the Minister of Finance and the 
Commissioner 
The Minister of Finance is the head of the Department of Finance. A public service official 
namely the Director General for Finance is responsible for the day to day running of the 
Department of Finance. The Department of Finance consists of numerous directorates, one of 












Landman ( 6) states that : 
the separation of administrative responsibility for income tax administration from 
political responsibility embodies, it is submitted, an important constitutional convention. 
It is founded on the presumed intention of parliament that the administration of fiscal 
laws including the Income Tax Act must be independent, impartial and free from 
political influence .. 
Landman (7) further states that the constitutional principle involved, namely the separation of 
administrative and political responsibility, is ensured by the secrecy provisions of the Act. 
The statement ignores the implementation of governmental policy by way of dominium (8). 
Daintith states (9) that 'the main resources available to government for persuading people to 
change their behaviour are two : first, the command of the law, backed in the last resort by force, 
carrying with it the threat of harm to those who do not comply; and second the promise of benefit 
for those who do (ie. dominium).' 
In other words, fiscal laws of any society are an expression of political influences. For example a 
government which is committed to the welfare of its subjects will usually impose high taxation so 
that money is available for social welfare. Thus a State may also impose a capital transfer tax. 
More specifically, dominium affects certain important sectors of South African society. For 
example, the standard values of livestock in the First Schedule of the Act is an example of the 
implementation of governmental policy in favour of farmers policy by way of dominium. 
T.herefore, it cannot be presumed that the political functions of the State have no connection \vith 
the perceived non-political implementation of the Income Tax Act. 
2.5 The Commissioner 
The relationship between the Minister of Finance and the Commissioner is one of independent 
control. Nevertheless, viewed from a political perspective, the parties to the relationship are 
inter-related. 
2.6 The Administrative Law Relationship between the Commissioner and his 
subordinate officials 
The Administrative Law relationship between the Commissioner and his subordinate officials is 
now examined. The administrative law relationship between the Commissioner and his subordinate 











(1) The powers conferred and the duties imposed upon the Commissioner by or under the 
provisions of this Act or of any amendment thereof, may be exercised or perfom1ed by the 
Commissioner personally, or by any officer engaged in carrying out the said provisions 
under the control, direction, or supervision of the Commissioner. 
(2) Any decision made and any notice of communication issued or signed by any such officer 
may be withdrawn or amended by the Commissioner or by the officer concerned, and shall 
for the purposes of the said provisions, until it has been so withdrawn, be deemed to have 
been made or issued or signed by the Commissioner : Provided that a decision made by any 
such officer in the exercise of any discretionary power under the provisions of this Act or of 
any previous Income Tax Act shall not be withdrawn or amended after the expiration of two 
years from the date of written notification of such a decision or of the notice of assessment 
giving effect thereto, if all the material facts were known to the said officer when he made 
his decision. 
(3) Any written decision made by the Commissioner personally in the exercise of any 
discretionary power under the provisions of this Act or of any previous Income Tax Act 
shall not be withdrawn or amended by the Commissioner if all the material facts were 
known to him when he made his decision. 
The following areas of contention pertaining to Section 3 are examined below : 
a) Delegation and discretionary power with reference to 
(i) the relationship of Section 3 to Section 79 of the Act ; and 
(ii) the rulings issued by the Commissioner. 
2.6.1 Delegation and Discretionary Powers 
Wiechers distinguishes (10), inter alia, between three types of delegation of administrative powers. 
The most rudimentary form of administrative delegation is a mandate or instruction. The 
superior organ takes a decision and requests or instructs the inferior organ to implement the 
decision. 
The second type of administrative delegation which is identified by Wiechers is that of 
deconcentration. Wiechers (11) states that this type of delegation takes place within the same 
state department or local authority. Features of deconcentration include the following. 
(a) The delegans ·may withdraw the delegation at any time. 
(b) If the delegation has not been withdrawn by the delegans, then the delegate, 10 
performing the act, replaces the delegans. 
( c) Once the delegans has performed the act, the delegate may not revoke the decision. 











The third type of administrative delegation which is identified by Wiechers occurs when there is 
decentralisation of activities. The difference between decentralisation and deconcentration is that 
in the former, the powers are transferred to an independent organ which carries out such powers 
in its own name. Wiechers states that there are a number of reasons why it is important to 
distinguish between deconcentration and decentralisation (12). 'In the case of decentralisation, 
the independent subordinate organ must be sued and not the superior controlling body; the lower 
organ may not transfer its powers to the superior organ and the superior organ may not, as a 
rule, perform the functions of the subordinate organ (except in the exceptional cases of 
dereliction of duty or impossibility of performance'). 
It is submitted that the above framework forms a useful means of analysing components of the 
Administrative Law relationship between the Commissioner and the taxpayer. 
2.6.2 Section 3 of the Act - General 
In terms of Section 3(1) the Commissioner may delegate any powers or duties imposed upon him 
to 'any officer engaged in carrying out the said provisions under the control direction or supervision 
of the Commissioner.' 
It is submitted that the delegation contained in Section 3(1) does not involve decentralisation but 
deconcentration because the delegate (Commissioner) does not transfer all his powers and 
functions to an independent organ which carries out these powers in its own name. Furthermore, 
one of the import ant reasons for the distinction between deconcentration and decentralisation is 
that in the case of decentralisation, the independent (inferior) organ must be sued and not the 
superior organ. This is not applicable here. 
In terms of Section 3(2) any decision made by a subordinate official may be withdrawn or 
amended by the Commissioner at any time. If however, the decision is made by the subordinate 
official in the exercise of any discretionary power under the provisions of the Act, then the notice 
shall not be withdrawn or amended after a period of two years 'if all the material facts were 
known to the said officer when he made his decision.' 
The Commissioner has stated that he will exercise certain powers and perform certain duties 
personally. For example in practice note number 5 the Commissioner stated that only he will 
invoke section 105 A of the Act. (13) 
2.6.3 The remedies which avail the taxpayer as a result of the exercise of a discretion by the 
Commissioner, include : 












(b) The expiration of the three year period in terms of section 79(1)(i) and (ii) of the Act. 
(c) The practice prevailing at the time was such that amount should not have been assessed 
to tax - section 79(1)(iii)(15) 
( d) Jurisdictional facts contained in section 3 have been ignored. 
In the next chapter, the remedy of Legitimate Expectation is examined. The relationship of 
section 79 to section 3 is canvassed in this chapter. A brief discussion of the limitation of the 
jurisdictional facts contained in section 3(2) is examined in the Chapter. The provisions of section 
79 are analysed in chapter four. Although Section 79 of the Act is examined below, it is necessary 
to consider those aspects of that section which affect the interpretation of Section 3(2) at this 
stage. 
Section 79 - Additional Assessments 
The courts have held that the time limits contained in the provisos to Section 79(1) of the Act 
override the provisions of Sections 3(2) and 3(3) and section 81(5) of the Act. (16) In ITC 788 
(17) it was held that the provision of Section 3(2) of the Act did not permit the recall of an 
assessment which had otherwise become final and conclusive pursuant to Section 77(16). The 
latter Section was the forerunner to the present Section 81(5). Ogilvie Thompson J stated (18) 
that: 
The words 'that any decision made and any notice or communication issued or signed' 
occurring in Section 3(2) of the Act are certainly comprehensive in their scope. In that 
sense they may be said to be capable of including an assessment. At the same time, 
assessments - which are a vital feature of the machinery of the Act - receive no express 
mention in Section 3(2), whereas Section [81(5)] specifically provides that, subject to the 
conditions there stated, assessments are to be 'final and conclusive.' No language could 
be clearer. Purely as a matter of construction there would, I apprehend, be considerable 
difficulty in construing the provisions of Section 3(2) as overriding the clear language of 
Section [81(5)]. Moreover, on general grounds, such a conclusion would, I think, be most 
unfortunate; for all considerations appear to me to render it desirable that - subject to 
the conditions mentioned in Section [81(5)] of the Act - there should be finality in regard 
to assessments. The whole concept of the Act is based upon separate years of assessment 
ending ... , and it is manifestly desirable that, as a general principle, finality should at a 
certain stage be attained.' 
In ITC 1150 (19) an employee of a welfare council incurred travelling and incidental expenditure 
on a holiday tour in Europe. The Commissioner issued an additional assessment in terms of 
Section 79. One of the grounds of the taxpayers objection was that Section 81(5) rendered the 
assessment final and conclusive and therefore the Receiver could not invoke Section 79 or 
Section 3(2) against him. It was held that Section 79 overrides Section 81(5). Although nothing 
was said as to the relationship between Section 3(2) and Section 79 it can be inferred that Section 
3(2) similarly overrides Section 81(5). In CIR v Lauw (20) Corbett J A in a case dealing with the 
















One of the jurisdictional facts of Section 3(2) is that there must be a decision which has been 
made and which must be communicated to the taxpayer. A letter of confirmation by the Receiver 
has been held to be a decision. ITC 1261 (21) dealt with the export marketing allowance provided 
for in Section 11 bis (4)(a)which refers to instances 'where it is proved to the satisfaction of the 
[Commissioner] that expenditure of the nature referred to .... has been incurred.' It was held that 
this wording implied a discretionary power subject to the limitations imposed by Section 3(2). It 
was also held that a letter from the Receiver of Revenue to the taxpayer confirming that certain 
commissions (the details of which had been fully explained to the Receiver in a letter from the 
taxpayer's auditors) would qualify for the export marketing allowance constituted a 'decision' in 
the context of Section 3(2). 
If the decision which was made was based on a lack of material information furnished by the 
taxpayer then the taxpayer may not invoke Section 3(2) against the Commissioner. In ITC 1357 
(22) the taxpayer claimed that an amount received was subject to Section 7A( 4) of the Income 
Tax Act. The Commissioner accepted this but in a subsequent tax year requested a copy of an 
agreement which revealed that the amount received could not be subject to Section 7 A( 4). The 
Commissioner issued an additional assessment. The taxpayer contended inter alia that the 
provisions of Section 3(2) of the Act precluded a reopening of the matter. 
Melamet J stated that the agreement constituted material information which was not in the 
possession or known to the Commissioner at . the time he exercised his discretion and that 




Section 3 is now examined in order to ascertain the relationship between the regulation of 
discretionary power and the issuing of rulings. The reason for undertaking such an examination is 
that rulings, being a manifestation of rule based administrative action, may be used to regulate 
the .exercise of discretionary power. It is submitted that the recommendations of the Margo 
Commission in respect of rulings, should be adopted. Consequently, these recommendations are 
examined in detail. 
A framework of rules 











between imperium and dominium. Briefly, imperium means 'the governments use of the 
command of law in aid of its policy objectives' (24) while the term dominium is used to describe 
the employment of the wealth of government for this purpose.' For example, if a government 
wished to pursue a trade protectionist policy such as the local content programme applicable to 
the motor industry, it could either promulgate legislation prohibiting the import of motor vehicle 
parts (imperium) or it could offer incentives to manufacturers who used locally made parts 
(dominium ). 
It is submitted that in the modern 20th century administrative states, the government relies to a 
greater degree on dominium in order to implement policies than in the past. 
'In earlier centuries, however, regulatory laws, with some rather haphazard enforcement 
mechanisms, were about the only resource for economic management available to 
government. Today government has available, in addition to a much greater enforcement 
capacity, enormous resources of public funds and public property accumulated through 
taxation, borrowing and purchase (25).' 
One of the reasons why dominium has replaced imperium is because the use of imperium can 
sometimes be administratively impracticable (26). Furthermore, an advantage of dominium is 
that it facilitates implementation of government policy more readily than imperium. The reason 
for this is that implementation of government policy by way of imperium must take place through 
the medium of Parliament. Whereas the implementation of government policy by way of 
dominium does not require the passage of policy through Parliament. 
It is submitted that the transition from imperium to dominium and the 'retreat from primary 
legislation in favour of government by informal rule's (27) mutually reinforce one another. 
Baldwin states (28) that : 
Each time a government confronts a difficult regulatory task, it seems to come up with a 
new device; a code of practice, guidance note, circular, approved code, outlined scheme, 
statement of advice, departmental circular - the list goes on. One view of such rules is 
that they offer a useful structuring of discretion .. .' 
Thus the regulation of policy by way of granting of and removal of financial incentives means that 
officials will be vested with discretionary power in order to decide who will qualify for such 
incentive. 
A further factor is that the 20th century administrative state has meant that discretionary power 











The varieties of rules 
Baldwin (30) distinguishes three types of rules from primary legislation. 
'First there is delegated legislation, in the case of which it is usual both for the parent 
statute to confirm power on a minister to make rules or regulations and for the statute to 
make clear that such rules shall have full legislative force. Second comes sub-delegated 
legislation where it may not be clear whether parliament has delegated a power to an 
individual, nor is it always plain whether the authorisation runs to making prescriptions 
of full legal force. Finally, there is the huge group comprising all those rules, guides or 
other statements of general applicability that are promulgated by administrators or 
others without express legislative mandate; these might be termed to 'unsanctioned 
administrative rules." 
Baldwin adopts a framework, which is followed in this thesis, and which distinguishes between 
types of rules in the second and third category ref erred to above. 
a) Procedural rules 
These are rules which state the procedure which must be followed when applicant's apply for 
rules. For example see Practice Note No. 7 which deals with the procedure to be followed in 
applications for exemption in terms of the Stamp and Transfer Duty moratorium. 
b) Interpretive guides 
This includes statements as to how legislation and court cases will be interpreted or applied. 
c) Instructions to officials 
The aim of these rules is not the offering of guidance to parties 'outside a bureaucracy, but a 
controlling the exercises of powers within the bureaucracy. They aim not to inform citizens but to 
impose internal order - usually so as to facilitate planning or to encourage consistency.' Strong 
arguments have been made for the publication of all such rules, but secrecy is sustained by the 
desire to avoid having to justify them in public (31). 
The Income Tax Handbook which is distributed to officials of the Receiver's office, but which is 
not available to the public, is an example of this. 
d) Prescriptive/evidential rules 
These rules prescribe the action which must be followed and refer to a sanction or allude to an 











e) Commendatory Rules 
In this type of rule a course of action is recommended. Failure to adhere to such a rule will not 
result in a direct or even indirect sanction. 
f) Voluntary codes 
Voluntary codes 'apply to stave off government regulation by upholding standards within a 
defined interest group, they may nevertheless carry considerable force; expulsion from the group 
for breach of a code may close down a business. The City Code on Takeovers and Merge is a 
prime example of a voluntary code.' [Baldwin page (32) 243-244] 
g) Rules of practice, management or operation 
These rules consist of arrangements made by administrative bodies which affect the operation of 
the law between one subject and another (33). An example of this is the extra concessions made 
by the Commissioner's for Inland Revenue in Britain. (see below page ) 
h) Consultative devices and administrative pronouncements 
This is a safety net and it covers 'those pronouncements which fit into none of the o~her groups, 
but which has a significance that goes beyond the individual case. Principle amongst these are 
consultative documents. They often involve draft outlines of agency or departmental policy and 
invite comments (34).' 
An example of this would be the invitations by Vatcom to taxpayers and their representatives to 
make representations before the draft VAT Bill has been finalised. 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Rules 
Baldwin [page 267-268] summarises the advantages of and reasons why, such rules may be cause 
for concern. (35) 
• They have legal effects even though they have largely bypassed parliamentary scrutiny. 
• Their legal creditionals are uncertain. But it may not be clear whether legal effects are 
authorised when tended at all. 
• They may be· couched in vague language. 













• They allow ministers illegitimately to instruct judges on interpretation of statutes. 
• They are resorted to on issues of great political contention and so render the law most 
vaguit points when it should be most clear. 
• They may be inconsistent with primary legislation. 
• They are published haphazardly if at all and are inaccessible (this is especially true in 
South Africa). 
• Little provision is· made for consultation or public input into many rule making 
procedures. 
• Special groups and interests may exert undue influence on the body which formulates the 
rules. 
• The advantages for resorting to rules are the following : 
they guide untrained officials and so facilitate planning and management. 
they encourage consistency in bureaucratic decision making. 
• they inform the public of official attitudes. 
they are flexible and may be issued quickly. 
they deal with matters which are not am.enable to strictly legal language. 
they are relatively free from judicial review. (this is debatable) 
they allow control of official action where legislation is either inappropriate or 
politically undecided by the government. 
Baldwin (36) states that the legal force of the rules contained in the framework vary 'according 
both to the strength of authority or legitimacy that a set of rules has and to the nature of the 
particular rules.' 
Rulings in South Africa 
In South Africa, there is no formal system of published rulings which correspond to the 
categories of rules described above. Rulings are issued to taxpayers who request them and are 
not available to other taxpayers. In addition, the Commissioner has issued eleven Practice Notes 
since March 1985. Most of these notes fall within the category of Interpretive rules (see above). 
Practice Note No. 7, which lists the information and documentation which must be supplied in 
requesting an exemption from stamp or transfer duty in terms of the moratorium, is an example 
of a procedural rule. Practice Note No. 2 is an example of a residual category of rules. This 
Practice Note states th.at the profits derived by the holders of certain financial instruments, are 
subject to tax. The Practice Note then quotes the penalties contained in section 75 and section 76, 
of the Act although this ruling does not contain a sanction, ie. it is not a Prescriptive ruling, it 













The Commissioner has made use of press releases for a variety of purposes. Some of the press 
releases fall outside the category of rulings. For example, some press releases are the precursors 
of future legislations. For example, on December 15, 1989, a press release announced the 
curtailment of section UB of the Act and the introduction of section 12C. Some of the press 
releases fall within the last safety net category. One example is the press release dated December 
14, 1990 in which it was announced that VAT would be introduced on October 1, 1991, despite 
rumours to the contrary. 
Probably the most official comprehensive documentation in respect of the interpretation of the 
Act is the Income Tax Handbook which is issued only to officials of the Receiver of Revenue. 
This Handbook contains details pertaining to the interpretation of the Act. 
The most obvious and serious indict:inent against the system which operates in South Africa is 
that it amounts to a haphazard publication of a few documents. No rulings are published. The 
Income Tax Handbook is not available to the taxpayer, yet it is the only official comprehensive 
document in South Africa which deals with the interpretation of the Act. 
It will be shown, that in comparison with other jurisdictions, the South African approach to 
rulings is grossly deficient. However, the Margo Commission has made recommendations in 
respect of rulings. These recommendations are examined in detail with reference to the systems 
which operate in other jurisdictions. 
An application for a ruling 
There is no specific section in the Act in terms of which a taxpayer is entitled to apply for a 
~ruling. Generally, rulings are issued pursuant to Section 3(2) and Section 3(3) of the Act. 
Rulings issued by the Commissioner personally 
Section 3(3), which governs the procedure for rulings issued by the Commissioner, provides that 
any written ruling made by the Commissioner personally in the exercise of a discretionary power 
may not be withdrawn if all the material facts were known to the Commissioner when the ruling 
was made. If the ruling is made as a result of the exercise of a non-discretionary power then 
presumably it may not be withdrawn. (37) 
Rulings issued by subordinate officials 
This is regulated by Section 3(1) and 3(2) of the Act. In terms of Section 3(1) the Commissioner 
may delegate any powers and duties to subordinate officials. In terms of paragraph 3(2) any 













discretionary power cannot be withdrawn or amended by the Commissioner or by the officer 
concerned after the expiration of two years from the date of such written notification or of the 
notice of assessment giving effect to such decision if all material facts were known to the said 
officer. 
THE MARGO COMMISSION 
The applicability of rulings : 
The Margo Commission recommended that : 
Rulings should not be used to give a particular taxpayer the advantage of certainty in a matter of 
general application which should, more appropriately, fall within a public regulation. (38) 
Thus the Margo Commission recommends that the general administrative law relationship must 
take precedence over the individual administrative law relationship if the ruling sought is also 
applicable to a group of taxpayers. This recommendation is a recognition of the importance of 
interpretative rulings and of the fact that interpretative rulings, which are useful to taxpayers 
generally should be publicised. The Commission does not state what is meant by 'public 
regulation.' In view of the fact that the Commission does not recommend the publication of 
individual rulings it is submitted that publication by 'public regulation' is similar to the existing 
Practice Notes. If individual rulings are not published but 'rulings of general application are 
published, then a problem may arise because it may be difficult to determine when a ruling will 
'give a particular taxpayer the advantage of certainty in a matter of general application which 
should fall within a public regulation. Furthermore, the reason why a taxpayer would apply for a 
ruling would be to obtain 'the advantage of certainty.' If one applied this fact to the 
_recommendation, then most rulings sought would be publicised by way of a 'public regulation.' It 
is submitted that the solution is to publish all rulings as is the practice in jurisdictions such as 
Australia, Canada and the United States of America. 
The Binding Effect of Rulings 
The Margo Commission stated further that : 
There are numerous provisions in the Income Tax Act giving the Commissioner a discretion 
upon the exercise of which imposition of taxation depends. 
In order to gain certainty and thus facilitate economic decision-taking, and to promote equity, it 
seems appropriate that - solely in those cases where the imposition of taxation depends on the 
exercise of a discretion - the taxpayer be entitled to approach the Commissioner for a ruling 











The Margo Commission recognises that, in the circumstances described above, a ruling should be 
binding. The Margo Commission neglected to state whether the ruling should be binding on the 
Commissioner only or whether the taxpayer should be bound by the ruling as well. The Margo 
Commission neglected to state the grounds on which the Commissioner should be held to a 
ruling. In Australia, the Commissioner has issued a ruling ( 40) in terms of which it is bound by 
rulings which it has issued if certain conditions are fulfilled. In terms of this ruling, the 
Commissioner will not be bound by a ruling if there are 'good and substantial reasons' not to be 
bound. Such reasons include that : 
• there have been legislative changes; 
an applicable Tribunal or court overturns or modifies an interpretation of the law on 
which a taxation ruling is predicated; or 
the approach adopted in a Taxation ruling is otherwise no longer considered appropriate. 
A departure from a ruling on the basis that it was no longer considered 'appropriate' would 
generally only arise where; 
• the commercial practice in respect of which the taxation Ruling was provided no longer 
operated in the manner described in the taxation ruling; 
• an administrative practice outlined in a taxation ruling was being exploited by taxpayers 
as a means of tax avoidance; or 
on reconsideration, the taxation ruling was considered to be wrong in law. 
The problem with this approach is that 'the system operates on the basis of good faith and 
consensus ( 41).' Webb ( 42) states that the effectiveness of the good faith and consensus is based 
-on the presumption that the Commissioner would not breach the ruling because of fear of 
adverse publicity and on the presumption that the rulings will be admitted in a reasonable and 
consistent manner.' 
In Australia, a sounder basis which would hold the Commissioner to be bound by a ruling is the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act of 1975. In terms of this Act on aggrieved 
taxpayer would have to establish 
• a relevant 'decision,' 
• that the decision is of an administrative character; 
that the decision has been made under an enactment; 
• the decision is not excluded from the ambit of the Act; 
the taxpayer is aggrieved by the decision; and 











Webb ( 43) states that a taxpayer is faced with problem inter alia, of proving that he has been 
aggrieved by a ruling unless the ruling overrode a previous ruling which was favourable to the 
taxpayer. The development of the doctrine of legitimate expectation is a means of ensuring that 
the Commissioner is bound by a ruling and this is examined in the next Chapter. 
In Sweden, a ruling is binding for the benefit of the applicant only. (45) Nevertheless the ruling 
does have persuasive value before the tax courts in Sweden. ( 46) The position is the same in 
Britain. In the United States of America, a ruling may be used by a taxpayer in a court of law. ( 47) 
In South Africa, a ruling is not binding in either party. Thus in ITC 429 ( 44) the court held that it 
was not bound by a ruling of the Commissioner. 
2.6.4.5.2 Practical Limitations to the issue of Rulings 
The Margo Commission ( 48) identified certain practical limitations to the issuing of ruling, 
namely : 
(i) It could add to the administrative burdens on the Revenue authorities; 
(ii) it has been abused to some extent in the past by taxpayers who, having approached the 
Commissioner for a ruling, have used the Commissioner's response to restructure a 
transaction in a manner which avoids tax: The Commissioner becomes, in effect, a ta.x 
consultant. 
It is accepted that a practical limitat on to the issuing of rulings is the fact this would add to the 
administrative burden on the Revenue authorities. In South Africa this is especially significant 
because of the general shortage of persons with skills in taxation. ( 49) 
in Canada, where the legislation division of Revenue Canada is responsible for the issuing of 
rulings, difficulties have been experienced in recruiting skilled staff. The same problem occurs in 
the United States of America (50). In view of the fact that persons who are required to issue 
rulings roust be highly skilled, South Africa does have a problem. 
The further practical limitation identified by the Margo Commission, namely that the 
Commissioner becomes a tax consultant in respect of the avoidance of tax is a problem which has 
been experienced in other jurisdictions. In Canada, (51) the Revenue authorities are willing to 
grant rulings in respect of tax avoidance matters where previously they were reluctant to do so. In 
the United States of America, promoters of certain tax shelters are required to obtain and quote 
rulings (even if adverse) in respect of the scheme which they are promoting. In New Zealand, no 











2.6.4.5.3 Recommendation to Overcome Practical Limitations 
In order to obviate these problems the Margo Commission recommended the following (53) 
The taxpayer (personally or through his agent) should either have the right to apply for a ruling 
only on one occasion in respect of a particular matter. The Commissioner could, in his discretion, 
allow subsequent applications. Moreover the Commissioner could lay down any administrative 
procedures to facilitate administrative convenience and eliminate abuse. Rulings should be 
limited to matters in which the taxpayer already has a direct and substantial interest. The right to 
obtain a ruling should not extend to contingent or speculative matters. ......... Finally, the 
Commissioner should be entitled to decline to give rulings in matters which, in his opinion, it 
would not be appropriate to do so. 
The recommendations referred to above are analysed in detail below. 
In the above recommendation, reference is made to the establishment of administrative 
procedures pertaining to the application of rulings. Such procedures would fall within the 
category of procedural rulings referred to by Baldwin. Practice Note 2, which states the 
procedure which must be followed in applications for exemption from stamp and transfer duty is 
an example of a procedural ruling. 
2.6.4.5.4 An Administrative Procedure 
New Zealand 
In New Zealand (54) the administrative procedure in respect of rulings is the following: 
• In the first instance, application is to the taxpayer's district office in the Inland Revenue 
Department. Most rulings are made at this level, though reference to Regional Offices 
or to the Departmental Head are not uncommon. 
• The Department does not consider itself obliged to issue rulings, though it endeavours to 
do so. 
• There is no appeal from an unfavourable ruling. The taxpayer may carry on regardless if 
he wishes and challenge the view of the department when a return has been furnished 
and an assessment issued. 
The department emphasises that its rulings are expressions of its opinion and are not 











Webb ( 43) states that a taxpayer is faced with problem inter alia, of proving that he has been 
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Recommendation to Overcome Practical Limitations 
In order to obviate these problems the Margo Commission recommended the following (53) 
The taxpayer (personally or through his agent) should either have the right to apply for a ruling 
only on one occasion in respect of a particular matter. The Commissioner could, in his discretion, 
allow subsequent applications. Moreover the Commissioner could lay down any administrative 
procedures to facilitate administrative convenience and eliminate abuse. Rulings should be 
limited to matters in which the taxpayer already has a direct and substantial interest. The right to 
obtain a ruling should not extend to contingent or speculative matters. ......... Finally, the 
Commissioner should be entitled to decline to give rulings in matters which, in his opinion, it 
would not be appropriate to do so. 
The recommendations referred to above are analysed in detail below. 
In the above recommendation, reference is made to the establishment of administrative 
procedures pertaining to the application of rulings. Such procedures would fall within the 
category of procedural rulings referred to by Baldwin. Practice Note 2, which states the 
procedure which must be followed in applications for exemption from stamp and transfer duty is 
an example of a procedural ruling. 
2.6.4.5.4 An Administrative Procedure 
New Zealand 
In New Zealand (54) the administrative procedure in respect of rulings is the following: 
• In the first instance, application is to the taxpayer's district office in the Inland Revenue 
Department. Most rulings are made at this level, though reference to Regional Offices 
or to the Departmental Head are not uncommon. 
• The Department does not consider itself obliged to issue rulings, though it endeavours to 
do so. 
• There is no appeal from an unfavourable ruling. The taxpayer may carry on regardless if 
he wishes and challenge the view of the department when a return has been furnished 
and an assessment issued. 
• The department emphasises that its rulings are expressions of its opinion and are not 














subsequently discovered that the facts are not as stated by the taxpayer in the application 
for the ruling. However, changes in the law or its interpretation will also cause the 
department to change its ruling. Furthermore, the department from time to time 
corrects rulings that it concludes were wrong when issued. 
Application for a ruling is by letter setting out the fact of the proposal together with 
drafts of relevant documents. 
The department will not give rulings in proposals which involve or could involve tax 
avoidance, hypothetical situations, a series or alternatives to the same transaction, or 
proposals where the names of the taxpayers are not disclosed. 
United States of America 
In the United States of America (55), a request for a ruling to the IRS must include: 
Names, addresses and tax identifying numbers of all interested parties; The location of the IRS 
office that has or will have jurisdiction over the return or report of each party; A full and precise 
statement of the business reasons for the transaction; And a careful detailed description of the 
transactions. 
In addition, the true copies of all contracts, wills, deeds, agreements, instruments and other 
documents involved in the transaction must be submitted with the request. However relevant 
facts reflected in documents submitted must be included in the taxpayers statement and not be 
incorporated by reference, and must be accompanied by an analysis of their bearing on the issue 
or issues, specifying the pertinent provisions. The request must contain a statement whether, to 
the best of the knowledge of the taxpayer or his representative, the identical issues are being 
considered by any field office of the IRS in connection with the act of examination or audit of a 
tax return already filed or is being considered by a branch office. Where the request pertains to 
.~:mly step of a larger integrated transaction, the facts, circumstances etc. must be submitted with 
respect to the entire transaction. 
Conclusion 
It is submitted that the Commissioner for Inland Revenue could emulate the procedures laid 
down by the New Zealand Inland Revenue as well as the information required by the IRS and 
compile an application procedure which would include the details which the taxpayer was 
required to submit. Baldwin, asks the question of whether procedural rulings are mandatory or 
directory (56). He states (57) that generally, 'the legal force varies according both to the strength 
of authority or legitimacy that a set of rules has and to the nature of the particular rule.' It is 
submitted that procedural rules, would be more likely regarded by the Judiciary, as being 
mandatory if their aim is to facilitate smooth administration. Rulings should be issued as 
expeditiously as possible. In this regard, the writer has been informed by a representative of the 
Receiver of Revenue in Cape Town that, for the purposes of completion of the new part 8 of the 











ruling pertaining to information which is required to be furnished in this schedule. 
2.6.4.5.6 Direct and Substantial Interest 
2.6.4.6 
In other jurisdictions, the taxpayer is required to have a direct interest in the ruling which is 
sought. In the United States of America a request for a specific ruling must include the names, 
addresses and taxpayer identifying numbers of all interested parties. In Canada (58) individual 
rulings will not be given where the taxpayer is not identified. The position is the same in Australia 
and New Zealand. (59) 
In jurisdictions such as Sweden and Canada trade and industry associations successfully obtain 
rulings which have become precedents for that trade or industry. Although these rulings are not 
binding, nevertheless they have strong persuasive influence before the courts in those 
jurisdictions. In Canada a company can successfully obtain a binding ruling on behalf of its 
employees or shareholders even though the employees or shareholders are not parties to the 
application for the ruling. This would occur in cases such as a restructure. This recommendation 
must be read together with the recommendation in respect of the applicability of rulings, which is 
examined on page above. 
Publication of Rulings 
The Margo Commission (60) recommended that: 
The Commissioner should stablish a manual containing the regulations published by him from 
time to time. These regulations would set out the interpretation which the Commissioner accords 
to various sections of the Act. The Commissioner would be bound by these regulations, but the 
-taxpayer would be at liberty to challenge any of them. 
Publication of Rulings in other Jurisdictions 
Australia 
It is obvious that, in order that discretionary power is regulated effectively by rule based 
administrative action, it is crucial that the taxpayer is aware of the rules, ie. the rules must be 
published. 
The Jons et origo of the introduction of formal published rulings in jurisdictions such as Canada 
and Australia, is the existence of a Freedom of Information Act. 











provide the public inter alia with : 
'manuals, or other documents containing interpretations, rules, guideline practices or precedents 
including ... precedents in the nature of letters of advice providing information to bodies or 
bodies outside the Commonwealth administration.' 
In most countries a distinction is made between a publication of individual rulings and the 
publication of general administrative procedure or general interpretation of legislation. Generally 
the publication of general information is not restricted. However there are restrictions on the 
publication of individual rulings. 
In terms of Section 3 of the Freedom of Information Act : 
'The right of access is to be granted by making available to the public information about rules and 
practices affecting them in their dealings with departments and public authorities and by creating 
a general right of access to information in documentary form in possession of ministers, 
departments and public authorities.' 
In terms of part 2 of the Act copies of documents containing technical rulings, interpretations and 
guidelines as well as practices or precedents used to make decisions affecting the rights and 
obligations of taxpayers, must be made available for inspection and for purchase by the public 
(61). 
The above Act came into effect in 1982. As from December 1, 1982 the taxation ruling system 
was introduced as a method of disseminating decisions on interpretation of the laws administered 
by the Commissioner of Taxation. This system is intended to enable the Commissioner to fulfil 
his obligations under the Freedom of Information Act. Taxation rulings are available for 
information and purchase at branch offices of the taxation officer. These rulings cannot bind the 
Commissioner and cannot circumvent the law. The rulings are however published but the 
anonymity of the taxpayer is maintained. 
Canada 
Canada also has a Freedom of Information Act 1984 which is similar to the legislation in 
Australia. Accordingly Revenue Canada is required to publish rulings. These rulings are edited 
and although anonymity is preserved, they are nevertheless available for public examination. In 
Canada rulings were not published for a number of years. This caused the establishment of 
informal clubs of tax practitioners from law and accounting firms who exchanged these 
unpublished rulings. (62) In Canada a distinction is drawn between specific rulings and general 












Sweden also has a Freedom of Information Act. Consequently rulings are published but the 
anonymity of the taxpayer is preserved. General policy statements in Sweden are published as 
well. 
United States of America 
General policy decisions pertaining to the interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code are 
published by the IRS. These interpretations are published as treasury regulations. 
The rulings issued pursuant to a specific request must also be publicised. The anonymity of the 
taxpayer must be maintained. 
United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom distinguishes between three types of statements of revenue practice. Firstly 
there are extra statutory concessions which are usually published. These are : 
Departures from the strict letter of the law, but always in favour of the taxpayer. There purpose is 
to allow relief which is in the spirit of a particular piece of legislation but which, for some reason 
or other is not actually given by it. There is a published list of these extra statutory concessions 
which is brought up to date annually. They are all reported to the Comptroller and Auditor 
General and are subject to scrutiny by the Public Accounts Committee. They are therefore 
subject to Parliamentary examination and oversight. (64) 
Secondly there are statements of practice which is also published. These statements of practice 
are: 
'A description of the way the revenue will in the general run of cases interpret and apply 
particular legal provisions. There is nothing legally binding. The statement if a public statement 
of the revenues understanding. It is open to any taxpayer who could consider .that its application 
to his own tax liability produces a result which cannot be upheld in law, to appeal against the 
assessment in the usual way. Certain of these statements are published.' 
The third category consists of advance rulings which are granted in individual cases provided the 













From the above it can be seen that most jurisdictions distinguish between general interpretation 
of sections of the Act which are published as well as individual rulings which are generally 
published although taxpayer anonymity is maintained. The existence of a Freedom of Information 
Act has meant that a ruling system has been developed as a means of fulfilling the requirements 
of the Act. In Australia, the taxation rulings system has now 'developed to such an extent that 
simply meeting the requirements of [The Freedom of Information Act] is arguably no longer the 
raison d'etre for issuing rulings. The public rulings system has now become a self perpetuating 
body for which documents are specifically created. Although the system maintains its primary 
function as a notification system for decisions, 'rulings' now often constitute the decisions 
themselves. Moreover they are written in a manner and form specifically for tax practitioners in 
mind, rather than simply as instructions to internal taxation officers (65).' 
South Africa 
In order to facilitate the completion of part 8 of the IT14 form, the Receiver of Revenue has 
undertaken to issue rulings, within 2 weeks of the request being made (in the case of simple 
matters) in respect of the information which is required in that part of the return (66). It is 
submitted that these rulings, if published, would assist a taxpayer in completion of Part 8 of the 
IT14. Furthermore, the rulings which have been published would contribute to greater efficiency 
in the office of the Receiver of Revenue because a taxpayer may be able to complete a return by 
referring to a published ruling, rather than applying for an individual ruling. 'The practice [of 
issuing Rulings] exists because the Revenue has concluded that it is of assistance to the 
administration of a complex tax system and ultimately to the benefit of the overall tax yield. [per 
_Judge Jin R v Board of Inland Revenue, ep. MF K Underwriting Agencies (67). 
The recent case of CIR v SA Mutual Unit Trust Management Co (68) illustrates the effect of the 
secrecy which surrounds the system of rulings in South Africa. In this case, the meaning of 
'practice generally prevailing' in section 79(1)(iii) was examined. In this case, the taxpayer failed 
to discharge the onus that the original assessment was in accordance with a practice generally 
prevailing at the time. 
Corbett CJ stated that a crucial feature of such a practice is that the practice must be one which 
is applicable to generally in the offices of the Receiver of Revenue and that 'it would not be 
sufficient to show that the practice was applied merely in one or two offices.' 
(This statement by Corbett C J is similar to the view of Bingham L J in MF K Underwn'ters who 
stated (69) that the similar responses of six Revenue officials over a period could not be 












The dearth of publications means that it is very difficult for a taxpayer to discharge such an onus. 
He could only discharge the onus (i) if there was a practice note. (Only eleven have been issued 
since March 1985) or (ii) by the subpoena of all the Receivers of Revenue (70). 
It is submitted that the recommendations of the Margo Commission are inadequate. It is 
submitted that South Africa should follow other jurisdictions in respect of the publication of 
individual rulings which have beeu obtained provided that the anonymity of the taxpayer has been 
maintained. It is submitted that this would allow the public to inspect rulings which had been 
obtained and this would offer them guidance in their own tax planning. 
The recommendation by the Commission that general regulations should be published on the 
interpretation which the Commissioner accords to various sections of the Act should be 
welcomed. This is in accordance with practice prevailing in other jurisdictions. Once again this 
would assist the taxpayer in planning his affairs. 
The Government's response in its White Paper to this recommendation was (71) : 
This recommendation would be appropriate to a system of self assessment. 'Regulations' are not 
made by the Commissioner under the present system. This recommendation is at present not 
considered necessary as good text books and other publications dealing with taxation practice are 
available. The issuing of Practice Notes on a more regular basis is contemplated. 
It is submitted that the response of the government White Paper to the recommendation is 
unacceptable. Furthermore one wonders whether the Government regards the press statements 
which are released as a component of the 'other publications.' Such statements have sometimes 
been retroactive. Furthermore they are not always clear and furthermore they are also introduced 
at short notice. This creates uncertainty and does little to enable a person to plan his affairs. Text 
-books etc. contain views of third parties and do not interpret the Income Tax Act on behalf of the 
Commissioner. The response by the government that more Practice Notes should be issued is 
welcomed. Nevertheless it is submitted that the i;:;suing of Practice Notes should be in addition to 
the publication of a manual containing general regulation which is in accordance with most 
foreign jurisdictions. 
In view of the numerous discretions which the Commissioner has it is submitted that publication 
of rulings, Practice Notes and a manual of regulations would in the words of the Margo 
Commission 'gain certainty and thus facilitate economic decision making and ... promote equity.' 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter, the administrative law relationship between the Commissioner and the taxpayer 
was examined with refererce to the Commissioner. Section 3 was examined because it is a 











proposed rulings should be binding upon the Commissioner rn certain circumstances. 
Furthermore, it was proposed that Rulings should be published. Rulings are an important 
manifestation of rule based administrative action. The publication of Rulings means that there is 
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THE SUBJECT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW RELATIONSHIP 
CONTINUED: THE TAXPAYER AND THE DOCTRINE OF 
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION 
3.1 Introduction 
The parties to the administrative law relationship are the Commissioner and the individual 
taxpayer. Having examined certain aspects of the Commissioner's role in this Administrative Law 
relationship, it is necessary to examine the administrative law relationship from the perspective of 
the taxpayer. The question which is answered here is whether the taxpayer has the remedy of 
legitimate expectation which can be enforced against the Commissioner. 
3.2 General and Individual Administrative Law Relationships 
Wiechers (1) makes a distinction between general (objective) relationships as opposed to 
individual (or subjective) relationships. General administrative relationships are those 
relationships to which the same legal rules apply to all persons within those relationships and 
which are created or varied by legislative measures, whether by parliamentary or subordinate 
legislation. On the other hand, the content of indlvidual relationships vary from case to case. 
_Wiechers (2) draws the following conclusions from this distinction. 
(a) General relationships may only be varied or terminated by general means, ie. by 
legislation including subordinate legislation. 
(b) An administrative organ may not govern general relationships by way of an individual 
resolution. 
( c) The effect of an Act which repeals a prior Act is drastically influenced according to 
whether there is a general or individual relationship is involved. If an Act which contains 
rules governing a general relationship is amended or repealed, the new legal rules apply 
to that relationship. Unless the amending Act directs otherwise, individual relationships 











( d) A further consequence of the difference between the general and specific relationships 
relates to the administration's power to enter into agreements with subjects. An 
administrative organ may not stipulate anything in an agreement if there is a general 
provision relating to that aspect. 
(e) When a court invalidates a legislative measure which creates a general relationship, the 
entire relationship is terminated. 
Wiechers (3) states that private individuals also have rights which can be enforced against the 
State. This is based on the theory of public law rights. However, there is no actio popularis which 
gives the individual the right to challenge an administrative act on the ground of general interest. 
According to Wiechers, rights which an individual has, include 
a) All those rights which he can enforce against other private individuals in a private 
sphere. Unless authorised to do so, the administration may not deprive a subject of his 
private rights. 
b) A private individual has a variety of common law freedoms, powers and privileges which 
may be enforced against the administration. One example of such a common law 
privilege or freedom which enjoys full recognition in Administrative Law and which is 
not generally recognised in private law is the right of the subject to be economically 
active. In Administrative Law it is this very right of the subject to be economically active 
which entitles him to demand that the rules of natural justice be complied with when he 
applies for a trading licence. ( 4) 
-c) The private individual has a wide variety of rights, powers and privileges which he 
acquires either by statute or by virtue of the democratic constitutional system. Thus, for 
example, a subject who objects to the issue of a new licence may rely on the right against 
over-trading; this right has been conferred on him by the statute which guards against 
over-trading in a particular commercial sphere. (5) 
In chapter one, a distinction was made between rule based administrative action on the one hand 
and adjudicative techniques of decision on the other. Essentially adjudicative techniques of 
decision mean 'the participation of the affected person in the decision about his welfare' (6). The 
most obvious method by which a person participates in a decision which affects him is by utilising 
the rules of natural justice, eg. the audi a/terem partem rule. 











legitimate expectation. The relationship between this doctrine and the rules of natural justice is 
examined in order to answer the question of whether the doctrine is applicable to Revenue Law 
in South Africa. 
3.3 English law and the doctrine of legitimate expectation 
In England (7), the doctrine of legitimate expectation has developed concurrently with the 
concept of the duty of fairness. Generally the duty of fairness means that an individual may avail 
himself of the remedy of judicial review 'on the grounds that a duty of fairness is owed by 
administrators to the public (8).' 
One of the first cases in which the doctrine of legitimate Expectation was mentioned is m 
Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Affairs. (9) where Lord Denning stated: 
'An administrative body may, in a proper case, be bound to give a person who is affected 
by their decision an opportunity of making representations. It all depends on whether he 
has some right or interest, or some legitimate expectation, of which it would not be fair 
to deprive him without hearing what he has to say.' 
Generally the doctrine of legitimate expectation contains a procedural as well as a substantive 
component. In terms of the procedural component of the doctrine, the aggrieved person has a 
legitimate expectation that he will be given a right to a hearing and that rules relating to 
procedural fairness are applied. The substantive law component of the doctrine means that the 
aggrieved person has a legitimate expectation that a decision will be favourable to him. In 
Schmidt's case, Lord Denning mentioned the doctrine in respect of substantive law only. 
At the time of Schmidt's case and cases which were heard a few years thereafter, the duty of 
f}lirness meant adherence to the rules of natural justice (10). 
A useful distinction was made by Sir Robert Megarry in a later case, namely Mcinnes v Onslow 
Fane (11). He stated: 
'[W]here the court is entitled to intervene, I think it must be considered what type of 
decision is in question. I do not suggest that there is any clear or exhaustive 
classification; but I think that at least three categories may be discerned. First, there are 
what may be called the forfeiture cases. In these, there is a decision which takes away 
some existing right or position, as where a member of an organisation is expelled or a 
licence is revoked. Second, at the other extreme there are what may be called the 
application cases. These are cases where the decision merely refuses to grant the 
applicant the right or position that he seeks, such as membership of the organisation, or 
a licence to do certain acts. Third, there is an intermediate category, which may be called 
the Expectation cases, which differ from the application cases only in that the applicant 
has some legitimate expectation from what has already happened that his application will 
be granted. This head includes cases where an existing licence-holder applies for a 
renewal of his licence, or a person already elected or appointed to some position seeks 











The problem which arises with this classification is the position of the dividing line between the 
second category ie. the application cases, and the third category ie. the expectation cases. As far 
as the distinction between the forfeiture cases and the application cases is concerned, Megarry 
stated (12) that 
'It seems plain that there is a substantial distinction between the forfeiture cases and the 
application cases. In the forfeiture cases, there is a threat to take something away for 
some reason; and in such cases, the right to an unbiased tribunal, the right to notice of 
the charges and the right to be heard in answer to the charges ... are plainly apt. In the 
application cases, ·on the other hand, nothing is being taken away, and in all normal 
circumstances there are no charges, and so no requirement of an opportunity of being 
heard in answer to the charges. Instead, there is the far wider and less defined question 
of the general suitability of the applicant for membership ... The distinction is well 
recognised, for in general it is clear that the courts will require natural justice to be 
observed for expulsion from a social club, but not on a application for admission to it.' 
As far as the legitimate expectation cases are concerned, Megarry stated (13) that : 
'The intermediate category, that of the Expectation cases, may at least in some respects 
be regarded as being more akin to the forfeiture cases than the application cases; for 
although in form there is no forfeiture but merely an attempt at acquisition that fails, the 
legitimate expectation of a renewal of the licence or confirmation of the membership is 
one which raises the question of what it is that has happened to make the applicant 
unsuitable for membership or licence for which he was previously thought suitable.' 
Thus, the common element between the application and the expectation cases is that something 
has been taken away. The difficulty is deciding what it is that has been taken away and 
consequently whether the rules of natural justice apply (forfeiture cases) or whether a diluted 
version of the rules apply (expectation cases). 
Lord Diplock stated (14) in respect of the duty of fairness that : 
'Such legitimate expectation gave to each appellant a sufficient interest to challenge the 
legality of the adverse disciplinary award made against him by the Board of the grounds 
that in one way or another the Board, in reaching its decision, had acted outwith the 
powers conferred on it by the legislation under which it was acting; and such grounds 
would include the Board's failure to observe the rules of natural justice : which meant no 
more than to act fairly towards him in carrying out their decision-making process .. .' 
Thus the duty of fairness is equated with the rules of natural justice. 
3.3.1 The GCHQ case 
A leading case in English Law is Council of Civil Service Unions and Others v The Minister for the 
Civil Service (15). Government Communications headquarters (GCHQ) is a branch of the Civil 
Service whose main functions were to ensure the security of the United Kingdom Military and 
Official Communications and to provide signals intelligence for the government. All the staff at 
GCHQ had a long standing right, originating when GCHQ was formed in 1937, to belong to 











taken in 1981, the Minister for the Civil Service issued an oral instruction to the effect that the 
terms and conditions of Civil Servants at GCHQ would be revised so as to exclude membership 
of any trade union other than a departmental staff association approved by the director of 
GCHQ. That instruction, which was issued without prior consultation with the staff at GCHQ 
was issued pursuant to the Minister's power under Article 3 of the Civil Service Order Council 
1982 to : 'give instructions ... for controlling the conduct of the service and providing for ... the 
conditions of service.' 
The order itself was made under the Royal Prerogative. The appellant, applied for a judicial 
review of the Minister's instruction. 
It was held, inter alia, that the appellant's legitimate expectation arising from the existence of a 
regular practice of consultation which the appellants could reasonably expect to continue, gave 
rise to an implied limitation on the Minister's exercise of the power contained in Article 3 of the 
1982 Order, namely an obligation to act fairly by consulting the GCHQ staff before withdrawing 
the benefit of trade union membership. It was further held that the Minister's failure to consult 
was a ground for judicial review. However, the Minister's decision was upheld on the grounds of 
national security. The case is important because the judges discussed the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations at length. 
Lord Fraser equated legitimate expectation with a reasonable Expectation. (16) He further stated 
that : 
'Legitimate, or reasonable Expectation may arise either from an express promise given 
on behalf of a public authority or from the existence of a regular practice which the 
practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue.' (17) 
Thus, the word 'legitimate' is equated with the notion of reasonableness. Furthermore, the 
representation in respect of which a legitimate expectation arises is either an express promise or 
the existence of a regular practice. 
Lord Diplock in deciding whether a matter was subject for judicial review, stated generally that a 
decision must have consequences which affect some person or body of persons. As in 
South Africa, there is no English equivalent of the actio popularis. Lord Diplock stated that the 
decision must affect the person : 
'either : (a) by altering rights or obligations of that person which are enforceable by or 
against him in private law or; (b) by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which 
either (i) he has in the past been permitted by the decision maker to enjoy and which he 
can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there has been 
communicated to him some rational ground for withdrawing it on which he has been 
given an opportunity to comment or; (ii) he has received assurance from the decision 
maker will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing 











The first category is similar to the forfeiture cases referred to by Megarry in Mcinnes v 
Onslow-Fane (19) The distinction is in turn the same as that referred to by Wiechers (20) where 
he states that private individuals who enter into administrative law relationships possess all those 
rights which can be enforced against other private individuals in the private law sphere. 
As far as Lord Diplock's second category is concerned, the distinction is made between the 
procedural component and the substantive component of the doctrine of legitimate expectation. 
Lord Diplock states that he prefers the phrase 'legitimate expectation' rather than 'reasonable 
expectation' because : 
'In order thereby to indicate that it has consequences to which effect will be given in 
public law, whereas an expectation or hope that some benefit or advantage would 
continue to be enjoyed, although it might be well entertained by a reasonable man, 
would not necessarily have such consequences ... Reasonable furthermore bears different 
meanings according to whether the context in which it is used is that of private law or 
public law. To eliminate confusion it is best avoided in the latter.' (21) 
Lord Roskill emphasised that procedural component of the doctrine (22) when he stated that 
'The principle is closely connected with a right to be heard. Such an expectation may 
take many forms. One may be an expectation of prior consultation. Another may be an 
expectation of being allowed to make representations, especially where the aggrieved 
party is seeking to persuade an authority to depart from a lawfully established policy 
adopted in connection with the exercise of a particular power because of some suggested 
exceptional reasons justifying such departure.' 
Lord Fraser's statement as to when a legitimate expectation would arise (23) was applied in a 
later case, namely Ruddock v Secretary of State for the Home Department. (24) This case 
concerned the tapping of telephones of members of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. 
'!'he Secretary of State had issued criteria governing the interception of calls. Furthermore, the 
Secretary of State stated that he would only authorise interception of telephone calls of certain 
groups which did not include the Campaign for Nuclear Disarm3Illent. Taylor J applied these two 
factors to the test stated by Lord Fraser. He stated : 
'It would be hard to imagine a stronger case of an Expectation arising in Lord Fraser's 
words in the GCHQ case ... Either from an express promise given on behalf of a public 
authority or from the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can reasonably 
expect to continue.' (25) 
This case is interesting in that it shows that it is not always easy to distinguish between the 
procedural component and the substantive component of the doctrine of legitimate expectation. 
Taylor J stated that 'I conclude that the doctrine of legitimate expectation in essence imposes a 
duty to act fairly (26).' This is the procedural component of the doctrine. 
Taylor J then states that the applicants were entitled to a legitimate expectation that their 











substantive component of the doctrine. (27) 
3.3.2 English law continued : Application of the doctrine to Revenue Law 
Decisions have been reported in England where the doctrine was canvassed in respect of 
Revenue Law. In Preston's case (28) the taxpayer and the Inland Revenue Commissioner agreed 
that if the taxpayer withdrew his claims for certain tax relief the Inland Revenue Commissioner 
would not make any further investigations into the sale of shares by the taxpayer. An inspector 
from Inland Revenue later re-opened the investigation. The taxpayer's appeal was ~ismissed 
because the correspondence between the taxpayer and the Inspector did not disclose any 
agreement or representation that the Commissioners would abandon their right to further 
assessments on the taxpayer. 
It is implied in the judgment that the doctrine of legitimate expectation does not apply to general 
administrative law relationships (29) because it was held that the primary duty of the 
Commissioner was to collect, not to forgive, taxes and in the absence of special circumstances in 
which the unfairness complaint amounted to an abusive power, the court could not by way of 
judicial review, decide that an action against the taxpayer which the Commissioner's had 
determined to be fair, was unfair. 
Lord Templeman stated (30) that : 
In principle I see no reason why the taxpayer should not be entitled to judicial review of a 
decision taken by the commissioners if that decision is unfair to the taxpayer because the conduct 
of the commissioners is equivalent to a breach of contract or a breach of representation. Such a 
decision falls within the ambit of an abuse of power for which in the present case judicial review 
is the sole remedy and a appropriate remedy. There may be cases in which conduct which savours 
of breach of contract or breach of representation does not constitute an abuse of power; there 
IIlay be circumstances in which the court in its discretion might not grant relief by judicial review 
notwithstanding conduct which savours of breach of contract or breach of representation. In the 
present case, however, I consider that the taxpayer is entitled to relief by way of judicial review 
for 'unfairness' amounting to abuse of power if the commissioners have been guilty of conduct 
equivalent to a breach of contract or breach of representations on their part. 
Lord Templeman equates unfairness with an abuse of power and abuse of power arises, inter 
alia, where there is conduct on the part of the Commissioner which is equivalent to a breach of 
contract or a breach of a misrepresentation. This means that the duty of fairness no longer means 
that the rules of justice. must be observed. 
In MF K Underwriting Agents Limited (31) the doctrine of legitimate expectation was canvassed 
extensively. The five applicants were Lloyds Underwriting Agents and syndicates. In terms of 











two years after close of an underwriting year. In order to invest the premium income in securities 
which were not only secure, inflation proof and readily accessible (in case the funds were 
required to meet claims by policy holders) but which also produced a yield which is taxable for 
capital gains rather than as income, thereby minimising the tax liability of their members, Lloyds 
syndicates preferred to invest premium income in index-linked gilts or similar securities where 
possible. In the case of UK Gilts the indexation uplift in the redemption value of the stock was 
treated as capital and any gain was taxed as a capital gain. In the case of premium income 
received in US or Canadian dollars the applicants were required to hold that income in US or 
Canadian dollar accounts or invest it in US or Canadian dollar securities but prior to 1986 there 
was no equivalent of index-linked US or Canadian dollar securities available for the investment of 
premium income received in US or Canadian dollars. A number of US banks therefore proposed 
to issue index-linked US or Canadian dollar securities intended for the Lloyds market. They 
made independent approaches to the Revenue seeking confirmation that the index-linked 
element payable on redemption of those securities would be regarded as capital and, if it was 
taxed at all, it would be taxed only as capital gains and not as inc me. In reply, Revenue officials 
indicated that the considered that the index-linked element payable on redemption would be 
taxed only as capital gains and not as income. Betw en April 1986 and October 1988 the 
applicants purchased index-linked bonds in US and Canadian dollars on the basis that they 
index-linked element payable on redemption would not be taxed as income. In October 1988 the 
Revenue decided to tax the index-linked element as income. The applicants applied for judicial 
review of that decision on the grounds that it was unfair, inconsistent and discriminatory and thus 
an abuse of power. 
The applicants counsel argued that decisions of the Revenue, should be the subject of judicial 
review, inter alia, on the grounds of abuse of power, ie. on the grounds of unfairness (32). 
Counsel argued that the conduct of the Revenue was unfair because the conduct of the Revenue, 
(were the Revenue not a public body) had given rise to an estoppel or breach of contract. 
Counsel for the applicants argued that if a public authority has a policy which it makes known or 
announces, it may not act inconsistently with that policy without sufficient notice and then not 
retrospectively. 
In support of the above submissions the applicants relied, inter alia, on Preston's case and 
Ruddocks's case (33). 
Counsel for the Revenue stated that judicial review could not be invoked to oblige the Revenue 
to act contrary to its statutory duties. Counsel stated that Parliament alone could decide what 
taxes should be paid and Inland Revenue had to collect the tax that Parliament had determined. 











duty, agree or indicate in advance that it would not collect tax which, on a proper construction of 
the relevant legislation, was lawfully due. It was further submitted on behalf of the Revenue that 
this case was distinguishable from cases discussed above because in casu the statements relied on 
fell far short of any statement of official policy. 
In reply, the applicants counsel agreed that the Revenue could not bind itself to act contrary to a 
statutory duty. Counsel for the applicants argued however that the Revenue had been vested with 
a wide discretion as to the_ best means of collecting tax and its representations fell within this 
discretion. Therefore it did not act contrary to its statutory duty. 
Bingham L J stated that the application would be unsuccessful if the Revenue could not lawfully 
make the statements or representation which were allegedly made. However he stated that if, in a 
case involving no breach of statutory duty, the Revenue makes an agreement or representation 
from which it cannot withdraw without substantial unfairness to the taxpayer who has relied on it, 
that may found a successful application for judicial review. The above statement is based on the 
views of Lord Templeman in Preston's case (34). 
However, in cases where there has been no breach of statutory duty, Bingham L J stated that he 
was of the opinion that : 
'In assessing the meaning, weight and effect reasonably to be given to the statements of 
the Revenue the factual context, including the position of the Revenue itself, is all 
important. Every ordinarily sophisticated taxpayer knows that the Revenue is a 
tax-collecting agency, not a tax-imposing authority. The taxpayer's only legitimate 
expectation is, prima facie, that he will be taxed according to statute, not according to a 
concession or a wrong view of the law (35). 
Bingham L J stated that the applicants case should fail but that if the following requirements had 
J:een met, then he would have held that the Revenue was bound by its representation. 
(a) The taxpayer must give full details of the specific transaction on which he seeks the 
Revenue's ruling, unless it is the same as an earlier transaction on which a ruling has 
already been given; and 
(b) the taxpayer must indicate the ruling sought which means that; 
(i) the taxpayer must make plain that a fully considered ruling is sought; and 
(ii) the taxpayer should indicate the use he intends to make of the ruling; and 
( c) it is necessary that the ruling or statement relied upon should be clear, unambiguous and 











The above requirements are tantamount to a procedural ruling of the type discussed in 
chapter two. Bingham L J stated that he was not undermining the concept of legitimate 
expectation. He stated that the doctrine of legitimate expectation was 'rooted in fairness' (37) by 
which is meant 'the notion of equitableness, of fair and open dealing to which the authority is 
entitled as much as the citizen.' 
The doctrine of legitimate expectation was again canvassed in Camacq Corporation. (38) In this 
case the applicants applie4 for judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner revoking a 
direction given to one of the applicants to pay dividends to the US. 
Counsel for the applicants argued that the Revenue, having conceded the existence of a practice, 
ie. of allowing gross dividends to be paid overseas, should have honoured it and if it wished to 
change its practice, it should have said that it was going to do so. Counsel for the applicants 
further argued that the applicants had a legitimate expectation that the Revenue would behave in 
that way because the doctrine of legitimate expectation was not limited to procedural 
irregularities. 
Counsel for the Revenue brought evidence to show that the applicants were doubtful about the 
applicability of the ruling to that case. 
Kennedy L J rejected the contentions of the applicants. He stated that : 
'[The) applicants cannot invoke the doctrine of legitimate expectation because the 
practice in question never operated to their benefit. It benefited another class of 
taxpayer and it is only those who expect to benefit who can legitimately complain if, 
without notice, the practice which they expect to continue is prematurely brought to an 
end. It seems to me that the only practice on which the applicants could rely would be a 
practice of always issuing directives such as the directive issued on June 8 [to pay a gross 
dividend) and there is no evidence before me of the existence of any such practice.' (39) 
3.3.3 Conclusion and Analysis of English Law 
The following points may be concluded from all of the above cases : 
a) The doctrine of legitimate expectation is well entrenched in English Law. The doctrine 
has a procedural and a substantive law component which are inter-related. 
b) The doctrine of legitimate expectation and the doctrine of fairness have developed 
concurrently. In earlier cases such as O'Reily's case ( 40), fairness was equated with the 
rules of natural justice. In later cases such as Preston's case ( 41) fairness meant an abuse 
of power by which was meant conduct on the part of the authority which is equivalent to 
a breach of contract or a breach of misrepresentation. In MF K Underwriting ( 42), it was 
held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation was rooted in fairness, and that fairness 











equitableness of fair and open dealing to which the authority is entitled as much as the citizen 
(43).' 
c) In order for an applicant to succeed by invoking the doctrine of legitimate expectation, 
the applicant will have to comply with the procedural guidelines suggested by Bingham L 
J. 
d) The representation must benefit the applicant directly. If the representation was issued 
in respect of another class of taxpayer, then the applicant may not invoke the doctrine 
(44). 
e) Although the doctrine may not be invoked in order to bind the Revenue to an act which 
is in conflict with the statute (In R v Imperial Chemical Industries PLC ( 45) Lord Oliver 
stated that an ultra vires violation of the statute (for payment of Petroleum Revenue tax) 
could not create a legitimate e>,.-pectation), nevertheless in view of the wide discretion 
which the Revenue has in order to collect taxation, the Revenue may not merely rely on 
the fact that it has no discretion to remit the taxation which has been imposed by 
Parliament in MF K Underwriters (46), where it was stated that the Revenue has 'a 'Nide 
managerial discretion as to the best means of obtaining for the national exchequer from 
the taxes committed to their charge, the highest net return that is practical having regard 
to the staff available to them and the cost of collection.' 
3.4 Australia 
The doctrine of legitimate expectation has been accepted in Australia. As in England, the concept 
of fairness in Australia was initially equated with the rules of natural justice ( 47). Furthermore, in 
-
Australia the doctrine of fairness meant that a hearing was implied where a representative of the 
state had made an undertaking 'or followed a regular practise which the complainant could 
reasonably expect to be honoured' (48). 
The case of Cunningham v Cole and Others ( 49) involved an application for re-appointment to 
the public service. The application was refused on the grounds of alleged misconduct. Ellicot J 
allowed the applicant's. appeal. 
The judge stated : (50) 
'Once it is accepted ... that the notion of 'legitimate expectation' can apply even where 
the person affected by the decision does not have a right to the exercise of a discretion in 
his favour, it becomes necessary ... to consider each case in relation to its circumstances. 
The proper question to ask is, in my view, whether, having regard to the circumstances in 
which the discretion is being exercised, the person complaining is entitled to expect, in 
accordance with ordinary rules of fairness, that rules of natural justice such as an 











a/ia, on a consideration of the nature of the discretion in its statutory context, the 
circumstances in which it is exercised and the consequences of its exercise unfavourably 
to that person.' , 
It is clear that Ellicot J is discussing the procedural component of the doctrine. He concluded 
that the applicant : 
'Had a legitimate expectation that the question of his future employment in the service 
under the application in question, would not be decided on grounds of prior conduct 
without his having had knowledge of the alleged misconduct and an opportunity to be 
heard in relation to it.' (51) 
In a later case, namely, Kioa v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (52) the doctrine of 
fairness was given a different meaning. The applicant's were citizens of Tonga, who had 
requested extensions of their temporary entry permits. An order had been issuing in terms of 
which the applicants were to be deported. Of significance in this case is the fact that there had 
been no prior representation by the Minister that the temporary entry permit would be extended 
upon its expiry, ie. there had been no act on the part of the Minister hich was tant amount to a 
breach of contract or representation. It was held that the applicant's had a legitimate expectation 
generally because a previous temporary entry permit had been granted. It was held that the rules 
of natural justice were applicable whenever 'rights, interests, status or legitimate expectations' at 
page 383 were affected. The tenor of the judgment is that the enquiry is not firstly to establish 
whether the applicant has a legitimate expectation, and if so to apply the rules of natural justice. 
Rather the judgment in this case suggests that the rules of natural justice should be invoked 
whenever an individual is affected in any way by the decision. 
In a subsequent case, namely, Kurtovic v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic 
(53) Affairs, the Minister signed the deportation order which was subsequently revoked. After 
revocation, the applicant received a letter warning him that any further convection would lead to 
~e question of his deportation being reconsidered. In 1988 the Minister signed a fresh 
deportation order even though the applicant had not been convicted of a further offence. It was 
held that the voluntary promise in 1985 founded a legitimate expectation in the applicant that 
without new material before the Minister, he would not deport the applicant. 
3.4.1 Conclusion and analysis of the doctrine in Australia 
In Australia, as in England, the concept of the legitimate expectation had to develop in tandem 
with that of fairness to permit this extension of natural justice to new fields of administrative 
decision making (54). 
A//ars states that : 
'Australian, judicial and academic perception of natural justice has been stifled by faithfulness to 
the test ... for the implication of natural justice. The three-fold test requires consideration of the 











administrator is entitled to intervene and the sanctions the latter is entitled to impose. Any one or 
more of the factors may point to the implication of the rules of natural justice (55).' 
In Kioa's (56) case, this test was not adhered to and it was held that in order for procedural 
fairness to apply, the decision of the administrative authority may affect any interest of the 
individual. 'The expression 'legitimate expectation' is simply an epithet for all his interest and is 
not a sure criterion for determining whether natural justice is implied (57).' 
However, in Kurtovic's (58) case Einfeld J (59) again adhered to the implication test referred to 
in above. Therefore it appears as if the test in Kioa's (60) case may not signify a new trend in 
Australia. 
As in England, policy statements by the relevant governmental authority may create a legitimate 
expectation that the representation of the particular Minister will not be revoked. 
3.5 European Courts 
The European Courts have accepted the doctrine of legitimate expectation. Forsyth states that 
the development of the doctrine (61) before the European Courts was not based on English law 
but on the German doctrine of Vertrauenschutz Literally translated, it means 'protection of 
trust.' The concept arose in reaction to the principle of the free revocation of administrative acts. 
In Germany, the doctrine has been invoked even where the administrative act was unlawful. Thus 
in one case, the court had to weigh principles in order to determine whether public interest in the 
legality of the administration outweighed the need to protect the trust placed by a citizen in the 
validity of the administrative act. 




The development of the doctrine in South Africa has been strongly influenced by the 
development of the doctrine in English law. Cases pertaining to this doctrine which culminated in 
the acceptance by the Appellate Division of the doctrine are examined. After this development 
has been examined the question will be answered as to whether the doctrine has application with 
respect of rulings of the Receiver of Revenue. 
Case law 
Laubscher v Native Commissioner 













In this case it was held that the relevant Act did not make provision for an enquiry by a Native 
Commissioner before the latter could refuse the applicant permission to enter upon certain lands. 
The appellant was an attorney whose clients resided on the land in question. Reynolds A J A 
stated (63) that the appellant was not entitled to invoke the audi alteram partem rule. He stated 
that this rule was only applicable where the act complained of, took away some rights which the 
appellant possessed. In view of the fact that no existing rights were taken away, the doctrine had 
no application. This is an example of a forfeiture case mentioned by Megarry in O'Reilly's case. It 
is interesting to speculate as to what the outcome of this case would be, if it was decided recently 
and the appellant claimed that the doctrine of legitimate expectation applied. If he had been 
previously allowed on the land then it is submitted, based on the doctrine of legitimate 
expectation, the Commissioner would not be able to refuse permission for him to enter on the 
land again. Furthermore, on the basis of Kioas' case, it could be argued that the interest of the 
applicant was affected, ie. he had to consult with his clients. Therefore the rules of natural justice 
were applicable. 
In Laubscher's case, Hall A J A stated that the classification of administrative powers as purely 
administrative on the one hand and quasi judicial on the other, was apt. From this he concluded 
that where the Commissioner exercised a purely administrative power, 'he is under no obligation 
whatsoever to acquaint an applicant for permission with any information upon which that 
decision may have been based.' (64) 
It is submitted that this classification results in unfairness towards an applicant in Administrative 
Law. Administrative functions are not capable of easy classification according to whether they are 
administrative, legislative, judicial or quasi judicial. If an enquiry into the rights of an applicant is 
determined by the classification of the administrative function in question, the real nature of the 
interest which is affected, may be ignored. The role of the classification of administrative powers 
- is examined below. 
Everett v Minister of the Interior 
The doctrine was discussed in Everett v Minister of the Intedor (65) The applicant, a British citizen 
by birth, wished to become a permanent resident of South Africa. She had no intention of 
returning to England. She applied for an extension of her temporary residence permit for one 
year during which she intended making further representations to the immigration authorities to 
be granted permanent residence. This application was granted and her temporary permit was 
finally extended. Just before the expiration of the extension she was served with a letter from the 
Minister which ordered her temporary permit to be withdrawn with immediate effect. She was 
ordered to leave the country within a few days. The applicant who had received no prior notice of 
the Minister's intention applied to the Supreme Court for an order setting aside the notice 













natural justice as she had not been afforded an opportunity of making representation. The court 
held that there had been a breach of natural justice and the Minister's notice was set aside. 
The approach of Fagan J was to classify the power of the Minister as quasi judicial and to 
conclude that therefore the rules of natural justice should apply. Furthermore, the applicant had 
a legitimate expectation flowing from the fact the she had been permitted to stay for a certain 
period of time that she would be given a hearing. The approach of Fagan J is somewhat 
cumbersome. As Hlophe points out (66) if the applicant had a legitimate expectation of being 
allowed to stay for the permitted time, then there was no need to refer to the classification of the 
administrative function at all. Hlophe submits that if the quasi judicial classification had been 
ignored, Fagan J would have arrived at the same conclusion, if he invoked the legitimate 
expectation doctrine. 
Nevertheless, the judgment is important because it accepted the doctrine of legitimate 
expectation in South African law. Fagan J adopted a classificati n which distinguished between 
application cases on the one hand and forfeiture cases on the other. (67) It is implied"'in his 
judgment that the doctrine has no place in application cases but that it does apply in 
re-application cases ie. those cases where an application is made in respect of a right or liberty 
which was granted previously. 
It is interesting to compare this case to Kioa's case and to Kurtovic's case. It will be remembered 
that in the former case the temporary permit had expired and yet a legitimate Expectation was 
founded. In the latter case, the promise of the Minister not to deport the applicant founded a 
legitimate expectation. 
Boesak v Minister of Home Affairs 
In this case (68) the applicant's passport had been withdrawn in terms of the prerogative powers 
vested in the State President. Counsel for the applicant argued that the applicant had a legitimate 
expectation that he would be given a hearing before his passport was withdrawn because he 
would be committing a criminal offence if he left the country without his passport. This is the 
procedural component of the doctrine. Friedman J, held that that the applicant was not entitled 
to a hearing before the withdrawal of his passport because to do so would allow the applicant to 
leave the country prior to the hearing which would frustrate the reason why the passport was 
withdrawn. He held that the doctrine of ( 69) legitimate expectation does not constitute an 
additional ground for the application of the audi alteram partem principle. 
Castel N 0 v Mawu 











for permission to hold the annual general meeting of its Natal branch at an open air venue in 
Durban. Permission was refused whereupon the respondent made an urgent application for an 
order setting aside the appellant's refusal and directing the appellant to authorise the meeting. 
The order was granted on the grounds that : 
(a) the respondent had not been given a hearing (the court having found that, in applying for 
authority to hold the meeting, the respondent had not been applying for permission to do 
something it had not otherwise been entitled to do); 
(b) the appellant had erred in adopting an incorrect approach and by taking irrelevant 
matters into account; and 
( c) the appellant had acted ma/a fide and had acted in fraudem legis. 
In appeal from the decision of the court a quo, the appellant argued, that since the gathering had 
been prohibited and could not validly be held without authority, the refusal of the authority to 
hold the meeting had not affected any right of, and had not involved any legal consequences to, 
the respondent. It had not therefore been necessary for the appellant to apply the audi alteram 
partem rule. The respondent, on the other hand, argued that freedom of assembly, like freedom 
to trade was a basic right which, as a result of statutory interference, could no longer be 
exercised, in the case of a right to trade, otherwise than by licence, and, in the case of the right of 
assembly, otherwise than upon permission of the Minister or Magistrate. 
Furthermore it was argued that, as in the case of an application for a trading licence where it was 
generally accepted that the audi alteram partem rule had to be observed, so had the rule to be 
observed in applications for authority in terms of the Internal Security Act. 
-It was held that there was no need for the Minister or the Magistrate to whom the application for 
authority had been made to observe the audi alteram partem rule unless there were reasons 
calling for its observance. The courts view was based on the authority of Laubscher's case (71) ie. 
that there was no need for the respondent to observe the audi alteram partem rule because no 
rights which previously had existed, had been taken away. 
The respondent argued that the principle in Laubschers case was unjust and invited the court to 
grant relief in cases where an administrative decision, which did not affect a person's rights but 
nevertheless involved serious consequences to him, is taken without the observance of the audi 
alteram partem rule. It was suggested that the doctrine of legitimate expectation be invoked here. 
Refer J A acknowledged that he was : 
'Not unmindful of the serious and, in certain respects, justified criticism which had been 













indeed a need for legal reform. It would be idle to explore the possibility of reform in the present 
case. Even if the legitimate expectation approach were to be adopted, there is no room for its 
application here. Applicant's counsel submitted that the applicant had a legitimate expectation 
that it would receive a fair hearing, and that its application would not be refused on grounds 
which it had not been afforded an opportunity to refute. There is, no factual basis for such a 
submission. Unlike the English and Australian cases on which the court relied, nothing had 
happened before the application for authority was submitted and nothing happened thereafter 
which could have caused the applicant to entertain such an expectation .. .' (72) 
Of significance is Refer J A's implied statement that the doctrine would apply if something 
happened after the application which could have caused the applicant to entertain such an 
expectation. 
Langeni v Minister of Health and Welfare 
In Langeni's case, (73) an application was made by four provincial hospital employees for 
reinstatement on the grounds that their dismissal was unlawful. Goldstone J held that the 
classification of administrative functions was no longer adequate in determining whether the rules 
of natural justice were applicable. He stated that 'other tests have been adopted such as whether 
the administrative act in question is affecting rights or involving legal consequences to persons.' 
(74) 
Goldstone J accepted that the doctrine of legitimate expectation was part of South Africa law. He 
relied on English law but stated that the employees : 
'clearly had no right or legal interest to remain in the employment after the expiration of 
a notice period. I have no doubt that they also did not have a legitimate expectation that 
their employment would continue indefinitely unless there were good reasons for its 
termination. In effect they were employed at the pleasure of the administration and 
could leave employment at their pleasure. The fact that in some cases such as that of the 
first applicant, the employment has continued for many years, in no way confers any 
additional right, interest or legitimate expectation upon the employee.' (75) 
It is submitted that the approach adopted by Goldstone J is narrow. Although the employment 
relationship was that between the private individual and the State, nevertheless this should not 
exclude the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The doctrine should extend to incorporate a spes. 
It is submitted that employees who have been employed by the same employer for a period of 
time (even though they may be subject to 24-hours notice) have a legitimate expectation (based 
on the period of time for which they have been employed) that they will be reinstated. The 
judgment raises a further problem namely that an individual cannot enforce private law rights 
against the State where these have been excluded. 
Mokoena v Administrator Transvaal 
A similar case is Mokoena and Others v Administrator Transvaal. (76) The applicants who were 












their employment brou~t an application against their dismissal. Goldstone J again heard the 
case. 
They had, however, all been employed for a considerable number of years and after the first two 
years, had become compulsory members of the pension scheme established under the Temporary 
Employee's Pension Fund Act and had made contributions thereto. They now disputed the right 
of the Administration to have summarily dismissed them without giving reason therefore. It was 
held that, although prior to their becoming members of the scheme the Administration had been 
entitled to summarily dismiss them on 24 hours notice, the effect of their becoming members of 
the pension scheme had placed them on an entirely different category. The administrative 
authority giving them 24 hours notice clearly affected their pension rights and involved legal 
consequences to them. 
As far as the procedural irregularity is concerned, it was held that the maxim audi alterem partem 
rule applied and that they should have been heard before action was taken against them. 
As far as the substantive law component of the application is concerned, Goldstone J relying on 
English Law applied the doctrine of legitimate expectation and stated that the applicant's had a 
legitimate expectation that they would not be deprived of their right to qualify for a pension 
without good or sufficient reasonable cause. He stated that 'that legitimate expectation [of not 
being deprived of the right to qualify for a pension without good cause) would have entitled them 
to a hearing before the decision to terminate their employment was made .. .' (77) 
Goldstone J did not invoke the procedural component of the legitimate expectation doctrine but 
rather applied the rules of natural justice in vacuo. This is similar to the approach adopted by 
Fagan J in Everett's case. The doctrine of legitimate expectation was applied to the substantive 
law aspect of the case. This raises the question of whether if one has a substantive legitimate 
expectation, there is not a procedural legitimate expectation or the rules of natural justice, 
superfluous. On the other hand, it may be argued that the procedural legitimate expectation is 
important and the substantive legitimate expectation is superfluous. 
Administrator Transvaal v Traub 
In Administrator Transvaal and Others v Traub and Others (78). The Appellate Division 
confirmed that the doctrine of legitimate expectation was part of South African law. The 
respondents were doctors at the Baragwanath Hospital. The applicant had refused to appoint or 
re-appoint certain of them to posts at provincial hospitals. The reason for this was that the 
respondents had published a letter criticising the attitude of the Provincial Administration to 
conditions in the hospital. It was held that the respondents should be promoted to their posts. 











appointments would be confirmed (substantive component of the doctrine). Counsel for the 
respondents further argued that the respondents had a legitimate expectation to be heard before 
their appointments were not confirmed (procedural component of the doctrine). Therefore, 
instead of relying on the audi alterem partem rule as far as the procedural aspect of the unfairness 
was concerned, counsel for the respondents preferred to argue the procedural unfairness on the 
basis of the procedural component of the doctrine of legitimate expectation. This approach is in 
contrast to the decisions in Langeni and Mokoena (79). Corbett C J based his judgment on the 
English case law discussed above. 
Corbett C J stated that legitimate expectations 'are capable of including expectations which go 
beyond enforceable legal rights, provided they have some legal basis.' He quoted the speeches of 
Lord Fraser and Lord Roskill in the GCHQ case where it was said : 
'Legitimate, or reasonable, expectation may arise either from an express promise given 
on behalf of a public authority or from the existence of a regular practice which the 
claimant can reasonably expect to continue.' (80) 
Corbett C J accepted that the doctrine 'is sometimes expressed in terms of a substantive benefit 
... and at other times in terms of a legitimate expectation to be accorded a hearing .. .' (81) 
He further stated that : 
'In practice the two forms of expectation may be inter-related and even tend to merge. 
Thus, the person concerned may have a legitimate expectation that the decision by the 
public authority will be favourable or at least before an adverse decision is taken, he wiil 
be given a fair hearing.' (82) 
Corbett C J disagreed with the statement by Goldstone J in Mokoena's case that legitimate 
expectation refers to the rights sought to be taken away (substantive component) and not to the 
right to a hearing (procedural component). As far as the procedural component is concerned, 
Corbett C J conflIUled that it is equivalent to a duty to act fairly which merely means that the 
courts are only concerned with the manner in which the decision was taken. 
Corbett C J stated that the classification of administrative powers was no longer relevant. He 
stated that Laubscher's case (83) was no bar to the acceptance of the doctrine in South Africa. 
Corbett C J further stated that the doctrine should apply in South African law. He stated : 
'There are many cases when one can visualise ... where an adherence to the formula of 
'liberty, property and existing rights' would fail to provide a legal remedy, when the facts 
cry out for one; and would result in a decision which appeared to have been arrived at by 
procedure which is clearly unfair, being immune from review. The law should, in such 
cases, be made to reach out and come to the aid of persons prejudicially affected. 
At the same time, whereas the concepts of liberty, property and existing rights are 
reasonably well defined, that rif legitimate expectation is not. Like public policy, unless 
carefully handled it could become an unruly horse. And in working out, incrementally, 














it does not, the courts will no doubt bear in mind the need from time to time, to apply 
the curb. A reasonable balance must be maintained between the need to protect the 
individual from decisions unfairly arrived at by public authority (and by certain domestic 
tribunals) and the contrary desirability of avoiding undue judicial interference in their 
administration.' (84) 
Administrator Cape v Ikapa Town Council 
In the recent case of Administrator, Cape and Another v Ikapa Town Council (85) the respondent 
argued that it had a legitimate expectation that the Demarcation Board would grant it a hearing 
before a decision was taken. The Demarcation Board had made use of information in coming to 
a decision, which it had acquired, after a hearing but which had not been disclosed to the 
respondent. It was held that the information was not of a material nature and had not influenced 
the Board in making a decision. Joubert J A held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation was 
an integral part of the audi alteram partem rule. he held that 'there is a clear duty on the public 
official or body in exercising its statutory functions to act fairly and accord the affected individual 
a fair hearing.' Thus the judge applied the procedural component of the doctrine (86). 
Kahn v Pietermaritzburg Local Road Transportation Board 
In Kahn t/a Kahn's Motor Transport v Chainnan, Pietennaritzburg Local Road Transportation 
Board (87) the procedural component of the doctrine was applied. It was held that the decision of 
the Road Transportation Board was invalid because the applicant had not been informed of the 
date of the hearing (88). 
Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile 
In Administrator Transvaal v Zenzile (89), the respondents had obtained an order in the court a 
.quo setting aside a decision to dismiss them, without a hearing, after they had participated in a 
work stoppage at the Natalspruit Hospital. It was held that the respondents had been entitled to a 
hearing, prior to their dismissal and the order of court a quo was confirmed. 
Hoexter J A, who delivered the judgment, reached his decision without reliance on the doctrine 
of Legitimate Expectation. 
The appellant argued firstly that the employment relationship between itself and the respondents 
was governed by the common law of contract in terms of which the appellant was entitled to 
summarily dismiss the respondents, because the respondents had fundamentally breached the 
contract. Accordingly, the appellant argued that the decision to dismiss the respondents was not 











Hoexter J A, rejected the argument of the appellant. He stated that this matter did not fall beyond the 
purview of Administrative Law because the two contracting parties were not private individuals but 
one private individual and one representative of the state (90). He stated : 
'one is here concerned not with mere employment under a contract between two private individuals 
but with a form of employment which invests the employee with a particular status which the law will 
protect. Here the employer and the decision-maker is a public authority whose decision to dismiss 
involved the exercise of Public Power. The element of Public Service injected by statute necessarily 
entails, so I consider that the respondents were entitled to the benefit of the application of principles 
of natural justice before they could be summarily dismissed for misconduct.' 
He stated further (91) : 
'where a statute empowers a public body to give a decision prejudicially affecting an individual in his 
liberty or property or existing rights, the individual has a right to be heard before a decision is taken 
unless the statute expressly or by indicates the contrary.' 
As far as the nature of the enquiry is concerned he stated (92) : 
'in my view it is logically unsound and wrong in principal to postulate that the audi principle has no 
application to 'purely contractual relations;' from that premise to embark upon an enquiry as to 
whether or not there is something in the legislation which imports the audi principles into the 
contractual relationship; and to require that the statutes concerned should incorporate the audi 
principle, either expressly or implicitly ... The existence of a contractual relationship cannot alter the 
essential relationship of the enquiry. With reference to any particular provision of a statute the 
questions to be answered are as always; (i) is a public official in power to give a decision effecting the 
existing rights of an individual? And, if so, (ii) is the right of the individual to be heard before the 
decision is taken excluded either expressly or impliedly?' 
Hoexter J A concluded by referring briefly to the doctrine of Legitimate Expectation. In commenting 
on the affirmation in Traub's case that the doctrine of Legitimate Expectation relates to the right to a 
hearing rather then to the right sought to be taken away, he cautioned (93) that this view would imply 
that in cases where the employees tenure is precarious such employee may invoke the doctrine of 
Legitimate Expectation if his employer is a public body. 
3.6.3 Conclusion and analysis of the doctrine of Legitimate Expectation in South African 
Law 
a) In early cases eg. Laubsher, the classification of administrative actions determined whether the rules of 
natural justice were applicable. Furthermore, the rules of natural justice were only applicable where 
the applicant was deprived of an existing legal right. In Everett's case, the classification of 
administrative powers was again used in order to determine whether the applicant was entitled to a 











whether the rules of natural justice were applicable, was preceded by an enquiry as to whether the 
applicant had a Legitimate Expectation. 
b) The doctrine of Legitimate Expectation was only applicable to cases where the applicant was deprived 
of an existing legal right. (Everett, Langen~ Mokoena and Boesak) 
c) In later cases (Langeni), the classification of administrative powers as a means of determining whether 
the terms of natural justice were applicable was held to be no longer adequate. In Traub's case, the 
Appellate Division held that the classification of administrative powers, inter alia, as a means of 
determining whether the rules of justice were applicable, was no longer relevent. 
d) Later cases, eg. Traub's case also held that it was not necessary that an existing legal right be taken 
away before the doctrine of Legitimate Expectation should be invoked. Thus in Traub's case the 
applicant did not have a legal right to be appointed to senior posts. In Zenzile's case the respondent's 
did not have a legal right to remain in employment. 
e) The exact meaning of the doctrine has been problematic. It has been stated that the doctrine has a 
procedural and a substantive component. This is similar to and the approach by the judiciary by the 
English Law. In Everett's case, the substantive aspect of the doctrine was applied. However, in Boesak 
and Castel, the procedural aspect of the doctrine was applied. In Mokoena's case Goldstone J stated 
that 'the Legitimate Expectation refers to the right sort to be taken away, and not to the right to a 
hearing (ie. he refers to the substantive component of the doctrine). In Zenziles case, Hoexter J A 
confirms that the Appellate Division has accepted that the Legitimate Expectation refers to the right 
to a hearing. In support of this he relies on the judgment of Corbett C J in Traub's case. However, 
Corbett C J did not unequivocally accept that the procedural aspect of the doctrine is the only meaning 
which may be ascribed to the doctrine. He stated (94) that : 
'in practice the two forms of expectation may be inter-related and even tend to merge. Thus, the 
person concerned may have a Legitimate Expectation that a decision by the public authority will be 
favourable, or at least before an adverse decision is taken, he will be given a fair hearing.' 
It is submitted that this is the correct view of the doctrine. An integral component of a substantive 
Legitimate Expectation must be that there is a Legitimate Expectation that the correct procedure will 
be adopted in reaching a decision. 
f) Zenziles case and Kioa's case have in common the fact that the doctrine of Legitimate Expectation was 
referred to in passing. In Kioa's case, the doctrine is 'simply an epithet for the interests which may be 
affected by a decision of the state and is not a sure criteria for determining whether natural justice is 
applied (95). In Zenzile's case one enquires whether a public official has the power to give a decision 
affecting the existing rights of an individual and if so, to determine whether the rules of natural justice 











g) In South Africa, England and Australia the rules of natural justice are applicable when a public official 
is empowered to give a decision which affects an individual. However, it appears that in Australia it 
would not be necessary to prove that a pre-existing legal right has been affected (if the trend set in 
Kioa's case will be followed) whereas in South Africa, the interest in respect of which the Legitimate 
Expectation arises may either have to be a legal right or at least a very substantial interest. 
3.6.4 The classification of Administrative powers 
3.6.4.1 Introduction 
The acceptance of the doctrine of legitimate expectation again questions the usefulness of the 
classification of administrative powers. Would the decision in Laubscher's case have been different if 
there was no such thing as the classification of administrative action and if the doctrine of Legitimate 
Expectation had existed at that time? It is submitted that the doctrine of Legitimate Expectation is a 
flexible doctrine which suits the changing Administrative Law relationship between the Commissioner 
and the taxpayer. The rigidity which the classification of administrative powers seeks to impose on this 
Administrative Law relationship is detrimental to it. 
The classification of Administrative powers is based on the doctrine of separation of powers whereby 
the Legislature, Executive and the Judiciary exist independently of one another. A distinction is made 
between legislative, judicial, quasi judicial, ministerial or purely administrative acts. Wiechers states 
that it is necessary to make such a distinction 'since the law attaches important consequences thereto.' 
(96) 
The problem with the classification of administrative functions is that the Courts have attached labels 
to the Administrative function in question and the consequences of these functions have been 
examined by the Courts once the classification label has been attached thereto. The correct approach 
is to examine the consequences and if necessary, attach a descriptive label to the administrative 
function. The latter trend is now being adhered to in case law. (97) Baxter states that the scheme of 
classification 'reflects more accurately attitudes of judicial activism or restraint than the relevant 
characteristics of the act in question.' (98) He states that 'it has been forgotten that classification is 
simply a method by which complex data is organised for the purpose of analysis and comprehension, 
and that no more than limited assistance is to be derived from the classificatory label.' 
Baxter proposes a broader category of distinctions. (99) He distinguishes between legislative and 
non-legislative acts. Generally legislative acts usually connote an action which is of general application 
in contrast to an action which is specific in application. This is similar to the general as opposed to the 
individual Administrative Law relationship proposed by Wiechers. (100) Baxter further distinguishes 
between (101) authoritative (unilateral) and consensual acts. The essence of this distinction is tha~ in 












contract with another private individual. 
The rejection of the classification of administrative powers case law 
A trend can be discerned in South African court decisions whereby the classificatory theory has been 
rejected. 
In Pretoria North Town Council v A-1 Ice-Cream factory (102) Schreiner J A warned (103) against 
viewing these labels as pegs upon which to hang the substantive content of the administrative power in 
question and stated : 
'The classification of discretions and functions under the headings of administrative, quasi judicial and 
judicial have been much canvassed in modern judgments and juristic literature; there appears to be 
some difference of opinion, or of linguistic usage, as to the proper basis of classification, and even 
some disagreement as to the usefulness of the classification when achieved .... One must be careful not 
to elevate what may be no more than a convenient classification into a s urce of legal rules.' 
In that case it was held that the appellant could not refuse certificates to hawkers who proposed to sell 
ice-cream manufactured outside its area to hawkers resident outside its area. Counsel for the appellant 
had argued that legislation gave the Counsel not a quasi judicial but an administrative or purely 
administrative discretion which it was entitled to exercise on any grounds of policy that might seem 
just. In other words the appellant argued that the classificatory scheme should be elevated to 
substantive Law. 
The same caution which had been expressed by Schreiner J A was repeated by Rumpff C J in 
Oberholzer v Padraad van Outjo. (104) In Oberholzer's case the Court a quo held that the function of 
the road board was administrative and that therefore it was not necessary to grant the appellant a 
hearing. The Court set aside the decision of the court a quo. It is significant that in this case as in the 
A-1 Ice-Cream case the rejection of the elevation of the classificatory scheme to substantive law 
resulted in decisions against individuals being set aside. 
In South African Defence Aid Fund v Minister of Justice (105) Williamson J A stated in a dissenting 
judgment allowing the appeal that he agreed with the remarks of Schreiner J A in Pretoria North Town 
Council v A-1 Electric Ice-Cream Factory. (106) He stated that he feared : 
'The rigidity which such classification and labelling may induce. I appreciate the value, in its proper 
sphere of a scientific analysis and sub-division under proper nomenclature of the application in 
practice of a legal principle ... it is possible that, in the case of a basic principle of 'fair play' under 
consideration an undue limitation may be placed upon its scope by an attempt to find its applicability 
entirely by means of the type or class of test. The essential feature in each case is, I think the true 












The South African Defence and Aid Fund had requested a hearing prior to it being declared unlawful. 
In Traub's case (107) Corbett C J appears to have put a seal of approval on this trend when he stated 
that the classification of decisions 'no longer seems to have any relevance in this sphere.' (108) (109) In 
Traub's case the rejection of the classification theory went hand in hand with the acceptance of the 
doctrine of Legitimate Expectation. In Langeni's case the same occurred. 
Conclusion 
It is submitted that the classificatory scheme is not relevant to the Administrative Law relationship 
between the Commissioner and the taxpayer. 
Adherence to the classificatory scheme as anything more than a mere labelling system would be 
prejudicial to the taxpayer. The latter comments acquire added significance against the background of 
the large number of discretions which are granted to the Commissioner. Even the distinction between 
the general and individual administrative law relationship, proposed by Wiechers, should merely serve 
as labels once the consequences of the administrative function in question have been examined. The 
above is consistent with the proposition in this thesis that the Administrative Law relationship between 
the Commissioner and the taxpayer should not be subject to unnecessary legalism. 
3.7 Estoppel 
3.7.1 Introduction 
Having examined the doctrine of Legitimate Expectation as a remedy which the taxpayer has against 
the Commissioner, the remedy of estoppel is considered. Can estoppel operate to prevent the 
' 
Commissioner or his subordinate officials from revoking a ruling? In terms of this doctrine (110) 'a 
person is precluded, is estopped, from denying the truth of a representation previously made by him to 
another person if the latter, believing in the truth of the representation, acted thereon to his prejudice.' 
The requirements for estoppel are : 
(a) that there must be an intentional representation; and 
(b) that the person who pleads estoppel must have acted on the faith of the representation to his 
prejudice; and 
( c) there must be a causal correction between the representation and the prejudice which was 
suffered (111). 
Whether a public official can be estopped from denying a representation which he has made is the 











Baxter states : 
'Allowing a public authority to waive legal requirements or prohibitions will also overlook an 
important principle of public policy that person's, be they public or private, cannot waive 
rights in which the public have an interest.' (112) 
It is submitted that the question of whether Estoppel should operate in Revenue Law depends, to a 
certain extent on whether the Administrative Law relationship is general or specific. \Viechers 
distinguishes between general administrative law relationships and individual relationships. (113) 
General administrative relationships are those relationships in which the same legal rules apply to all 
persons within those relationships. In the case of individual administrative relationships the content 
varies from case to case. Wiechers states (114) that: 
'the difference between general and individual legal relationships lies in the fact that, in a 
general relationship, the same legal rules obtain non-specifically and impersonally with regard 
to the legal subjects within that group, while in an individual legal relationship there are 
specific legal rules applicable to specific legal subjects who have been identified.' 
It is submitted that generally the doctrine of estoppel may conceivably apply to Revenue Law if one 
is dealing with an individual legal relationship but not in the case of a general administrative 
relationship. Prima facie, the relationship between the Commissioner and the taxpayer is a general 
administrative relationship. The reason for this is that estoppel does not operate if the act is ultra 
vires. In the general administrative law relationship, wrong acts by the Commissioner are nearly 
always ultra vires, eg. if the Commissioner neglects to collect tax. (In Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue v 17ze Master it was held that the Commissioner was not estopped from (116) raising taxes 
where he had neglected to do so). 
Where, however, the relationship between the Commissioner and the taxpayer is an individual 
administrative relationship, ie. when the Commissioner issues a ruling to the particular taxpayer 
which is not ultra vires then it is submitted that estoppel should operate. In other words, because 
estoppel operates if the act of the Commissioner is not ultra vires, it is more likely that the doctrine 
will apply in the case of an individual Administrative Law relationship (because it is less likely that 
rulings are ultra vires) than in a general Administrative Law relationship. 
The Margo Commission has recommended (115) that subject to a full disclosure of the facts a 
taxpayer should be permitted to obtain a binding ruling by the Commissioner. The Commission 
recommended that rulings should be limited to matters in which the taxpayer has a direct and 
substantial interest. If the. operation of estoppel is refused in the case of ruling which has been 
obtained, then the recommendation of the Margo Commission would be inapplicable. It must be 
remembered that the Margo Commission recommended the issuing of rulings by the Commissioner 











effectively. To refuse to extend the doctrine of estoppel to rulings would not lead to the effective 
achievement of the objectives of Inland Revenue. 
3.7.2 The extension of the doctrine to statutory illegality 
In Trust Bank van Afrika BPK v Eksteen (117) Hoexter J A stated : 
'The doctrine of estoppel is an equitable one, developed in the public interest, and it seems to 
me that whenever a representator relies on a statutory illegality it is the duty of the court to 
determine whether it is in the public interest that the representee should be allowed to plead 
estoppel.' 
Baxter asks the question as to whether compensation should be provided to someone who has 
suffered prejudice rather than allowing the operation of estoppel. (118) 
However, he states, it may be difficult to prove negligence. Furthermore, if, as Baxter states, the 
interest of the general public is protected by a refusal to extend the doctrine of estoppel to ultra vires 
acts of public authorities, then it is submitted that the interest of the general public is also protected 
if compensation is not paid for negligent acts of public officials. In other words if the aggrieved 
person cannot rely on estoppel, then why should he be entitled to compensation instead? 
3.7.3 Estoppel and internal irregularities 
The courts have held more readily that estoppel operates where the legal defect is a mere internal 
irregularity. This usually occurs where the presumption of regularity ie. omnia praesumuntur rite esse 
acta is applied. 
In Natal Estates v SIR (118) counsel for the Commissioner, in support of his argument that the 
-
Commissioner had satisfied himself as to the requirements of Section 79(1)(a), argued that the rule 
of omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta gave rise to the inference that the Commissioner had applied his 
mind to the requirement of Section 79 (l)(a). Holmes J A rejected this. He quoted from Wigmore 
on Evidence where that author stated that several requirements must be met before the presumption 
is applicable. The requirements are set out below. 
(a) The matter must more or less be in the past and be incapable of easily procured evidence; and 
(b) the matter must involve a mere formality or detail of required procedure; and 
(c) the matter must involve, to some extent, the security of apparently vested rights so that the 
presumption will serve to prevent an unwholesome uncertainty; and 











3.7.4 Estoppel and Legitimate Expectations 
(a) Generally estoppel and the doctrine of Legitimate Expectation can only be invoked if there 
has been no breach of statutory duty. 
(b) The requirements needed to establish estoppel differ from those pertaining to Legitimate 
Expectation. Although both doctrines require that there must be a representation, it is 
submitted that the taxpayer does not have to first act on that representation to his prejudice to 
invoke the doctrine of Legitimate Expectation whereas, in order to establish estoppel, he must 
have acted to his prejudice on the representation. In other words a taxpayer could invoke the 
doctrine of Legitimate Expectation if the Commissioner threatened to penalise the taxpayer in 
respect of future conduct, providing that a ruling had been obtained. 
( c) Estoppel is a substantive doctrine whereas Legitimate Expectation has substantive and a 
procedural component. 
3.8 Conclusion in respect of the application of the doctrine of Legitimate Expectation 
to rulings and other decisions by the Commissioner for Inland Revenue 
It is submitted that the following should be applicable to rulings by the Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue. 
(a) If the Commissioner or his subordinate officials have, in issuing a ruling or giving a decision, 
breached a statute, then the doctrine of Legitimate Expectation is not applicable. The 
standard would be that of the reasonable taxpayer, ie. whether the reasonable taxpayer should 
have known that the ruling/ decision was clearly in conflict with the statute. If the taxpayer 
should have known of this then cadit quaestio. 
(b) - If the Commissioner issues a written decision personally and all material facts are known to 
him then he may not withdraw that notice in terms of Section 3(3). The doctrine of Legitimate 
Expectation would have no relevance. 
(c) If the taxpayer had received a ruling pursuant to Section 3(3) and the taxpayer was refused a 
subsequent ruling based on similar facts then the doctrine of Legitimate Expectation should 
operate. The taxpayer should have a Legitimate Expectation that he be given a hearing as to 
why the ruling did not apply to the second set of similar facts (procedural component of the 
doctrine) the taxpayer would also have a Legitimate Expectation that the Commissioner 
would not refuse a ruling if one had been granted in the past on similar facts (substantive 
component of the doctrine). 
( d) If the Commissioner's agreement was oral then, even though it could be argued that the 











submitted that the taxpayer has a Legitimate Expectation that he will be given a hearing 
(procedural component). Furthermore, it is submitted that the taxpayer has a Legitimate 
Expectation that the decision would not be withdrawn (component). 
( e) If a subordinate official issues a discretionary ruling in writing, this may be withdrawn prior to 
the expiration of two years from the date of written notification of such decision or the notice 
of assessment. After two years the notice may not be withdrawn if all the material facts were 
known. It is submitted that, if, prior to the expiration of the two year period, the decision is 
withdrawn then the taxpayer has a Legitimate Expectation to a hearing as to why the 
communication was withdrawn (procedural). It is submitted further that the taxpayer has a 
Legitimate Expectation that, provided all the material facts were known, the communication 
would not be withdrawn (substantive). 
(f) That which has been stated in c) above applies mutatis mutandis to communications by 
subordinate officials. 
(g) That which has been stated in d) above in respect of the Commissioner's oral rulings should 
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In the previous chapters, the regulation of discretionary power was examined with reference to 
rule based administrative action and with reference to adjudicative techniques of decision. The 
issuing of rulings is an example of the former and the doctrine of legitimate expectation is an 
example of the latter. The jurisdictional facts, which are contained in the Act also regulate 
discretionary power. In this chapter, the sections of the Act which constitute the administrative 
law relationship between the taxpayer and the Commissioner are examined in more specific 
terms. The core of the administrative law relationship is the issuing of assessments by the 
Commissioner and the obligation by the taxpayer to pay the amount contained therein. 
The initial stage of the Administrative Law relationship is contained in Sections 65 and 66 of the 
Act. The latter provisions pertain to the filing of returns by the taxpayer pursuant to a notice 
issued by the Commissioner requiring returns to be filed. The second stage of the Administrative 
Law relationship is contained in ,those sections which pertain to the assessment. The latter stage 
is governed by sections 77 to 80 of the Act. 
Section 74 (production of documents and evidence on oath), Section 75 (penalties on the default 
in respect of return) and Section 76 (additional tax in the event of default or omissions to make 
return) do not fit easily into the chronology of the administrative law relationship. The latter 
three sections may apply to the initial stage of the administrative law relationship ie. they may be 
invoked when a return has not been sent or if a return is faulty or they may be invoked in the 
_second stage of the administrative law relationship ie. when, once an initial assessment has been 
issued, further investigations are undertaken by the Commissioner which result in an additional 
assessment. 
Accordingly the following methodology is adopted in this chapter. An examination of the initial 
stage of the administrative law relationship (section 65 and 66 of the Act) is undertaken. This is 
followed by an analysis of Section 77 to 80 of the Act. Sections 74, 75 and 76 are discussed briefly. 
4.2 The initial stage of the Administrative Law Relationship - section 65 and 66 of 
the Act 
4.2.1 Section 65 Returns to be in the form prescribed by the Commissioner 











this Act shall be in such form as may be prescribed by the Commissioner from time to time.' 
The return must be distinguished from the form of the return (1). The meaning of return is 
discussed below. It is submitted that Section 65 imposes an obligation on the Commissioner to 
ensure that the form of the return is clear. If the form of the return is not clear, then the 
imposition of penalties pursuant to a failure by the taxpayer to render a return or an incorrect 
return, could be set aside on the grounds of unreasonableness. In other words, it is unreasonable 
to expect the taxpayer to understand or complete a form if the contents thereof are not clear. 
In CIR v Da Costa, (2) the taxpayer was assessed for penalties in terms of Section 76 of the Act. 
The taxpayer stated in evidence that he entrusted the bookkeeping and the handling of his tax 
returns to a firm of accountants whom he regarded as possessing the necessary knowledge and 
skill in relation to such matters. Counsel for the Commissioner in the special court accepted the 
taxpayer's explanation and submitted that the taxpayer should nevertheless be penalised for the 
deceit of his agents. 
4.2.2 The clarity of the form 
The following questions must be answered: 
Firstly, what standard should one apply in deciding whether a form issued by the Commissioner is 
clear, and secondly, if the form is unclear can any actions by the Commissioner pursuant to the 
issuing of such form, be declared invalid on the grounds of unreasonableness? 
In S V Ziegler (3) the taxpayer argued that a form (an IT12) which had to be completed by a 
trustee and which had been issued by the Commissioner was void because it was vague. It was 
held, dismissing the appeal, that in view of the unfettered discretion given to the Commissioner 
by the statute as to the form the return should take, the courts would not lightly regard such a 
form as void. 
It has been held that the test should be that the meaning : 
'must not be so vague as to create substantial uncertainty in the minds of those who have to apply 
it or of those to whom it applies ( 4). 











applies. For example, if the form is addressed to a tax expert, the standard would not be that of 
the ordinary man in the street but that of the expert. (5) 
The form which is encountered most frequently is the ITU in terms of which a taxpayer is 
required to make a return in respect of income received for the previous tax year. It is submitted 
that if a taxpayer is unable to understand what information is required, based on the test of the 
reasonable taxpayer, then the Commissioner could not impose the penalties provided that the 
taxpayer was not assisted in the preparation of the form by a professional tax adviser. 
Th.is begs the question of what liability attaches to the person who prepares the tax form on 
behalf of the taxpayer. If the person who assisted with the completion of the form is, for example, 
a tax consultant, then does a different test apply, ie. whether the reasonable tax consultant should 
know what information was required. If, th.is is the case then is the taxpayer liable because he 
could have taken the advice of his adviser? Alternatively is the professional preparer of the form 
liable on the basis that the reasonable tax consultant should have known what information was 
requested? 
Section 105A of the Act enables the Commissioner to lodge a complaint with the controlling body 
of a person who has assisted a taxpayer to contravene the Act in any way provided such assistance 
constitutes a contravention of any rule or code laid down by the controlling body of that person. 
In Practice Note 5 the Commissioner stated that the duties and obligations in respect of which an 
adviser could assist a taxpayer are those explicitly imposed by the Act such as the duty to make a 
full and true return of income and obligation to pay tax when due. The Commissioner further 
stated that he would invoke this section personally. He further stated : 
'It is appreciated that questions of degree may be involved and it is not the intention that any 
complaint be lodged unless it appears that the professional adviser is guilty of a serious or 
persistent dereliction of duty involving dishonesty or subterfuge or the circumstances indicate that 
an intention to obstruct or mislead revenue officials in the performance of their duties under the 
Act.' (6) 
It is submitted that the following conclusions may be drawn from the above : 
(a) If the form (IT12 or any other form or request) cannot be comprehended by the 
reasonable taxpayer, thenprimaface, the action of the Commissioner is unreasonable on 
the grounds of vagueness and the taxpayer should not be penalised if he is unable to 
furnish the correct information. 
(b) If the taxpayer in (a) above is assisted by a professional adviser in the completion of the 
form or the request for information then, as far as the taxpayer is concerned, the test 











( c) If the test in (b) above is not satisfied, ie. the reasonable ta>..-payer could not be expected 
to comprehend the information requested from him, then the court should apply the test 
of the reasonable tax adviser. If, based on this test, it is held that reasonable tax adviser 
should have understood what information was being requested then : 
i) The taxpayer should not be penalised if he entrusted his affairs to the tax adviser. The 
matters may be so complex as to necessitate the appointment of a tax adviser as an 
agent. It must also be noted that, for the purposes of the completion of the IT12, the tax 
adviser is not acting as an agent of the taxpayer. The former states that he is merely 
assisting the latter. 
ii) The Commissioner should report the conduct of the tax adviser to his controlling body in 
terms of Section 105A. 
4.2.3 THE FIRST STAGE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW RELATIONSHIP CONTD. 
SECTION 66 - NOTICE BY COMMISSIONER REQUIRING RETURNS FOR 
ASSESSMENT OF TAXES ... AND MANNER OF FURNISHING RETURNS ... 
4.2.4 Meaning of Returns 
A 'return' is not defined in the Act. It is submitted that return is a general term referring to all 
information which is required by the Commissioner for the purposes of the Act. Section 66 and 
the regulations contain a list of what information comprises a return. It is difficult to compile a 
numerns clausus of such information because, in' addition to specific information requested, the 
Act provides that the return shall be a full and true return for the whole period of the relevant 
financial year. (see Section 66 (13) and 66 (13) quat) 
The following information comprises a return: 
(a) Those particulars which may be prescribed by the Commissioner (Section 66(9)). 
(b) Further or more detailed returns affecting any matter of which a return is required 
(Section 66(10)). 
(c) Such information which constitutes a full and true return (Section 66(13) and 66(13) 
quat). 
( d) Further information which may be required by the Commissioner (Section 69(2)). 











whatsoever nature as are necessary to support the information comprising the return 
(Regulation A2). 
(f) Sufficient evidence to enable the Commissioner to satisfy himself as to the nature of the 
income (7). 
Thus, it can be seen that it is very difficult to state what information comprises a return. In 
essence, the information must be sufficient so as to enable the Commissioner to issue an accurate 
assessment. This raises the question : 'What constitutes sufficient information?' 
In terms of Section 66(1) the Commissioner must give public notice that all persons who are 
liable personally or in a representative capacity to. pay tax must do so within a specified period. 
The Act contemplates two capacities in which a person becomes liable for income tax, ie. in his 
personal capacity or in his representative capacity. (8) 
The notice states places where prescribed forms may be obtained and in terms of Section 66(2) 
all persons who are required to furnish such returns must apply for the prescribed forms. In 
practice the Commissioner does issue a notice which is displayed at various government offices. 
The taxpayer does not apply for the relevant form but the form is sent to the taxpayer (Section 
66(3)). Any person who is not required to furnish a return may, for the purpose of having his 
liability for taxation determined, furnish a return in three years after the end of such year of 
assessment (Section 66(5)). 
'The return must be signed by the taxpayer or by his agent duly authorised in that behalf, and any 
person signing such return shall be deemed for all purposes in connection with this Act to be 
cognizant of all statements made in that return.' (Section 66(6)). 
It is submitted that the reference to agent in this Section does not refer to the person who signs 
the ITU in the capacity of the person who prepared the return. It is submitted that a person may 
only sign as an agent for the taxpayer for the purposes of this Section if he signs in the place 
where the taxpayer should sign and states that he is signing in his capacity of agent for the 
taxpayer. In such a case the taxpayer is liable for statements made in that return. 
In terms of Section 66(7) any return made or signed on behalf of any person shall be deemed to 
be duly made and signed by the latter person unless the latter person proves that the return was 
not signed by him or on his behalf. 
In terms of Section 104(2) the Act creates a rebuttable presumption that it is proved that if a false 
statement is made in any return by or on behalf of any taxpayer, then that taxpayer shall be 











allowed it to be made with the intent to evade assessment or taxation. Furthermore, in terms of 
the latter section, any person who made such false statement or entry shall be presumed, until the 
contrary is proved, to have made such false statement or entry with intent to assist the taxpayer to 
evade assessment or taxation. 
In terms of Section 66(14) - if any person: 
'When called upon to furnish a return under this Act is unable to furnish such return, the 
Commissioner may accept a return of estimated income for assessment, and such assessment shall 
be adjusted by the Commissioner if and when an actual return of income is furnished.' 
The following points pertaining to Administrative Law pursuant to this section are raised. 
(a) While Section 66 embodies a general administrative law relationship between the 
Commissioner and the taxpayer, Section 66(14) constitutes a departure from this type of 
relationship. The latter section embodies the individual administrative law relationship. 
(b) Secondly, does this section permit the Commissioner to depart from the statutory duty of 
collecting taxes due? It is submitted that this is not so for the following reasons; firstly, 
the section contains a wide discretion so that the Commissioner is not obliged to accept 
a return of estimated income (9); and secondly, a narrow meaning has been ascribed to 
the word 'estimate'. In CIR v Di Ciccio, (10) it was held by Nestadt Jin relation to (11) 
Section 76: 
'The degree of accuracy in a return of estimated income will, inevitably, be less than in an 
accurate return. Nevertheless, these types of returns may not simply be a guess as to the 
taxpayer's income. They have to be more accurate than that.' 
Thus the Commissioner may not accept any estimate of return. Nestadt J further stated that: 
'The amount a person should estimate his income at would normally depend on what, in relation 
to his business activities, he knew or ought to have known at the time of making it.' (page 205) 
A further factor is that the (U) reason for the failure to make the return would have to be an 
objective one such as loss of books of account by fire, theft, etc. and not a personal disability. 
4.2.5 The Duty of Disclosure 
A question which is not capable of an easy answer is exactly what information must the taxpayer 











have been given or sent or served upon any person by the Commissioner is set out in Section 
106(2). 
Section 77(1) provides that all assessments : 'Shan subject to the provisions of Section 3, be made 
by the Commissioner or under his direction.' 
In terms of Section 77(2) the particulars of every assessment and the amount of tax payable 
thereof may be destroyed by the Commissioner after the expiration of a certain number of years. 
Section 77(5) contains an error. It provides that the Commissioner shall inform the taxpayer in 
the assessment that any objection which he wishes to make must be made within twenty one days 
after the date of assessment. However, in terms of Section 81(1) the period for objection has 
been extended to thirty days. 
Sections 77(6) and 77(7) provide for returns by spouses and partners respectively. 
4.3.1 General 
Unless a revenue official is specifically empowered to do by statute he may not enter into a 
contract with a taxpayer even if the taxpayer undertakes to pay the amount of tax which would be 
owing on an assessment. (16) 
4.3.2 Reduction 
Revenue officials cannot, by agreement, reduce any amount of tax legally due in terms of the 
Income Tax Act. In the case of CIR v De/fas (17) Wessels C J stated : 
4.3.3 Errors 
'The principle that an officer appointed to carry out the provisions of the Revenue Act 
cannot, by contract, remit taxation or monies due to the crown is clear.' 
Revenue officials are not prevented from collecting tax merely because of an error of judgment. 
An incorrect decision by a revenue official cannot release a taxpayer from liability. (18) 
4.3.4 Estimated Assessments 
In terms of Section 66(14) : (19) 
'If any person, when called upon to furnish a return under this Act in unable to furnish such 
return, the Commissioner may accept a return of such estimated income. Such assessment may 











It has been stated (20) that this section pertains to income estimated by the taxpayer. However, 
the fact that the section provides that the Commissioner may accept the return implies that the 
section also includes income estimated by the Commissioner. The reason for inability to furnish a 
return is considered (21) to be an objective reason such as the loss of books of account by theft, 
fire, etc. 
Section 78(1) provides for. estimates by the Commissioner. It is submitted that unlike section 
66(14) which implies that the estimate is based on the co-operation of the Commissioner and the 
taxpayer, section 78(1) does not imply such co-operation, ie. the Commissioner may estimate the 
income without the co-operation of the taxpayer. 
The Commissioner may estimate such income if there is a default in the furnishing of a return or 
information on the part of the taxpayer or if the Commissioner is not satisfied with the return or 
information. The grounds pursuant to which an estimation of taxable income is based is wider in 
section 78(2) than in section 66(14). It is considered that both section are, to some extent, 
duplications of each other. For example, a taxpayer who is unable to furnish an accurate return 
for objective reasons (Section 66(14)) may provide an estimation of taxable income. The 
Commissioner may adjust that taxable income, either in terms of section 66(14) or in terms of 
section 78(1) on the grounds that he is not satisfied with the return information furnished by the 
taxpayer. 
Furthermore, it is submitted that the first reason contained in Section 78(1) pursuant to which 
the Commissioner may make such an estimation; ie. that the person makes default in furnishing 
any return is subsumed under the second reason, ie. that the Commissioner is not satisfied with 
the return or information furnished by the person. It may be argued that the first reason assumes 
"that no return or information has been made while the second reason assumes that, although 
such return or information has been furnished, it is inadequate. 
In ITC 1377, (22) counsel for the taxpayer argued that where a taxpayer has kept books of 
account which were produced and where he has sworn to the accuracy of the books and has 
proved that they are in harmony with the returns made by him, he has prim a face discharged the 
onus of proving that an estimated additional assessment made by the Commissioner is wrong. 
Counsel for the taxpayer argued that therefore the onus would pass to the Commissioner in such 
a case to prove that the accounts were inaccurate. The President of the Court Melamet J rejected 
this. He stated that this would place too high a reliance on the production of correctly drawn and 
certified accounts. He stated that such accounts may assist the taxpayer in discharging the onus of 











4.3.5 Agreed Assessments 
Section 78(2) provides that : 
'If it appears to the Commissioner that any person is unable, from any cause, to furnish an accurate 
return of his income, the Commissioner may agree with such person as to what amount of such 
income shall be taxable income and any amount so agreed upon shall not be subject to objection or 
appeal.' 
This is an exception to the general principle that the Commissioner cannot agree with the 
taxpayer on the tax. Mere discussions on the particular items of income or expenditure do not 
constitute an agreement for the purposes of Section 78(2). (23) 
This exception applies only if a person is unable to furnish an accurate return of information. If a 
taxpayer supplies information and the Commissioner is not satisfied with such information, the 
Commissioner may estimate either, in whole or in part, the taxable income in relation to such 
information (Section 78(1)). 
The power of the Commissioner to agree with the taxpayer as to the amount of taxable income is 
restricted to those cases where the taxpayer in question is unable to furnish an accurate return of 
his income. The information in question must relate to income and this provision does not apply 
to information that a taxpayer is unable to obtain which relates to matters that do not have a 
bearing on income. 
4.3.6 Agreed Additional Tax 
Section 76(2) provides that : 
' ... the Commissioner may either, before or after an assessment is issued, agree with the taxpayer on 
the amount of the additional charge to be paid, and the amount so agreed shall not be subject to any 
objection or appeal.' 
Additional taxes are in fact penalties. The Commissioner may therefore agree with the taxpayer 
regarding penalty as a separate matter. This type of agreement differs from the agreed 
assessment that may be reached in respect of the taxpayer's income. 
4.3.7 Additional Assessments 
Section 79 provides that: 
'if at any time the Commissioner is satisfied -
(a) that any amount which was subject to tax or should have been assessed to tax under this 
Act has not been assessed to tax; 
(b) that any amount of tax which was chargeable and should have been assessed under this Act 











(c) that as respect any tax which is chargeable and which has become payable under this Act, 
otherwise then under an assessment, such tax has not been paid out in respect of any 
amount upon which such tax is chargeable or an amount is owing in respect of such tax 
'he shall raise an assessment ... not withstanding that an assessment ... may have been 
made upon the person concerned in respect of the year or years of assessment in respect of 
which the amount or amounts in question is or are assessable and not withstanding the 
provisions of sections 81(5) and 83(18).' 
(i) In terms of the proviso to the section the Commissioner shall not raise an additional 
assessment after the expiration of three years from the date of assessment, (if any) unless 
the Commissioner· is satisfied that the fact that the amount which should have been 
assessed to tax is not so assessed for the fact that the full amount of tax chargeable was not 
so assessed, was due to fraud or misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts; or 
(ii) In respect of any tax referred to in paragraph c ... that the Commissioner is satisfied that the 
fact that such tax was not paid in full was due to fraud or misrepresentation or 
non-disclosure of materials facts or 
(iii) ... the full amount of tax which should have been assessed under such assessment was in 
accordance with practice generally prevailing at the time of the assessment ... not assessed 
to tax; or 
(iv) In respect of any amount, if the previous assessment made on the person concerned has in 
respect of that amount been amended or reduced pursuant to any order made by a special 
court ... unless the Commissioner is satisfied that the order in question was obtained by 
fraud or misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts.' 
4.3.8 Introduction 
In Saacks v SIR (24) Friedman J stated (25) that 
the Act requires that 'liability for tax is determined with reference to income received by 
or accrued to a taxpayer during a particular year of assessment. The date on which the 
assessment for that year happens to be made by the Secretary is irrelevant. Section 79(1) 
accords fully with this principle : it enables the Secretary to raise assessments in respect 
of amounts which should have been assessed to tax but which have not been so assessed. 
Section 79(1) does not entitle the Secretary to raise an assessment in a particular tax 
year in respect of income received by or accrued to the taxpayer during a previous or 
subsequent tax year.' 
Accordingly section 79 is founded upon the principle of annuality. 
In terms of section 79 the Commissioner must be satisfied at two stages that certain jurisdictional 
facts exist. 
At the first stage he must be satisfied that the jurisdictional facts in section 79(1)(a) or (b) or (c) 
exist. In Bailey v CIR (26) Curlewis J A stated (in respect of the predecessor to section 79) that 
'All that that section requires is that the Commissioner shall be satisfied that any amounts which 
should have been subject to tax have not been assessed to tax. In the present case we do not know 
how, or in what manner, the Commissioner become satisfied ... ; it may be that he satisfied 
himself on that point merely by reviewing the work of his subordinate officers. But whatever the 
reason or the cause may have been which induced him to become satisfied on that point, we are 











The Commissioner is required to undertake an internal enquiry in order to ascertain whether an 
amount has been assessed to tax or whether an amount of tax should have been charged or 
whether an amount of tax has not been paid. 
It would be difficult for a taxpayer to challenge a discretion of the Commissioner on the grounds 
that he did not satisfy himself as to the existence of one of these jurisdictional facts. In this regard 
the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta would apply. In Natal Estates Ltd v SIR (28) Holmes 
J A quoted volume 4 of Wigmore on evidence where it is stated that presumption applies if 
several condition exist; 
'First, that the matter is more or less in the past and incapable of easily procured evidence; 
secondly that it involves a mere formality or detail or required procedure, in the routine of a 
litigation or of a public officers action; next that it involves to some extent the security of 
apparently vested rights, so that the presumption with serve to prevent an unwholesome 
uncertainty; and finally that the circumstances of the particular case add some element of 
probability.' 
It is submitted that the first condition has been satisfied. Because the matter is more or less in the 
past and incapable of easily procured evidence. Furthermore, the second condition is fulfilled 
because the Commissioner's satisfaction is a mere formality. The third condition has been 
fulfilled because the presumption 'will serve to prevent an unwholesome certainty' furthermore 
the final condition has probably been fulfilled. 
In ITC 522 (29) the President of the court stated [page 413 - 414] that 
'Now, the court has discussed that meaning of the word 'satisfied' with ... the Commissioner's 
representation and it appears clear that what the· learned judge meant in this paragraph was that 
'satisfied' means 'satisfied in his own mind'. It does not mean satisfied by new evidence or new 
fact. This seems clear from the learned judge's words 'it may be that he satisfied himself on that 
point merely by reviewing the work of his subordinate officer'. 'Satisfied' does not mean that you 
.must be satisfied - you may satisfy yourself, and there is no procedure or test laid down by which 
you have to satisfy yourself.' 
The second set of jurisdictional facts in respect of which the Commissioner must be satisfied are 
contained in the provisos to the section. Generally the Commissioner must be satisfied that there 
exists fraud or misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts, whether directly ie. in a 
communication between the taxpayer or the Commissioner or indirectly ie. where the taxpayer 
obtained the order of the special court by means of fraud or misrepresentation or non-disclosure 
of material facts. These jurisdictional facts limit the Commissioner's discretion because they are 
matters of substantive law and not merely matters such as ascertaining whether tax has been paid. 
Case law in respect of this section reveals that generally two questions form the basis of the 











Commissioner for him to be satisfied that there was no fraud or misrepresentation or 
non-disclosure of material facts and consequently he may not open re-open the assessment. The 
second group of cases involve the question of the communication of the Commissioner's 
satisfaction that there was fraud misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts to the 
taxpayer. 
4.3.9 How much information must be furnished to the Commissioner in order to 
prevent him raising an additional assessment after a period of 3 years? 
In ITC 1254 (30) the taxpayer disclosed an amount but the description was misleading. The 
Commissioner assessed the amount as capital initially but after 3 years he assessed it as revenue. 
Counsel for the taxpayer argued that the fault lay with the Commissioner because he should not 
have assumed that the amount was capital without a further enquiry. Counsel for the 
Commissioner argued that it was not the duty of the Commissioner to question the taxpayer in 
respect of the amount involved. 
The President of the Court, Melamet J stated that : 
'(31) Die betoog van die Appelant is dat die bedrae in sy opgaaf van bruto inkomste aangetoon is 
en dat die Ontvange van Inkomste horn oor hierdie bedrae moes uitgevrae het, voordat hy dit as 
inkomste van 'n kapitale aard beskou het. Die betoog van die Appelant wil die verpligting wat op 
die belastingbetaler op die Ontvanger van Inkomste oorplaas. Daar is 'n verpligting op die 
belastingbetaler om 'n juiste en volledige opgawe in te dien waarop hy aanslaan kan en sal woord. 
In ITC 1290 (32) the taxpayer was informed by a Receiver of Revenue that because of the 
invocation Section 7(5), his trust would have a nil return. The taxpayer ignored this and did not 
include the trust's income in his own income when submitting his own tax return to another 
Receiver of Revenue. It was held that it was the duty of the taxpayer to include such an amount 
and failure to do so meant that there was a non-disclosure of material facts. 
In ITC 1425 (33) the President of the Court Grosskopf J stated' 
"n Wakkerder of bekwammer aanslaer sou moontlik besef het dat die ontbrekende inligting 
nodig is, of van tot 'n korrekte gevolgtrekking gekom het daarsonder, of sou nie van die spoor 
gebring gewees het deur die verkeerde inligting nie. Alie aanslaers is egter nie altyd ewer wakker 
en bekwaam nie .. .' 
In summary it can be said that a taxpayer is required to give sufficient information to the 
Commissioner and must assume that 
(a) a different person may deal with the matter; 
(b) the officials may not be diligent; 
( c) the communication to the Commissioner must not result in the Commissioner having to 













This latter requirement must however be treated with circumspection. It is not the duty of the 
taxpayer to provide all information. 
Communication by the Commissioner to the taxpayer 
The following principles emerge from the cases. Firstly the Commissioner must be satisfied that 
there was fraud or misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material fact and secondly the fact that 
the juridical facts in sect_ion 79(1)(a), (b) or (c) were due to fraud misrepresentation or 
non-disclosure of material facts. Furthermore the Commissioner must communicate all this to 
the taxpayer. 
As far as the communication of the satisfaction by the Commissioner to the taxpayer in Natal 
Estates was concerned, counsel for the Commissioner made the submission in the court a quo 
that the Commissioner was satisfied that there had been a material non-disclosure. In support of 
this counsel for the Commissioner relied on the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta which 
he claimed supported the inference that the Commissioner had indeed applied his mind to the 
requirements. 
Holmes J A stated that the maxim cannot apply because this was not a merely formal decision. 
He said (35) : 
'However there must be some evidence before the Special Court that he was so satisfied, 
otherwise there is no displacement of the immunity conferred on the tax paid by the proviso to 
Section 79(1) and the opening words of paragraph (a) thereof. A convenient time and place for 
indicating the secretarial satisfaction would be in _the additional assessment itself, or in a covering 
letter; or in the notice which the Respondent is required by Section 81( 4) to send to the taxpayer, 
if the latter's objection to the assessment is disallowed. It should state the particular conduct of 
the taxpayer to which it relates, ie. whether fraud or misrepresentation or non-disclosure of 
_material facts ... The taxpayer should not have to grope inferentially for the secretarial 
satisfaction, or the particular form of dereliction of duty to which it relates ... For one thing [and 
it was common cause in this appeal that the material non-disclosure could be innocent] the 
taxpayer is entitled to know whether fraudulent conduct - a grave and ugly imputation, is being 
held against him.' 
The tests laid down in the Natal Estates were added to in Trow's case (36) Wessels J A stated and 
confirmed the decision of the Special Court that not only must the Commissioner satisfy himself as to 
the existence of fraud or misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts but the Commissioner 
must state in a letter to the taxpayer that he was satisfied that it was the non-disclosure which caused 
him not to assess the profit in question. In other words the Commissioner must be satisfied and must 
consequently communicate to the taxpayer the fact that the existence of the jurisdictional facts in 79(1) 
(a), (b) or (c) is causally linked to the existence of fraud misrepresentation or non-disclosure of 
material facts. 
The tests laid down in Natal Estates and Trow's case were followed in ITC 1454. (37) In ITC 1454 (38) 
counsel for the Commissioner argued that it is often impossible to decide whether to rely on fraud, 













against an additional assessment. However, if the ruling is given to a particular taxpayer and the 
Commissioner issues a revised assessment on the basis that it was not general practice to issue 
such rulings at the time, the taxpayer should invoke the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The 
problem here is the difficulty which the taxpayer will encounter in proving the practice at the 
various offices of the Receivers of Revenue (see page above). 
Order of Special Court 
Proviso (iv) 
This Proviso gives the Commissioner power to, in effect nullify an order of Special Court if he is 
of the view that the Order was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation or non-disclosure of 
material facts. This is an extremely wide power and gives to the Commissioner a power to 
overrule decisions of the Special Court. 
Production of Documents and Evidence on Oath 
Section 74 
This section enables the Commissioner to require any person to produce any deeds, plans, 
instruments which the Commissioner may deem necessary for the purpose of the Act. The 
Commissioner may require the taxpayer to produce a translation of the document if it is not in 
one of the official languages. In terms f Section 74(2)(a) the Commissioner may require any 
person to attend an examination, on oath, in respect of matters affecting them. The powers 
granted to the Commissioner are wide. In Heiman Massdorp and Parker v SIR and another ( 43) it 
was held that this section does not entitle the Commissioner to privileged communication 
between an attorney and his client. Nevertheless there are certain limits imposed by this section. 
Firstly, the production of the documents and evidence on oath must be for the purposes of the 
administration of the Act. In terms of Section 74(2) the official must produce written 
authorisation that he is entitled to enter the premises of the taxpayer. 
Penalty on default Section 7 5 
This section provides for penalties in respect of any person who fails to, or neglects to, furnish 
any communication to_ the Commissioner which is required to be furnished in terms of the Act or 
if he fails to disclose material facts in such communication. 
Thus this section may be invoked by the Commissioner if there is a failure to furnish a return or 
if the return is incomplete. This section may also be invoked in respect of the issue an 
assessment. This section is invoked by the State. In S v Benson ( 43) it was held that while Section 
66(3) of the Act imposes an obligation on every person who is liable to taxation to obtain a form 
and submit a return of income for assessment, an obligation to complete and return a form under 












been received by the taxpayer; consequently, in the absence of any proof that the appellant had 
received the form sent to him, the magistrate had not been entitled to convict him under the 
charge as laid. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter the core of the Administrative Law relationship between the Commissioner and 
the taxpayer was examined_. This core consists of the issuing assessments and the obligation to pay 
the tax. The relationship consists of two chronological stages namely that of the returns (section 
65 and 66) and the second stage, ie. that relating to the issuing of assessments. In the first stage, 
the problem is that it is not clear exactly what must be contained in the return. Generally, there is 
a duty of disclosure in respect of material facts. It is submitted that in ascertaining the content of 
the information to be furnished in a return, one must remember that the Administrative law 
relationship between the Commissioner and the taxpayer is adversarial. 
In other words, there will always be conflict as to what constitutes an adequate return although 
the view of the court is to favour the Commissioner. 
Section 79 demonstrates that, because the Commissioner has wide powers, eg. he can ignore a 
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APPEAL AND REVIEW 
5.1 Introduction 
The administrative law relationship between the Commissioner and the taxpayer is now examined 
by analysing the methods by which the taxpayer may enforce his remedy against the exercise of 
discretionary power. 
The medium through which the taxpayer exercises his remedy against the Commissioner is 
judicial review. The problem in respect of this aspect of the administrative law relationship is that 
there is uncertainty as to the precise remedy which the taxpayer has against the Commissioner as 
a result of the decision in KBI v Transvaalse Suikerkorporasie (1). In this case Van der Walt, J 
stated that the sections of the Act which deal with the decisions of the Commissioner can be 
divided into three groups. The first group consists of those sections where the decision of the 
Commissioner is expressly made subject to objection and appeal. The second group consists of 
those section which specifically exclude the right of objection and appeal (Section 76(2)( c) and 
Section 78(2)). The third group consists of those sections where there is no right of objection and 
appeal nor is there an express prohibition against objection and appeal. 
Van der Walt, J stated that where the decision of the Commissioner is expressly made subject to 
objection and appeal, then the Special Court reconsiders the facts and makes a decision based on 
its reconsideration of the facts. He stated that where the right of objection and appeal is not 
.. expressly excluded or included, then the taxpayer may appeal against a decision in terms Section 
83(1). He stated that in the latter case, the appeal is actually a review of the decision of the 
Commissioner on the usual grounds of review. He stated implicitly that where objection and 
appeal is excluded expressly then there is no right of appeal to the Special Court. 
It is submitted that the remedy proposed by van der Walt, J in cases where the right of objection 
or appeal is neither excluded or included, is incorrect. In this chapter the reasons for the latter 
statement are supported. 











The meaning of appeal and review 
The difference between appeal and review 
The remedies of the taxpayer at the objection stage and secondly at the stage when an appeal is 
made to the Special Court and thirdly when an appeal is made to the Supreme Court. 
In order to understand the problems which have ansen as a result of the decision in KB! v 
Transvaalse Suikerkorporasie, it is necessary to understand all the meanings of appeal. These are 
examined in chronological order, ie. at the objection stage and secondly when an appeal is made 
to the Supreme Court. 
5.2 The Meaning of Appeal to the Special Court 
The powers of the Special Court are set out in Section 83(13) of the Act which states that the 
Special Court may; 
'a. in the case of any assessment under appeal, order such assessment to be amended, 
reduced or confinned, or may if it thinks fit refer the assessment back to the 
Commissioner for further investigation and assessment; 
b. in the case of an appeal against the amount of additional charges imposed by the 
Commissioner under sub-section (1) of Section seventy-six, reduce, confinn or 
increase the amount of the additional charges imposed; 
c. in the case of any other decision of the Commissioner which is subject to appeal, 
confinn or amend such decision.' 
In Tikly v Johannes NO (2), Trollip, J distinguished three meanings of the word appeal. He said 
(3) that: 
'the word appeal can have different connotations. Insofar as it is relevant m these 
proceedings it may mean : 
i) an appeal in the wide sense, that is, a complete re-hearing of and fresh 
determination on the merits of the matter with or without additional evidence or 
information ... 
ii) an appeal in the ordinary sense, that is, a re-hearing on the merits but limited to 
the evidence or information on which the decision under appeal was given, and 
in which the only determination is whether the decision was right or wrong; 
iii) a review, that is, a limited re-hearing with or without additional evidence or 
information to determine, not whether the decision under appeal was correct or 
not, but whether the arbiters exercised their powers and discretions honestly 
and properly. 
Accordingly there is a wide appeal which is a complete re-hearing of the matter. Secondly there is 
an ordinary appeal which is a re-hearing on the merits and is similar to the powers of appeal 
exercised by the Supreme Court. Thirdly included in the meaning of an appeal, is a review. In the 











From the above it can be seen that there is a confusion of terminology. According to the 
distinction of Trollip, J, which was also accepted in COT v AB Company Limited (4), an appeal 
includes a review. 
The question which must be answered is what does the word appeal mean when used in the 
Special Court. 
5.2.1 Case Law 
It is necessary to answer this question by reference to case law. In Bailey v CIR (5), 
Curlewis, J A stated : 
' ... a Special Court under the Income Tax Act is not a court of appeal in the ordinary 
sense; it is a court of revision with power to investigate the matter before it and to hear 
evidence thereof.' 
One assumes that by the term 'revision' Curlewis J A refers to a wide appeal. Both Baxter and 
Meyerowitz and Spiro support this conclusion (6). However the word 'revision' is an example of 
vague terminology. To revise means to read or look over or re-examine or reconsider and 
correct, improve or amend (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th Edition). In other words it is possible 
that revision includes review in this case. 
In Rand Ropes (Pty) Limited v CIR, (7) Centlivres, C J stated : 
'that the legislature apparently thought it was necessary to give a special right of appeal 
in cases where a matter is left open to the discretion of the Commissioner appears from 
a number of instances where the special right is confirmed. In all these cases it seems to 
me that the legislature intended that there should be a re-hearing of the whole matter by 
the Special Court and that that Court could substitute its own decision for that of the 
Commissioner. For, as Curlewis, J A pointed out in Bailey v CIR, the Special Court is 
not a court of appeal in the ordinary sense; it is a court of revision.' 
It is submitted that although this is authority for the view that an appeal to the Special Court is a 
wide appeal, nevertheless Centlivres, J A does not add any clarity to the meaning of the word 
'revision' as used in Bailey's case. 
In ITC 1351 (8) Friedman, J expressed the view at page 63 that 
'where one is concerned with a permitted appeal against the exercise by the Commissioner of a 
discretionary power, then the approach of this court should become similar to that adopted by 
appeal courts in general when considering appeals against decisions involving the exercise by the 
court a quo of a discretion.' 
In this case Friedman, J appears to equate the powers of the Special Court on appeal with that of 











quo of their discretions, this is usually on accepted grounds of review. 
In CIR v Da Costa (9) it was held that in cases involving the exercise of a discretion by the 
Commissioner, the Special Court on appeal to it is called upon to exercise its own original 
discretion. 
In ITC 1430 (10) the Special Court followed the approach expressed in Da Costa and specifically 
held that the Court was entitled to take into account new evidence not originally before the 
Commissioner when he exercised his discretion, in exercising its own original discretion. 
In SIR v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert (11), Ogilvie Thompson CJ stated : 
'Although a major criterion prescribed by sub-section (1) is the opinion of the Secretary, 
his decision thereunder is by sub-section ( 4) expressly rendered subject to objection and 
appeal. Consequently the Special Court may, on appeal to it by the taxpayer, re-hear the 
whole case and if it decides substitute its own decision for that of the Secretary.' 
The above cases illustrate that where the section provides for objection and appeal, then the 
appeal to the Special Court is a wide appeal. Therefore, the Special Court will have full power to 
re-hear the whole matter and substitute its own decision for that of the Commissioner. 
Notwithstanding the above, there are a number of Special Court decisions which hold that the 
appeal to the Special Court is a narrow appeal. In ITC 1078 (12), the Special Court held (13) that 
'this Court is in substantially the same position as an appeal court in an appeal concerning the 
quantum of damages.' 
In ITC 1295 (14), Friedman, J stated (15) : 
'The Secretary deals with a large number of cases of this kind. He has yardsticks by 
which to go and is in a far better position to decide upon appropriate remissions than 
this court. Where, of course, the Secretary exercises his discretion on an incorrect basis 
or by taking into account matters which he is not entitled to take into account, this court 
will disregard the Secretary's decision and be at large to itself decide upon an 
appropriate remission. Where, however, the Secretary has properly exercised his 
discretion in a bona fide manner, then it seems to me that this Court will interfere only 
where there has been an unreasonable exercise by the Secretary of hi~ discretion. In 
order, however, to decide what is or is not an unreasonable exercise of discretion, it is, as 
I have already indicated, necessary for this court itself to decide what it regards as an 
appropriate ~remission and if there is a significant difference between that which this 
court regards as appropriate and that which the Secretary has decided is appropriate, 
this court is entitled to inf er that there has been an unreasonable exercise by the 
Secretary of his discretion and will interfere. 
In this regard it seems to me that the position is not entirely different from that of, for 
example, a court of appeal hearing an appeal in a criminal case against the sentence 
imposed by a lower court.' 
In ITC 1351 (16), Friedman, J stated that 












Commissioner of a discretionary power, then the approach of this court should be 
similar to that adopted by appeal courts in general when considering appeals against 
decisions involving the decision by the court aquo of a discretion.' 
In Da Costa's case the court disagreed with views of Friedman, J in the above Special Court cases 
and confirmed that the appeal against a decision of the Commissioner, where the section allows 
for objection and appeal, is a wide appeal. 
5.2.2 The Meaning of Appeal to the Supreme Court 
Appeals against decisions of the Special Court to a provincial division of the Supreme Court or to 
the Appellate Division are governed by Section 86(A) of the Act. In terms of Section 86(A)(2)(b) 
the President of the Special Court must grant leave to appeal to the Appellate Division directly. 
In Hicklin v CIR (17) it was held that the appeal in Section 86(A) was similar to an appeal in 
terms of Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act. 
Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act provides : 
'17ze Appellate Division or a Provincial Divisior., or a Local Division having appeal 
jurisdiction, shall have power : 
a) on the hearing of an appeal to receive further evidence, either orally or by 
deposition before a person appointed by such division, or to remit the case to the 
court of first instance, or the cowt whose judgment is the subject of appeal, for 
further hearing, with such instructions as regards the taking of further evidence or 
otherwis  as to the division concerned seems necessary; 
and 
b) to confinn, amend or set aside the judgment or order which is the subject of the 
appeal and to give any judgment or make any order which the circumstances may 
require.' 
In Colman v Dunbar (18) it was held that the following principles apply in determining whether to 
receive further evidence or remit the matter to the court a quo for the reception of such evidence. 
a) It is essential that there should be finality to a trial and a litigant should therefore not be 
allowed to produce further evidence, except in exceptional circumstances. 
b) The party who makes the application must show that his failure to produce the evidence 
was not due to any omission on his part; he must satisfy the court that he could not have 
obtained the evidence if he had used reasonable diligence. 
c) The evidence tendered must be weighty and material and presumably must be believed, 
and must be such that if it is used it would be practically conclusive, for if not it would 
still leave the issue in doubt and the matter would lack finality. 
d) If the conditions have so changed that fresh evidence will prejudice the opposite party, 











cannot be brought back to refute the fresh evidence, or to explain their own evidence in 
the light of the fresh evidence, the court will not grant the application. 
5.2.3 Conclusion 
Therefore the appeal from the Special Court to either the Provincial Division of the Supreme 
Court or the Appellate Division is a narrow appeal. In contrast the appeal from a decision of the 
Commissioner to the Special Court is a wide appeal. 
5.3 Review procedure 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The question which is answered here is what is review and how does it differ from appeal. 
Thereafter the review procedure is examined in relation to the remedy which a taxpayer has 
against the Commissioner's exercise of his discretion in cases where the section provides for 
objection and appeal, in cases where the section is silent as to objection and appeal and where the 
section specifically prohibits objection and appeal. 
5.3.2 The meaning of Review - General 
The term review is capable of three distinct and separate meanings. (19) 
a) The first and most usual use of the term is to denote the process whereby the 
proceedings of lower courts are brought before the Supreme Court in respect of grave 
irregularities or illegalities occurring during the course of proceedings. Examples of such 
'inferior courts' means any court (other than a court of a division of the Supreme Court) 
which is required to keep a record of its proceedings. 
b) The second type of review is where a public body has a duty imposed upon it by statute 
and disregards important provisions. Here the Supreme Court may be asked to review 
the proceedings complained of and set aside or correct them. Such administrative 
authorities includes statutory boards such as road transportation boards, rent boards and 
valuation boards. 
c) The term review refers to that power conferred upon the Supreme Court which is 
intended to be far wider than the power which it possesses under either a) orb) above, 












5.3.3 Grounds of Review in terms of the Supreme Court Act 
In terms of Section 24 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 the grounds of review of proceedings 
of inferior courts are the following : 
a) absence of jurisdiction on the part of the court; 
b) interest in the cause, bias, malice or corrnption on the part of the presiding judicial 
officer; 
c) gross irregularity in the proceedings; 
d) the admission of inadmissible or incompetent evidence or the rejection of 
admissible or competent evidence. 
In terms of the Supreme Court Act 'inferior court means any court (other than a court of a 
division) which is required to keep a record of its proceedings, .. .' Examples of such court include 
the Children's Court under the Children's Act and the Maintenance Court under the 
Maintenance Act. 
5.3.4 The difference between Appeal and Review 
The following differences exist between appeal and review. (20) 
a) The first distinction i  that an appeal is directed at the result of a trial whereas a review 
is aimed at the method by which the result is obtained. 
b) In an appeal the appellant is bound by the record of the court a quo. In a review the 
applicant is not bound by the record of the court. 
c) There are procedural differences between appeals and reviews. 
5.3.5 Confusion of Terminology 
It can be seen that certain cases may involve both appeal and review procedures. Furthermore, 
the judiciary bas used vague terminology in distinguishing between appeal and review. In Tikly's 
case (see above) Trollip, J said that one of the meanings of appeal is 'a review, that is a limited 
re-hearing with or without additional evidence or information to determine, not whether the 
decision under appeal was correct or not but whether the arbiters exercise their powers and 











Baxter states that (22) : 
'The dividing line is often extremely difficult to draw, especially when discretionary 
powers are in question. This is because the legal limits placed upon discretionary power 
are, in the final analysis, questions which can only be determined by the courts. The 
extent to which the decisional referents that structure the discretion are considered to be 
justifiable will depend upon what is thought appropriate by the court. In the end all but 
the narrowest zone of choice could be deemed to be a matter affecting the legality of the 
decision and not its merits.' 
The distinction between appeal and review is even less clear in the Special Court when that court 
reviews the action of the Commissioner than when the Supreme Court reviews the action of the 
Special Court. A further problem which must be addressed is whether the Special Court has 
power to review the actions of the Commissioner where the section in question is silent as to 
objection and appeal or specifically excludes objection and appeal. In order to answer this 
question the review by the Supreme Court is first analysed. Thereafter the review jurisdiction of 
the Special Court is analysed. 
5.4 The Supreme Court and Review Procedures 
In terms of Section 23 of the Supreme Court Act the proceedings of inferior courts may be 
brought under review on the grounds stated in 5.3.3 above. 
An inferior court means any court other than a court of a division of the Supreme Court which is 
required to keep a record of its proceedings. 
The Special Court is required to keep a record of its proceedings. Therefore in terms of Section 
_24 of the Supreme Court Act, the Supreme Court may review proceedings of any inferior court. 
Furthermore the Supreme Court has inherent jurisdiction under the common law to review the 
proceedings of quasi judicial and administrative bodies in the appropriate circumstances (23). 
Thus, even if the Special Court is not an inferior court, the proceedings of the Special Court may 
nevertheless be reviewed by the Supreme Court because the Special Court is a quasi-judicial 
body. 'It must be appreciated that by inherent is meant logically inherent rather than inherited.' 
(24) 
5.5 The Special Court and Review Jurisdiction 
5.5.1 Introduction 
In KB! v Transvaalse Suikerkorporasie, van der Walt, J stated that the sections of the Act which 











consists of those sections where the decision of the Commissioner is expressly made subject to 
objection and appeal. In this case the Special Court reconsiders the fact and makes a decision 
based upon its reconsideration of those facts. The second groups consists of those sections which 
specifically exclude the right of objection and appeal (Section 76(2)(c) and Section 78(2)). He 
stated implicitly that in such cases there is no right of appeal to the Special Court. The third 
group consists of those sections where there is no express right of objection and appeal, nor is 
there an express prohibition against objection and appeal. In this case an appeal to the Special 
Court is actually a review of the decision of the Commissioner on the usual grounds of review. 
The question which must be answered is whether this is correct. In order to answer this question 
it is necessary to examine whether the meaning of review in the Special Court differs from the 
meaning of review in the Supreme Court. 
5.5.2 Case Law 
In a number of cases where the Act was silent as to whether a right of objection and appeal 
existed, it was held by Special Court that it could review a decision of the Commissioner on the 
usual grounds of review. 
In ITC 93, (25) the Court held that the Special Court could not substitute its decision for that of 
the Commissioner. The President of the Court stated : 
'The Commissioner had a discretion and that discretion had been delegated, as was 
authorised under the Act, to this official. The court had to be satisfied by unequivocal 
evidence that that official had not applied his mind to the matter in terms of the Act.' 
In ITC 168, (26) the court held that : 
'We have to enquire into whether the Commissioner had directed his mind to the 
question whether the debts were bad or doubtful.' 
However, in Irvin & Johnson SA Ltd v CIR (27) the court held that where the section of the Act is 
silent as to appeal and review, then there is no appeal against the exercise of the discretion to the 
Special Court. In other words the Special Court may not review the act of the Commissioner. 
Schreiner, J A stated (28) that 
'Despite therefore the right of appeal given by Section 79(1) (29) to a taxpayer who is 
dissatisfied with any decision of the Commissioner ... if it appears that the decision has 
been given under a section which requires the Commissioner to exercise an 
administrative discretion no appeal lies to the Special Court ... had the legislature 
intended that an appeal to the Special Court should lie in cases falling within the proviso 











In ITC 892 (30) the Commissioner's representative objected in limine to the hearing of the appeal 
on the ground that no appeal lay to the Special Court against the exercise by the Commissioner 
of the administrative discretion to allow the amount of any debts due to the taxpayer to the extent 
to which they are proved to the satisfaction of the Commissioner to be bad. 
0 'Hagan, J stated, approving the decision in !!Vin and Johnson, that where the Act does not in 
express terms confer a right of appeal from the exercise of a discretion then the objection by the 
Commissioner is well founded. 
O' Hagan, J stated (31) 
'The argument of the appellant's attorney seeks to invest the Special Court with a special 
power of review similar to that possessed by the Supreme Court in reviewing decisions of 
public bodies which have not duly performed discretionary duties required of them. 
The Special Court, I consider has no such power. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
in matters of this character is an inherent one as pointed out by Innes, C J in 
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company v Johannesburg Town Council ... The 
Special Court created by Section 79 (now 83) of the Income Tax Act possesses no such 
inherent jurisdiction. Its powers are derived solely from statute ... The only jurisdiction 
given to this Court by Section 79(1) (now 83) is to entertain appeals from any decision of 
the Commissioner as notified in terms of Section 77(6). If in a particular matter an 
appeal does not lie to this Court, this Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. It 
may well be that in cases where it can be proved that the Commissioner has not applied 
his mind to a matter entrusted to his judgment alone ... the Supreme Court can interfere 
on review ... The Special Court has, however no jurisdiction to do so.' 
In ITC 921 (32), Van Winsen, J approved views in the Irvin and Johnson case. In this case the 
taxpayer objected to a valuation which a Commissioner deemed to be reasonable in respect of 
wool. The taxpayer objected against the Commissioner's additional assessments on the grounds 
that the value fixed was too low. The court held that since the power vested in the Commissioner 
to fix the value in question was a discretionary power and the Act contained no provision granting 
a right of appeal against the exercise by him of such power and none of the recognised grounds of 
review had been established, that the Special Court was unable to interfere with the decision. 
The judgment does imply that if a recognised ground of review had been established then the 
Special Court may have heard the matter. 
In ITC 936 (33) the Commissioner raised the same argument which he had raised in limine in 
ITC 892, namely that the Special Court was not entitled to hear evidence that the Commissioner 
had not applied his mind to the matter since the Special Court possessed no inherent review 











right to substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner, it was competent for the Special 
Court to intervene if the Commissioner exercised his discretion in an improper manner and 
consequently it was competent for the court to hear the appeal which had been brought. The 
court however held that the Commissioner had applied his mind to the matter. 
In ITC 1400 (34) the taxpayer appealed against the exercISe by the Commissioner of his 
discretion in terms of Section 14(1)(b) to determine whether or not the particular aircraft was 
used in the business of transporting by air and for reward, persons, livestock, goods or materials. 
This section of the Act makes no provision for an appeal against the exercise of the 
Commissioner's discretion. The President of the court, Melamet, J stated that : (35) 
'Any decision taken bona fide in the exercise of a discretion is not subject to appeal 
unless the Act specifically provides for such an appeal ... the remedy is to take the 
exercise of such discretion on review to the Supreme Court if that discretion was 
exercised male fide or the Commissioner had not applied his mind to the matter. The 
procedure in such a case is by way of review. Whether this court is the competent court 
to which an application for review can be made is not clear. I shall assume for purposes 
of this appeal that it is competent to launch review proceedings before this court. As 
stated above, the grounds of review against the exercise of a discretion are that the 
presiding officer, in this case it would be the Commissioner, acted mala fide or failed to 
apply his mind to the matter.' 
The court held that because there was no suggestion of any objection or notice of appeal that the 
Commissioner acted mala fide or did not apply his mind to the matter but therefore the court 
could not entertain the motion. 
The above cases were decided before KB! v Transvaalse Suikerkorporasie and some of the cases 
were the basis of the decision in KB! v Transvaalse Suikerkorporasie. It is submitted that the 
~above cases cannot be regarded as authority for the view that the Special Court may review acts 
of the Commissioner on the accepted grounds of review. There are obiter dicta to the effect that 
the Special Court will review the Commissioner's exercise of a discretion on accepted grounds of 
review. The only Appellate Division decision on this matter, ie. Irvin & Johnson did not canvass 
the particular point. In 1983, when ITC 1400 was heard Melamet, J stated that he was not sure 
whether it was competent for the Special Court to entertain an application on the grounds of 
review but that he assumed that the Special Court was competent to hear such a motion. 
5.6 KBI v Transvaalse Suikerkorporasie 
In this case the court approved the view in ITC 936 that the Special Court can only intervene in 
the exercise of a discretion by the Commissioner on one of the recognised grounds of review. 
Van der Walt, J referred to the cases discussed above. He said nothing about the ITC 93, ITC 











where the Act was silent, as to whether an objection and appeal lay against the decision. He 
approved the view in ITC 936 that where nothing is said about appeal and review that the Special 
Court had the power to intervene on the accepted grounds of review. 
5.6.1 Is the decision in KBI v Transvaalse Suikerkorporasie correct? 
May the Special Court review the decision of the Commissioner on the accepted grounds of review 
where the section allows for objection and appeal? 
It has been shown that the appeal to the Special Court against the exercise of a discretion by the 
Commissioner is a wide appeal. Therefore on appeal, the Special Court may substitute its own 
decision for that of the Commissioner. In view of the fact that such an appeal is not a narrow 
appeal, it is submitted that the Special Court may review such a discretion on the accepted 
grounds of review. In a wide appeal there is no reason why the Special Court should be precluded 
from substituting its decision for that of the Commissioner on one of the accepted grounds of 
review where the Commissioner exercised his discretion improperly. 
Another remedy for the taxpayer in such a case would be to request the Supreme Court to review 
the proceedings. The Supreme Court has inherent jurisdiction to review proceedings of 
administrative tribunals. (36) 
Does the Special Court have the power to review the exercise by the Commissioner of his discretion 
where the section in the Act is silent as to whether a right of objection and appeal exists? 
It is submitted that the Special Court has no such power for the following reasons 
(a) The Special Court is a creature of statute. It derives its powers from Section 83 of the 
Act. In terms of Section 83(1) 'Any person entitled to make an objection may appeal to a 
Special Court.' (italics added). Therefore before the Special Court may consider an 
appeal the taxpayer must be entitled to make an objection. It can be argued that where 
the section of the 
Act is silent as to the right of objection and appeal, the taxpayer is not 'entitled to make 
an objection.' Therefore the Special Court may not exercise any powers in terms of 
Section 83. 
(b) In terms of Section 83(13)( a) of the Act the Court may 'in the case of any assessment 
under appeal order such reassessment to be amended, reduced or confirmed .. .' (italics 
added). Therefore before the Court may exercise any power, the assessment must be the 











whether a right of objection and appeal exists, it cannot be said that the assessment is 
'under appeal.' The same reasoning applies to Section 83(13)(b) and (c). The latter 
sub-sections both refer to assessments and decisions which are subject to appeal. 
In summary then, it is implicit in that determining the powers of the Special Court in 
terms of Section 83 of the Act, the objection must be capable of being the subject of an 
appeal. Where the Act is silent as to the right of objection and appeal it may be argued 
that such an appeal does not fulfil the jurisdictional facts set out in Section 83(13). 
ITC 1474 (37) is authority for the view that the Special Court's power in terms of 
Section 83(13)(a) of the Act is limited. In this case it was held that there was nothing in 
that section which empowered the Court to order the Commissioner to reassess the 
Appellant in respect of a tax year which had not formed the subject of the appeal. This 
case supports the view that an appeal in Section 83(13), although being a wide appeal, is 
somewhat restricted and that the power of the Special Court is limited to that which is 
subject to appeal. 
( c) It is submitted that the reasoning in KBI v Transvaalse Suikerkorporasie may not be 
correct. It is necessary to trace the reasoning adopted in order to support this conclusion. 
(i) In Irvin & Johnson (38) Schreiner J A stated (39) that 
'Despite, therefore, the right of appeal given by Section 79(1) to a taxpayer who 
is dissatisfied with any decision· of the Commissioner ... if it appears that the 
decision has been given under a section which required the Commissioner to 
exercise an administrative discretion, no appeal lies to the Special Court.' 
In ITC 936 (40) Van Winsen, J stated, in interpreting the above quote from Itvin & 
Johnson that : 
'Met hierdie passaat het die geleerde Regter na my mening slegs bedoel wat hy gese het, 
naamlik, <lat the Spesiale Hof nie regsbevoegdheid het om die besluit van die 
Kommissaris in heroorweging te neem in gevalle waar 'n diskrestionere mag aan die 
Kommissaris verleen word. Ek lei nie uit die aangehaalde woorde af <lat die geleerde 
Regter bedoel het <lat the belasting betaler horn nie na die Spesiale Hof kan wend waar 
sy klagte is <lat die Kommissaris sy diskretionere mag mala fide uitgeoefen het of op 
sodanige wyse behandel het dat sy besluit op een van die bekende hersieningsgronde 
aangeval kan word nie.' 
It is submitted that this interpretation by Van Winsen, J may not be correct. Schreiner J A did 
not say this. Van Winsen J, is merely interpreting that which was said by Schreiner J A. In KBI v 
Transvaalse Suikerkorporasie, van der Walt, J relied on the above interpretation by 
Van Winsen, J without comment and other factors in ITC 936 in order to arrive at a conclusion 
that the Special Court does have power to review the acts of the Commissioner on the accepted 











(ii) Van Winsen, J approved the view in Bailey's case (41) that the Special Court is a court of 
revision. He used this statement to emphasise the unique nature of the Special Court 
and this became a factor in influencing his decision. 
The description of the Special Court as a Court of revision is vague ( 42). Furthermore if 
the Special Court is a court of revision (whatever that term may mean) then why can the 
Special Court not- review the discretion of a Commissioner where the Act expressly 
prohibits the right of objection and appeal. In other words the description of the Special 
Court as a unique court of revision would imply that it would have this latter power ... 
(iii) Van Wins en, J relied on a series of cases ( 43) which were heard before ITC 892 and 
decided that these cases supported the view that the Special Court could hear the 
aggrieved taxpayer on the grounds of review where the Act was silent as to the right of 
objection and appeal. In ITC 892 the authorities on which Van Winsen, J had relied, had 
been dismissed. Since ITC 892 there have been very few cases which have specifically 
stated that the Special Court may review acts of the Commissioner where the section 
does not expressly provide for objection and appeal. Accordingly the reason of 
Van Wins en, J in this regard is open to question. 
In Transvaalse Suikerkmporasie the factors (subparagraphs (i) - (iii) above) in the 
judgment by Van Winsen, J were relied on by Van der Walt, J. It is submitted for the 
reasons stated above, that the cases relied on in the judgment of ITC 936 are not 
conclusive for illustrating that where the section is silent as to the right of objection and 
appeal, that the Special Court may review he acts of the Commissioner. Accordingly, 
these cases should not have been afforded the authority which they were in Transvaalse 
Suikerkorporasie. 
( d) An inconsistent result flows from the application of the judgment in Transvaalse 
Suikerkorporasie. Van der Walt, J stated that where the discretionary power of the 
Commissioner is not specifically made subject to an objection and appeal or specifically 
not excluded from objection and appeal, then the taxpayer can lodge an objection against 
the decision in terms of the general provisions of Section 81 and thereafter can appeal to 
the Special Court in terms of Section 83(1) against the Commissioner's decision. He 
stated that in this case the appeal is in fact a review of the Commissioner's decision on 
the accepted grounds of review. Thus, an aggrieved taxpayer can approach the Special 
Court on the grounds of review where objection and appeal is not specifically excluded. 
The taxpayer may also approach the Supreme Court on the grounds of review and the 
Supreme Court would grant a hearing because it has inherent powers of review. 











Van der Walt, J the taxpayer may not approach the Special Court on the grounds of 
review, even though the Special Court is a court of revision. 
If the taxpayer and the Commissioner agreed on an assessment (these are the provisions 
which exclude objection and appeal), and if, at a later stage the taxpayer realised that 
there was for example a misrepresentation by the Commissioner which induced him to 
agree, the taxpayer would have to bring his case before the Supreme Court. The 
inconsistency is the following : Why should the Special Court, if it is a court of revision 
not be entitled to hear matters on review (as that term is generally understood) where 
the section does not provide for objection and appeal, but only where the section does 
provide for objection and appeal or the section is silent as to objection and appeal. This 
is not consistent with the view that the Special Court has wide powers of revision. It is 
submitted that this supports the view that, although the Special Court is a unique Court, 
it only has wide powers, ie. wider than the Supreme Court as far an appeal is concerned. 
It does not have powers of review as that term is generally understood. 
( e) If the Special Court did have powers of review then it is inconsistent \\1th this power that 
the Commissioner is given a power in terms of Section 79(1)(iv) to nullify a decision of 
the Special Court where the Commissioner is of the opinion that the Court Order was 
obtained by fraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts. The situation 
could arise whereby the Special Court decides that the Commissioner acted male fide in 
imposing additional assessments. The Commissioner may decide that the Court Order 
was obtained by fraud, non-disclosure of material facts or misrepresentation. The 
decision of the Special Court, ie. that the Commissioner did act male fide would then 
have no effect. This catch-22 situation is not consistent with the view that the Special 
Court possesses powers of review. 
5.7 Strategy 
Despite that which has been said above, the aggrieved taxpayer who wishes to bring a matter on 
review may approach the Special Court if the section provides for objection and appeal or does 
not specifically exclude objection and appeals (Transvaalse Suikerkorporasie). The latter taxpayer 
may approach the Supreme Court on the grounds of review as well (because the Supreme Court 
has inherent powers of review). Where the section specifically excludes objection and appeal, the 
aggrieved taxpayer may proceed by way of review in the Supreme Court only (Transvaalse 
Suikerkorporasie). In order to obtain a hearing before the Special Court on the grounds of review, 












Judicial intervention in the administrative law relationship is confusing. The uncertainty m 
respect of the meaning of appeal leads to anomalous results. In summary, it is submitted that 
because the Special Court is a creature of statute, it does not have review powers where the 
section of the Act is silent as to the right of objection and appeal. The latter are possessed by the 
Supreme Court. It cannot have been the intention of the legislature, that aggrieved taxpayer could 
bring a decision on review either in the Special Court or in the Supreme Court. 
5.9 Margo Commission 
The Margo Commission recommended ( 45) that in view of the number of discretionary powers 
which are vested in the Commissioner, the protection which a taxpayer has against error by the 
Commissioner in the exercise of his discretion, be strengthened by reducing the number of 
discretionary powers that are not subject to objection and appeal and making those powers that 
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6.1 Aspects of the Administrative Law relationship between the taxpayer and the Commissioner were 
examined in this thesis. This relationship was examined with reference to the remedies which a 
taxpayer has against the exercise by the Commissioner of discretionary powers. The legal effect of 
rulings was examined and it was submitted that South Africa should emulate other jurisdictions. Thus 
rulings should be binding on the Commissioner. Furthermore, the Commissioner should publish more 
practice notes and regulations. Rulings should be published provided that taxpayer anonymity is 
preserved. The doctrine of legitimate expectation was examined. This doctrine should form part of 
Revenue Law in South Africa. Equity in determining the rights of taxpayers where the Act is 
ambiguous is an indication that the Judiciary would invoke this doctrine. The acceptance of the 
doctrine of legitimate expectation means that the traditional classification of administrative powers 
serves no real purpose. 
6.2 An examination of socio political influence on Administrative Law was undertaken. These included 
such features as, racial segregation and the tricameral parliamentary system. The positivistic influence 
on Administrative Law such as the doctrine of Separation of Powers and Administrative Corporativism 
was examined. Administrative Law is greatly influenced by these factors and therefore they were 
discussed. 
6.3 The core of the Administrative Law relationship namely the issuing of assessments and the obligation 
to pay tax was examined. It was shown that naturally adversarial nature of the Administrative Law 
relationship between the Commissioner and the taxpayer meant that it was not easy to determine what 
information should be incorporated in a return. The exercise of the Commissioner's discretion is 











6.4 The role of the Judiciary in the Administrative Law relationship was examined. The uncertainty as to 
the difference between appeal and review in Revenue Lavv has had the result that the Special Court 
has arrogated the power of review where the Act is silent as to the right of objection and appeal. It was 
submitted that this power is possessed by the Supreme Court only and that the resultant uncertainty 
weakens the Judiciary and strengthens the Executive. 
6.5 The Classification of Administrative functions is unnecessary to this relationship and it should be 
relegated to a function of labelling only. This labelling should take place once the relevant 
administrative function has been examined and not before. 
6.6 The Commissioner is vested with extensive discretionary power. This is a consequence of growth of the 
omnipresent Administrative State where there is a need for such power. On the other hand, the 
taxpayer must be afforded some protection against the abuse of such power. This can be achieved by a 
combination of the following : 
(a) Acceptance of the binding nature of rulings. 
(b) Greater publicity in respect of rulings, practice notes and regulations. 
( c) Acceptance of the doctrine of Legitimate Expectation in Revenue Law. 
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